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Along with the increase in interest in civil society among Political Theorists, there 
is the growing concern with the decline in community amongst Americans. Ethnic 
communities, however, are largely excluded from this discussion, though ethnic 
minorities are often found to be quite active in their communities and civil society. 
Diversity is hailed as an ideal, and we are uncomfortable with homogeneous groups, 
especially those racially/ethnically homogeneous; and yet, ethnic communities seem to be 
thriving. Using the Korean community as a case study, the overarching question of my 
dissertation is: What can we learn about building community from the Korean American 
community? Is the Korean community incompatible with a healthy and vibrant American 
civil society? 
Through interviews and participant observation of the second and 1.5 generation 
of Korean Americans in the Washington metropolitan area, I argue that there is more than 
common ethnicity to the livelihood of the Korean community, and that the relationship 
culture, the defining of oneself and others in terms of relationships, reinforces the 
obligatory nature of relationships that are in place within this ethnic community. I further 
argue that there are serious benefits the ethnic community has provided for its members, 
and that we need not categorically be uncomfortable with ethnic homogeneity, as 
diversity is not a good in itself. I conclude by acknowledging that Korean Americans are 
at a point in time that will not be repeated, and that while we do not yet know what the 
nature of the ethnic community will be for the third and later generations of Korean 
Americans, there is a glimpse of hope for compatibility between the relationship culture 
and a healthy American civil society. 
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Civil society and ethnic communities
In recent years political theory has seen a surge in the concern for community life. 
Prominent scholars like Bellah, Putnam, and Galston, have pointed out an unfortunate 
phenomenon—Americans are partaking less in their communities and talking less to their 
fellow citizens, while hyperindividualism has become the norm and self-interest their 
dominant motive. Not all scholars agree on the sources or the remedies of this malaise, 
and for others still, not even on the very nature of the problem. The debate itself, 
however, has attracted a following, and community life in America has become a matter 
of growing significance in academia.
There is an important exception to this trend of decline, however—ethnic 
communities. If anything, ethnic communities seem to have gained vitality in the last few 
decades, in numbers as well as in degree of participation. Ethnic churches are springing 
up throughout the country,1 along with ethnic (and racial) campus associations, business 
associations, and service-oriented organizations. At the University of Maryland alone, 
there are now at least sixty “cultural associations,” from the Bangladesh Student 
Association to the Royal Scottish Country Dance at Maryland. It is also not uncommon to 
see, throughout America, public places with de facto ethnic segregation or entire towns 
where English is hardly spoken. Informal and formal channels that serve and reinforce 
cultural roots are going on in America more than ever before. And while ethnic 
communities have received much attention from sociologists and anthropologists, they 
1  See Rah 2009, and Warnock 2009, an online column aptly titled “America’s Ethnic Churches Grow 
While White Churches Struggle.” 
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have received surprisingly little from civil society scholars. 
America is clearly not the melting pot it was once proclaimed to be. The once-
popular metaphor has been long replaced by the salad bowl—rather than assimilating to 
the larger pool of “Americans”, ethnic minorities retain their cultural identities and 
practices, some more fiercely than others. Minority groups that speak their language, eat 
their food, and practice their customs and traditions, are scattered throughout the United 
States, without assimilating into the mainstream. Such trends may have been expected 
from first generation immigrants, those who immigrate as adults. The unexpected trend, 
however, is that the first generation’s children, and their children’s children, are 
voluntarily and actively keeping the ethnic communities alive. They are not assimilating
—not exactly, anyway. 
As of 2007 over 54 million Americans (roughly twenty percent) speak a language 
other than English at home, and over half of them also spoke English “very well.”2 A 
growing group of bilingual Americans are the children of immigrants—the second 
generation, who are going to be a significant part of the adult American citizenry in the 
near future, who also have primary access to a culture other than the American one. They 
attend an American university but join an ethnic student association; they attend an 
English-speaking church but the members are of one ethnicity, ethnic church though the 
preachers preach in English; they watch American football while eating their native food; 
they work for the public school system but create an ethnic PTA. The United States is 
becoming a bigger salad bowl, with bigger, and more, ingredients. 
The most logical and obvious explanation for the increase in ethnic associations is 
2  U.S. Census bureau. 2005-2007 American community survey 3-year estimates. Only includes population 
aged 5 and over. 
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simply the increase in ethnic minorities. In 1970 ethnic minorities of America numbered 
around 11 million. As of 2008 that number was 67 million, and is projected to reach 171 
million in 2050.3 As astounding as these figures are, however, numbers alone do not 
create a community. It takes more than a group of people with a common ancestry to 
create and sustain a “spirit of community,” and assuming so would be grossly 
oversimplifying the inner-workings of communities in general, ethnic or non. 
Furthermore, the growth in populations also does not mean that all ethnic communities 
have the same patterns and trends. A close look into what keeps ethnic communities alive 
requires a more concentrated, but comparative, focus. 
We have a vast and complex literature on American civil society—its history, its 
apparent recent demise, possible causes and effects, and countless follow-up rebuttals and 
exceptions. Within this literature, however, there is an unease with ethnic associations or 
ethnic communities. No one denies that a common ethnicity can be a powerful tool for 
community-building, but no serious scholar is portraying ethnic communities as the ideal 
place to do so. Mark E. Warren worries that ethnic associations alone are not enough to 
produce democratic citizens;4 Amy Gutmann claims heterogeneous associations are more 
conducive to democratic citizenship;5 Nancy Rosenblum calls for a “habitual disregard” 
for ethnic differences.6 Civil society scholars often treat ethnic communities as outliers, a 
few steps behind or even backwards, cramping the ideal vision of civil society in a liberal 
democracy. Will Kymlicka, most known for his liberal theory on minority rights, sums 
up, “[T]here’s not much enthusiasm for ethnic associations... whereas associational life in 
3  U.S. Census bureau. All figures calculated using: total population minus non-hispanic whites and non-
hispanic blacks. Projection made in an August 2008 report. 
4  Warren 2001, Chapter 7.  
5  Gutmann 1998, 25. 
6  Rosenblum 1998, 332, 351.
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general is commended as helping to produce solidarity and trust, multiculturalist support 
for ethnic groups is increasingly decried as helping to produce balkanization, tribalization 
and the ‘disuniting of America.’”7 
Even fewer civil society scholars bother to look closely into existing ethnic 
communities, to see if they do, in fact, disunite America or fail to produce democratic 
citizens—or, to see if ethnic communities actually provide a genuine community which 
so many Americans are without, and perhaps even ameliorate minorities’ integration into 
the larger society. Despite their growing populations and their apparent advantage in 
building social capital, ethnic communities are largely excluded from the civil society 
debate. And when they do make an appearance, they are usually lumped together and 
uneasily danced around.  
This is not entirely the fault of political scientists; extreme specialization of 
modern academia has essentially pushed anything involving ethnicity to minority or 
“cultural” studies. In fact, we have a swelling literature on the respective ethnic 
communities of America—their demographics, their norms, their generational shifts and 
conflicts, their educational and occupational trends, etc. However, by giving each ethnic 
group special attention, ethnic communities are often treated like their own little worlds, 
as if they are so unique that they couldn’t possibly contribute to a broader (Western?) 
literature. The majority of such works seem to say, “This is what we are like,” which only 
perpetuates the “them” and “us,” prematurely cutting off potential dialogue between the 
disciplines. 
In the 1990s a series called The New Americans was published, with books titled 
South Asian Americans, The Cuban Americans, The Korean Americans, etc. Each work 
7  Kymlicka 1998, 177. 
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is a detailed description of the particular group, written by respective “experts,” and the 
series is intended to “introduce these groups to the rest of America.” In 2005 a book titled 
Multiculturalism in the United States was published, with each chapter titled after an 
ethnic group—Polish Americans, Scandinavian Americans, Vietnamese Americans, etc. 
These works, and many others, follow this pattern of categorizing by ethnicity—this is 
what makes them different. And while there is a place for such specialization, it is hardly 
sufficient to end there. If ethnic communities are just about them, what could we possibly 
have to do with them? It is no wonder civil society scholars have little to say about ethnic 
communities. 
What we don’t have enough of is what one body of literature has to do with the 
other, what particular ethnic communities have to do with the American civil society. It is 
as if the two are talking about two different worlds, and both bear responsibility for 
treating minority groups like permanent foreigners. But in actuality they are both very 
interested in America, or more specifically, community life in America. If political 
theorists are concerned with rebuilding community, rebuilding social capital, and 
revitalizing civil society, they must look into the particular communities that are doing 
just that, and look for lessons that can be applied elsewhere. They must also take 
seriously the hostilities between ethnic and racial boundaries, and refrain from 
unequivocally idealizing diversity. Likewise, sociologists and ethnic studies scholars 
ought to take seriously the more general concerns of theorists and work to make 
meaningful ties between practice and theory. They must also refrain from ignoring 
potential harms of racial/ethnic segregation, but address and, where necessary, correct 
them. Even if the forest and the trees cannot be looked at simultaneously, that is no 
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reason to forget the connection between the two. 
It is worth noting here that I do not begin by taking a normative stance on ethnic 
associations or ethnic communities. I reject the assumption that ethnic communities (or 
even “enclaves”, which is almost always used in a negative light) inherently breed 
ethnocentrism, racism and balkanization, or that they disrupt the vision of an American 
community life. These are valid concerns that must be taken seriously, but there is no 
good reason to oppose outright any and all ethnic communities and ethnically 
homogeneous groups, or to praise any and all heterogeneous groups. That being said, 
there is also no good reason to unconditionally prefer segregated ethnic communities over 
assimilation, to preserve the salad bowl and burn the melting pot. The simple argument 
here is that looking into a particular ethnic community may shed light on the American 
community life, even if it is what not to do, and we need not be so resistant to such an 
approach in academia.   
The purpose
One aim of this dissertation is to create a small bridge between existing ethnic 
communities and the civil society literature by using the case of the Korean American 
community. The overarching question that will guide this work is: How does the Korean 
American community reshape our understanding of civil society? Focusing on the 
children of first generation immigrants, Korean Americans who essentially grow up in 
two different worlds, I will attempt to show that the ethnic community must be included 
in the American civil society discussion—not as an exception or an anomaly, but as a 
useful case study for community-building. Though easier said than done, my goal is to 
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use a case without limiting the findings to the case, tell the story of a group without it 
being reduced to a mere story. And it is my hope that more small bridges will be built 
between mainstream society and various particular communities, ethnic and non, to avoid 
the pitfall of excessive specialization where only the experts chime in. 
Another broad hope of this work is to bridge practice and theory. Theorists are 
often criticized for being out of touch with the real world, which is a valid criticism that 
demands redress. We can speculate all we want on how to revive American community 
life, but if there are completely different ways this is being done by fellow Americans, we 
ought to revisit the theory. This is actually the starting point of this work—as I became 
more familiar with the civil society literature, I realized that the Korean American 
community does not fit its “logic,” and I can only assume that there must be more of such 
cases. It is my hope that as more empirical research is conducted, theory will become 
more refined, and raise the questions that matter for today and tomorrow’s civil society.  
It will be quite obvious that I lean towards communitarianism. I do believe that 
the disappearance of communities is a serious matter that ought to bother our minds, and 
I am encouraged by the many cross-disciplinary works, scholarly and non, that express a 
similar concern while offering ideas of remedy.8 I see ethnic communities as a valuable 
resource that could potentially enlighten us on how we may go about recovering the 
fabric of our American community life. 
Why Korean Americans? 
8  Among many, one inspiring and encouraging recent work is Mark R. Warren’s Dry Bones Rattling. By 
using the case study of the IAF (Industrial Areas Foundation) network, Warren points to which 
conventional beliefs on community-building hold true and which need revisiting, and which new lessons 
need to be introduced. Warren delves deep into the realities of this group, warts and all, and manages to 
glean theoretical implications from it, in a manner that is both timely and cross-disciplinary. I hope to do 
the same.
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No two ethnic communities are alike. The Korean American community is one I 
have access to, and one that I believe offers a fitting comparative challenge to the 
Western literature, precisely because it is an ethnic community that seems very exclusive. 
There are now well over one million Koreans living in the United States, with the 
heaviest immigration period having passed in the 1970s and 1980s. While some do return 
to Korea, for the overwhelming majority of immigrants and their children, America is 
their permanent home. Young Korean Americans are quickly becoming citizens, workers, 
professionals, and parents of America. And while a revival of ethnic identity is often 
attributed to the first and third generations, skipping the second (who often seek to 
assimilate), Korean Americans seem to have a second generation that is unusually active 
in maintaining ethnic solidarity.9 
Korean Americans are not the biggest Asian group in America,10 but their 
solidarity has certainly helped make their mark as an immigrant group, going beyond 
patterns like small-business ownership, priority of education, and the impact of the 
church. In a work celebrating 100 years since 102 Korean workers first migrated to the 
U.S. in 1903, Okyun Kwon noted, “[T]he Korean community is one of the most well-
organized communities in many respects. Unlike other multi-ethnic and multi-lingual 
Asian nationalities… Koreans maintain a single ethnic and monolingual tendency, which 
makes them much easier to keep ethnic solidarity after immigration.”11 Even in a work 
that studied Chinese Americans alongside Korean Americans, two immigrant groups that 
9  Communitarian Amitai Etzioni wrote, “In recent decades a measure of return to community has 
benefited from the revival of loyalty to ethnic groups. While the sons and daughters of immigrants, the 
so-called second generation, often sought to assimilate, to become Americanized to the point that their 
distinct backgrounds were lost in a new identity, their children, the third generation and onward, often 
seek to reestablish their ethnic identity and bonds.” Etzioni 1993, 120. 
10  As of 2000, Koreans rank 5th in Asian American populations. The top four, from the first, are Chinese, 
Flipino, Indian, and Vietnamese. Census 2000. 
11  Kwon 2004, 256. 
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perhaps have the most in common, the author found, “the family ethnic contexts of 
Korean Americans to be, in general, more self-consciously and actively ‘ethnic’ than 
those of their Chinese American counterparts.”12
This ethnic solidarity can be characterized as bonding as opposed to bridging, in 
Putnam’s terms. Bonding social capital, according to Putnam, is good for mobilizing 
solidarity, and can provide social and psychological support for members of the 
community.13 Korean Americans seem to be quite good at bonding, and though bonding 
is a simple enough concept, there are many complex ways bonding can occur. In other 
words, it is not only common ancestry or the common immigrant experience that 
facilitates bonding. A look into how Korean Americans build community and what kinds 
of bonds they form can challenge conventional (Western) wisdom, and can be useful for 
exploring new ways to build community throughout mainstream America. 
Of course, too much bonding and not enough bridging is exactly the source of the 
unease around ethnic communities. In fact, even Korean American scholars like Kwon 
express an ambivalence towards the self-segregating tendency of Korean Americans—
their organization and self-help skills are impressive, but not being well-integrated into 
American society perpetuates exclusivity, raising alerts of ethnocentrism and racism. If 
such alerts are valid, this is no trivial matter. Korean Americans are not refugees or 
national minorities, in Will Kymlicka’s terms. They immigrate voluntarily and regard the 
U.S. as their new home. I am not suggesting that Korean Americans are completely 
isolated in their ethnic community (they’re not) or that they don’t ever bridge across 
ethnic lines (they do). They are, however, relatively more self-segregating than other 
12  Kibria 2002, 45.
13  Putnam 2000, 22. 
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ethnic communities, and they admit as much. The point is that the story need not end 
there. Why is this the case? Why do they self-segregate? Is ethnic segregation, indeed, 
“behind” the civil society vision? What makes bridging across racial and ethnic lines 
more or less likely? If we want to know more about building social capital, both bonding 
and bridging, Korean Americans can be a useful case—even if (especially if) some of the 
lessons are of what not to do. 
 Korean Americans are the subjects of this work, but there will be many 
similarities between them and other ethnic minorities. Though it is beyond the scope of 
this work to compare and contrast the Korean community to other ethnic communities, 
they are just as deserving of attention. They, too, need to be explored and tied to the 
American civil society debate—together they make up a great part of the existing 
American community life. This work is not intended to be a model for ethnic 
communities, but to provide a push for the on-going probing of what particular 
communities, ethnic and non, have to contribute to the civil society literature. 
Method
My formal research began in early 2009, but my informal participant observation 
has been going on for about two decades. I immigrated with my family from Korea at age 
eight, and I have lived in the greater Washington metropolitan area since, which ranks 
third in Korean population size.14 I have been well-connected to the Korean community, 
particularly through the ethnic church, which is a typical and well-documented route for 
Korean Americans. Using all connections available to me, I conducted in-depth 
14  The metropolitan area with the largest Korean population is Los Angeles, and the second is New 
York/New Jersey. 
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interviews with twenty-five Korean Americans, all at least age twenty-five, either born in 
the U.S. (second generation) or immigrated before age thirteen (1.5 generation).15 All of 
the interviews were conducted in English, with occasional Korean words and phrases. 
They lasted between one to three hours, and took place in homes and coffee shops. All 
interviews were recorded and transcribed. 
The overall goal in interviews was to focus on two questions—one, how do 
informants feel about and/or act in their ethnic community? And two, how do informants 
feel about and/or act regarding ethnic diversity? I made the effort to arrive at informants’ 
attitude toward and as well as their actual involvement, in both their ethnic community 
and its relationship with the larger American civil society. I typically began by asking 
factual background questions, then moving on to past or current involvement with the 
Korean community—Are you a member of any particular Korean associations? How 
much of your social circle is Korean? How does your association resolve conflicts that 
arise? And how do you feel about that? Then, I asked about their views on the Korean 
community in America—Should Korean Americans be less segregated? Do you think 
your involvement in the ethnic community keeps you from participating in the American 
society? And do you actively seek diversity/integration in your life? Of course, I could 
not anticipate in advance the direction of any of the interviews, and most of the questions 
I ended up asking were follow-up questions. No two interviews were alike, in content, 
order, or organization, and putting together the information and extracting patterns was 
perhaps the most challenging part of the research. Nevertheless, conducting the 
interviews was very enjoyable, though a great deal of what was said by my informants 
15  The 1.5 generation refers to those who immigrated as a child. There is no scholarly consensus on the age 
range that immigration must occur in order to be considered 1.5, but I am following the work of Mary Yu 
Danico (2004), which defines 1.5 generation as those who immigrated before age thirteen.
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never made it into the work. I began to understand the scholars who stick to reporting the 
facts—there is so much information there as it is.16 
Korean Americans are not exactly hard to find, but it is a challenge to get to know 
them. They are not likely to talk openly with a stranger, much less a researcher, or to 
invite one to observe their daily lives. But once a connection is made, perhaps through a 
mutual acquaintance, (my being Korean American was indispensable here), the 
informants were very welcoming and helpful. Once I made a few contacts, it was 
relatively easy to meet more through the snowballing effect, and those who agreed to be 
interviewed were usually eager to cooperate. Most expressed concern about being “fit” or 
“having good answers” for the interview, and afterwards, more casual conversations and 
invitations to dinner were not uncommon.17 
I excluded first generation Korean immigrants from the research primarily 
because their integration into American society is more or less at a standstill. Difficulties 
with English and other American norms, along with grueling work schedules and the 
perpetual minority complex, tend to leave the first generation with little desire and even 
less choice to socialize with anyone but fellow Koreans.18 Their hardships are well-
documented, and these patterns certainly have an impact on their children, but lifestyles 
of the first generation rarely pass to their children in the same form. And because the 
concern here is the American civil society, its future and its potential partakers, the first 
generation’s children and their new set of circumstances are much more revealing. 
I decided fairly early on in my research that interviews would not be sufficient. 
The formal interview setting (no matter how cozy one tries to make it) always has its 
16  See Research Appendix for more details. 
17  See similar reports in Hurh 1998 and Pak 2006. 
18  See Min 1995, Chapter 8. 
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limits, and as Koreans will admit, they are very good at saying what they are supposed to 
say. Furthermore, much of the most interesting and important dynamics in any 
community are not explicitly pointed out, and I found interviews to be lacking in 
uncovering those. In order to catch more patterns of norms and spontaneous speech, I had 
to be as much a participant as an observer, which was limiting and agenda-setting at the 
same time. I could only participate in things that I potentially could in my real life, as a 
single, 1.5 Korean American female in her twenties, who attends graduate school. Given 
these traits, I made the commitment to partake in as many gatherings as I can, formal and 
informal, and I became quite social once the research began. I visited churches, joined 
small groups, and attended gatherings of various sorts, from birthday parties to PTA 
meetings—often invited by an interviewee. For comparison purposes, the associations 
and small groups I attended were a combination of Korean and those ethnically diverse. 
Some were more fruitful than others, and some considerably more enjoyable than others. 
As any participant observer knows, everything is data, and much seemingly-wasted time 
needs to be spent before significant data unexpectedly appears. 
Being Korean American, and having spent most of my life in the Washington 
area, it was nearly impossible to keep my research completely separated from my life. In 
many ways, the Korean community is “my community,” and it was never my intention to 
approach the research as an outsider looking in, as that would be both impossible and 
undesirable. Though the majority of my research subjects and all of the in-depth 
interviewees were people I did not previously know, many were reached through mutual 
acquaintances, and still others were later discovered to be a friend of a friend of a friend. 
On one occasion this happened at a Korean church to my surprise, to which a Korean 
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American causally responded, “Don’t you know all Koreans are connected somehow?” 
As Chapters Two and Three will highlight, Korean Americans have a tight-knit 
community all their own, their norms and taboos, their insiders and outsiders. I do not 
claim to paint the most objective portrayal of the Korean American community, but I 
believe I provide a unique perspective as a participant/researcher, insider/outsider. With 
every meeting and interview, the trick was to get the distance right. I quickly realized 
how useful it is to be bicultural and bilingual for an ethnographic research, and I was 
mostly able to flow through the member/researcher boundary with ease, facing the 
occasional “You’re Korean, you must know what I’m talking about,” followed by my, 
“Can you try to explain anyway?” When informants asked for my opinion, I gave it 
briefly but honestly, quickly returning to their point of view, though for some interviews 
sharing on my part was necessary to set the ease of a conversational tone. 
To be sure, not all 1.5/second generation Korean Americans are a part of the 
Korean community. There are many who explicitly reject it, and deliberately associate 
only with non-Koreans. It may seem as though I am over-generalizing an entire ethnic 
population, and I do at times refer to “Korean Americans” without meaning all of them. 
My subject here, however, is not Korean Americans in general, but the Korean American 
community, which essentially excludes those who are not and/or don’t consider 
themselves a part of the community. (Plus, those who are not a part of the Korean 
community are less likely to volunteer to be interviewed, though a few did, warning me 
of their lack of participation in the community.) That being said, it seems safe to assume 
there are more Korean Americans inside the community than outside of it, particularly in 
this geographical location, and why there are relatively few who opt out is certainly a part 
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of the overarching question of this project. 
Beyond the association
The associational life has attracted enough interest to spawn its own body of 
literature. In fact, voluntary associations are what many of us think of when we hear the 
words civil society. First observed by Alexis de Tocqueville, who is regarded a founder 
of sorts by civil society scholars, associations alone can bring citizens out of their private 
cocoons and bring them together in the public life, creating “reciprocal action of men 
upon one another.” 19 Though hardly the explicit purpose of associations, it is their by-
products that make associations so significant to a democratic society, ultimately 
renewing sentiments and ideas, enlarging the heart, and developing the human mind. As 
“civil society” became a buzz word in the 1970s and 1980s, the significance of 
associations also became magnified, and the civil society literature began treating the 
associational life as a special realm, often designated as the “third sector” that serves 
more or less as the middle arena between two other sectors with dominating tendencies—
between market and state, family and nation, private and public. 
A subgroup of contemporary civil society scholars echo Tocquevillian sentiments, 
appropriately referred to as the civic culture school. This school of thought talks about 
the skills, characters and habits that individuals develop by participating in voluntary 
associations, and it has become widely accepted that “civil society is seen as a school of 
virtue where men and women develop the dispositions essential to liberal democracy.”20 
Today’s associational life is unlike anything during Tocqueville’s time, but the renewed 
19  Tocqueville 2000, 491. 
20  Rosenblum 1998, 26. 
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interest in associational life has revived the scope with which Tocqueville looked at 
associations. It is the middle ground, the place that draws private citizens out of their 
private homes, out into the buzzing public life, which a healthy democracy requires. The 
idea here is that participating in voluntary associations builds civic virtue, interacting 
with different people builds an individual’s tolerance, talking out details to arrive at a 
common goal builds an individual’s deliberative skills—this strengthens the character of 
the citizenry, ultimately strengthening the democratic landscape. 
Therefore, Robert Putnam, perhaps the most widely-read neo-Tocquevillian of 
our time, has argued that Americans’ drop in associational life in the last few decades 
ought to raise an alarm. Because associations serve as the central place for many 
Americans’ source of connecting to one another and thus building social capital, the 
decline in associational life could be the beginnings of isolationism—the potential 
nightmare in a democracy. Inviting widespread agreement, criticism, and perhaps most 
importantly, further research, the associational life in the twenty-first century is attracting 
much attention from political theorists. The tendency to address the associational life 
separately, however, has not been without serious drawbacks. The literature is not so 
much inaccurate, but for one, there is some dwelling on the less significant questions—
for instance, the defining and categorizing of associations (What constitutes an 
association? What constitutes a good association? Must it be voluntary? Does the purpose 
matter? Decision-making processes? Size? Geography?)—which makes the mistake of 
overlooking the inner-workings of particular associations, in addition to the mistake of 
missing the larger implications of associations on society at large and vice versa. 
There are also the more liberal-minded scholars, like Nancy Rosenblum and Amy 
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Guttmann, who ask different questions altogether, but give associations special attention 
as well. For them, the voluntary nature is what really counts—the freedom of association 
exercised by autonomous individuals takes priority, in terms of entering, exiting, and 
everything in between. They argue it is impossible to normatively generalize about 
associations, and that certainly, not all associations are good, and furthermore, that a 
good association to one man is not necessarily to another. Rosenblum warns, “So I 
caution against the unwarranted assumption that the effects of an association on members 
can be predicted on the basis of a group’s formal purpose or system of internal 
governance. The moral valence of group life is indeterminate.” She continues, “That is 
why I emphasize the dynamic of association, pointing out that forming, joining, schism, 
and disassociation are as much a part of freedom of association as the solidity of 
identification and belonging.”21 The experience of pluralism is what counts, perhaps even 
the only thing that can be counted, and the temptation to make general normative 
conclusions about the associational life should be resisted.22 
The more communitarian-minded scholars (Amitai Etzioni, Michael Sandel, Mary 
Ann Glendon) try not to get caught up in the heuristics of what we broadly call civil 
society, while generously making normative claims, often to the horror of liberals. What 
voluntary associations look like and how academics categorize them may be important, 
but for communitarians, the good association cannot be a topic totally separate from the 
good family, church, and school—much of which is not voluntary, nor an association. 
The community, which encapsulates all of these separate but overlapping institutions, is 
the preferred term, as the term itself includes but does not equal something as concrete as 
21  Rosenblum 1998, 8, 17. 
22  Rosenblum, however, is not promoting isolationism, nor is that my suggestion. She promotes some form 
of association or group life over anomic individualism. 
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a voluntary association. (It is worth noting that Putnam considers the extended family a 
potential form of social capital, along with the church, the choir group, and the 
neighborhood, though he clearly pays more attention to concrete voluntary 
associations.)23 
In this sense, my work most resembles the outlook of communitarians—I see civil 
society as a much more interconnected place. This is not to suggest that there is no place 
for the voluntary association in the study of civil society, or to deny that the concrete 
nature of associations, with definite meetings, positions, and vision statements, make 
them easier to study than the elusive nature of communities. In fact, I began the research 
with plans to research Korean associations, but it became clear that what makes Korean 
associations tick is utterly inseparable from what makes Korean families and Korean 
communities tick. Thus, while more complex, the scope of the research here will go 
beyond the concrete association. 
Outline
The driving theme throughout this work is that we can learn something about 
community-building from the Korean American community. The Korean American 
community makes up “civil society” differently from how Western works have 
constituted the topic, and this work is an attempt to reveal those dimensions. The chapters 
have been divided according to the different aspects and the (follow-up) questions about 
civil society that the Korean American community raises. The first two chapters look 
more closely into what keeps the Korean community going, and the remaining chapters 
more so at what a flourishing Korean community means for the American civil society. 
23  Putnam 2000, 21. 
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Chapters One and Two highlight the “relationship culture” that Koreans have 
been noted for, and how it facilitates community-building. The relationship culture is not 
a term used in academia to specifically refer to Korean Americans,24 but the notion that 
relationships are central to the Korean culture is well documented. I argue that a key 
factor in Korean Americans’ solidarity is their tendency to see themselves and others in 
terms of relationships, to use the language of relationships, which may be more difficult 
in an equality- and autonomy- idealizing society. Tocqueville is a key figure in the first 
two chapters, as he was the first to warn that conditions of equality can lay the 
groundwork for isolation among a citizenry. I further argue that the language of the 
relationship culture is largely habitual and considered “normal,” which demands a re-
focusing of how important the “voluntary” nature of an association is. 
Chapter Three considers what kind of community the Korean American 
community is, and I argue that the classification of a good community versus a bad one is 
a fruitless one. No community is always pleasant, and the Korean community contains 
elements which are inherent to group life of all kinds, elements that can be both good or 
bad. I argue that we need to be honest about the inevitable costs of communitarianism as 
opposed to adopting a wholly optimistic approach, looking into particular communities 
rather than measuring them with a universal standard. I further consider “civility,” and 
how the trendy word is not quite fitting for the Korean community, since civility is a 
virtue among strangers, and strangers Korean Americans are not.  
Chapter Four, titled What’s So Great About Diversity?, addresses the valid 
concerns of ethnocentrism, racism, balkanization in and around an ethnic community. I 
consider the multilayered narrative of Korean Americans’ experience as a minority that 
24  For one, see Choi et al. 1993, a work in Psychology. 
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confirms the unfortunate fact that diversity has a negative effect on participation.25 
However, I also point out the very real benefits of an ethnic community, and what being 
“Korean” means to Korean Americans, and argue that diversity is not an end worth 
seeking in and of itself. 
Chapter Five concludes by considering the bridging that needs to be done within 
the Korean community, particularly between generations, though they may seem 
sufficiently homogeneous from an outsider’s perspective. I raise the role of the 1.5 
generation in the process of bridging, and how bridging within is required to improve and 
sustain the Korean community, as third and fourth generations of Korean Americans are 
born and raised. 




“In centuries of equality all men are independent of one another, isolated and weak…” 
(Alexis de Tocqueville. Democracy in America.)
The relationship culture
Dain is a 28-year-old second generation Korean American, who works full time 
Monday through Friday as an accountant and spends his weekends working at his father’s 
car wash business. When asked how he feels about this arrangement, he shrugs and 
replies, “I’m the older one. … There are times when I’m like ‘Augh, I’m tired,’ but 
overall, no regrets. I mean, I do it because I want to, no one forces me to do what I do. 
My parents would never tell me to do anything.” 
Charles is a 32-year-old dentist, a Korean American 1.5er, who immigrated when 
he was eight. Describing his job, he says, “It’s nice, I’m the boss…. It only works 
because we respect each other, the boundaries that we have. For example, if I say ‘Let’s 
do it this way,’ my team member shouldn’t say, ‘I don’t want to do it that way.’” 
Dain and Charles demonstrate the relationship culture in everyday life, where who 
you are is who you are to others. The relational role, such as son, boss, colleague, friend, 
all of which by definition assume a relationship with another human being, is the primary 
form of identification of oneself and others; while independent roles that can stand alone
—man, 30-year-old, bowler, Buddhist—play a smaller part in defining the person. 
Relationships are regarded more highly than individuality, and an individual’s behavior is 
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understood and explained in terms of his part in his relationships, whether it be in the 
home, the workplace, society, or the nation. At home he is a brother, at work an 
employee, at church a congregation member, at a restaurant a diner, at the polling booth a 
voter, and so on. He is never a completely isolated being, even when he is technically 
alone—he is in some kind of relationship, at all times and in all settings. He has a 
relationship with his fellow citizens and his local representatives, just as he has a 
relationship with his parents and siblings. The nature of the relationships, of course, 
varies, but the fact that he is in some kind of relationship is constant. 
Because the relationship culture sees relationships as the driving force in all areas 
of life, civil society is not a separate arena where an individual acquires skills and virtues 
that he cannot acquire elsewhere. It, too, places the individual in a myriad of 
relationships, just as the family and the nation do. He can and most likely does acquire 
skills and virtue from his networks, but they are primarily relational—he learns to be a 
member of an association, a player of a team, an attendee of a meeting. He does not 
merely learn how to listen, deliberate in public, and write letters—he learns how to listen 
to leaders, deliberate with newcomers, and write to elders. He learns how to be in a 
group, how to lead, how to follow, who to deliberate with and when. 
For most of us, family is the first and most foundational network of relationships, 
the first place where the relationship culture is practiced, and some (such as Confucians) 
even say that all human relationships ought to be modeled after the family.26 While the 
family is central to the making of the relationship culture, as it will be obvious throughout 
this work, the more important societal and political implication of the relationship culture 
is that it extends beyond the family. The constant reminder and reinforcement of one’s 
26  I purposely do not equate Confucianism with the relationship culture. See Chapter 2 for explanation. 
22
various relationships work to keep his networks, family and others, lively and intact. And 
thus the relationship culture, where individuals see and approach one other as related, is 
what keeps the Korean American community flourishing. It is not merely the work of 
common interests such as language, food, customs, or even the acknowledged 
commonality of being Korean—they certainly play a part, but it takes more than 
commonalities to sustain a community. 
I am not making an ontological claim with the relationship culture. That debate, 
of whether human beings are embedded and relational, or isolated and autonomous, has 
been unrealistically polarized by communitarians and liberals, respectively.27 If pressed to 
choose between the two camps, the relationship culture is closer to the former, but more 
meaningful by far for the relationship culture is the recognition of one’s obligatory 
relationships, which is more of an ideal than a truth claim. In other words, it is not merely 
that Korean Americans see themselves in relationships and communities, but that such an 
acknowledgment provides a language and a rationale for what they do, and more 
importantly, what they ought to do. 
In turn, and this is a point often overlooked, just as the acknowledgment of 
relational beings makes relationships more likely, the acknowledgment of isolated beings 
makes isolation more likely. This is the problem with the Rational Choice camp—not so 
much that it is inaccurate, but that it may become accurate, a self-fulfilling prophecy that 
justifies its own claims. And thus it is not the ontological fact of isolated or relational 
self, but the practical outcomes (by-products?) of such assumptions, that have major 
implications for our real-life communities. 
27  “But in the end I shall not simply side with either MacIntyre or his opponents. I want rather to move 
altogether beyond the debate between those called communitarians and liberals.” Stout 1988, 220. This 
excerpt is from Chapter 10, which in its entirety is an impressive critique on the debate. 
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The assumption of individuals as isolated and autonomous has been enjoying 
leverage in the social sciences for decades. To be fair, this is not very surprising—the 
West, relatively speaking, prioritizes individualism, and Political Science as a discipline 
is undeniably dominated by the West. Thus, political scientists’ tendency to envision 
autonomous, isolated individuals is understandable, but it is by no means an acceptable 
permanent assumption of the discipline. In a recent and admirable work, Dry Bones  
Rattling, Mark R. Warren (not to be confused with Mark E. Warren) directly confronts 
the individual-focused approach that dominates civil society literature: “[O]ur 
understanding of civic education itself is often quite narrow in its focus on individual 
skill acquisition.”28 He continues, “In one of the most important studies of civic 
participation, conducted by Sidney Verba and his associates, relevant skills for 
participation included the ability to write letters, run meetings, and speak in public.” 
Social science often treats the collective as merely an aggregate of individuals, and the 
effects of collective settings as merely effects on the individual—as if a skill or habit 
acquired in a group is transmitted to the participating individual, which he then possesses 
as his own. 
A principal claim of Warren’s work is that relationships are the building blocks of 
communities, and ultimately, a healthy democracy. Studying the famous Industrial Areas 
Foundation (IAF) in Texas, Warren observes, “The people who enter politics through 
religious congregations are not the disconnected individuals appealed to by our political 
parties. Rather, they are members embedded in congregations and immersed in 
community relationships.”29 Individuals are church members and neighbors before they 
28  Warren, Mark R. 2001, 237. 
29  Warren, Mark R. 2001, 22. 
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enter the IAF—in fact, the pre-existing relationship is what makes them likely to join a 
political organization together. And once a group forms, Warren notes, IAF members are 
intensely engaged in the very time-consuming relationship-building that is at the heart of 
the IAF’s success. 
Of course, simply having an acquaintance isn’t necessarily a good thing, and 
neither is simply joining a group. And Warren does not get very specific about what 
kinds of relationships exist prior to the IAF, or what kinds of relationships are being built 
in the IAF—it is as if relationships simply refer to people getting acquainted with one 
another, knowing one another, caring about one another. However, relationships come in 
all shapes and forms, and the various particular relationships, as such, deserve more 
focused attention in the civil society discussion. 
In the relationship culture, relationships do much more than put individuals in 
touch and create networks. The particular relationship an individual finds himself in 
defines his expectations and responsibilities, and the fulfillment of those expectations and 
responsibilities reinforces that relationship. Recall the earlier example of Charles—as the 
boss, much of the decision-making was his responsibility, and maintaining the boundaries 
as “the dentist” and “team member” was what made for a satisfying workplace. It is 
probably safe to assume that much of his dental school education was not about human 
relations, but the particular relationships he, as the dentist, had with others, provided the 
rationale for the ethics of the workplace. 
I am not suggesting that Americans are opposed to relationships or communities. 
The raise in alarm for the decline of community in America has spawned some serious 
community-building movements, in academia and beyond. I am also not suggesting that 
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there is no relationship culture in America. Sociologists (and others) argue that the 
defining of oneself in terms of relationships and roles is absolutely everywhere. There is, 
however, a dimension that is often overlooked, and that is the dynamics between 
relationship-building and the rhetoric of equality. Largely considered a fundamental 
American principle, equality has historically been invoked in the name of improving 
society, including relationships and communities, and it is rather inequality or hierarchy 
that falls under suspicion. However, the relationship culture found among Korean 
Americans demonstrates that hierarchical relationships can be the building blocks to 
communities, more specifically, to building obligatory relationships, by making each 
relational role more recognizable. 
English as the language of equals
In all of my interviews I asked, “How are Koreans different from Americans?” 
There were many common answers, but one that all respondents touched on was “the 
respect thing,” “respect for adults,” or some version thereof. I then asked what that 
meant, to which one informant said, “Americans are all friends. There’s no above and 
below. They’re all ‘ya’”—ya roughly translates as “hey,” an informal greeting only 
acceptable between equals, friends, or close acquaintances. Another informant, Brooke, 
described the “regular American culture” as “more of an equal society, whereas in 
Korean society you’re supposed to respect the adults.” Brooke was not implying that she 
herself is not an adult (or that Americans are taught to disrespect adults). But Brooke 
referred to anyone older (usually parents’ generation and older) as “adults,” which is 
quite telling—at twenty-seven, Brooke is an adult too, but she didn’t see herself quite in 
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the same category as “the adults,” or as another informant put it, “the adult-adults.” 
Rubin noted equality as a mark of Americanization, specifically referring to 
language as a key indication.30 Comparing the Korean Ministry to the English Ministry 
within his church, he said, “If you’re in the English Ministry side, even if you’re thirty, 
forty years old, it’s ‘Hey Sue,’ ‘What’s up,’ you get no respect.” In other words, the more 
Americanized one becomes, the more likely he is to treat and be treated, speak and be 
spoken to, as an equal. This is not a phenomenon only Koreans notice. As P.M. Forni, 
author of Choosing Civility notes, “People from other parts of the world are often taken 
aback by the prevalence of informality and familiarity in American social interaction.”31 
Brooke and Rubin didn’t go so far as to pass judgment on this difference, but they, like 
many informants, expressed their fondness (not necessarily preference) of the “Korean 
way” of showing respect to the elder. Some referred to the biblical command of 
respecting elders, and others claimed they simply want to be polite. Whatever their 
explanation, and considering how long they have lived in America, my informants had 
not yet adapted (or assimilated) to what they see as the culture of equality. 
The use of the word “respect” has a specific meaning here. It refers to a form of 
elevating of others, whether according to age, status, or some other vertical measure. The 
implication is not that there cannot be respect between equals, but that an elevating 
respect is not the norm in American society. Language is what most informants use as an 
example, though language is certainly not the only way to display elevating respect—
there are countless rules on how to treat the elder in traditional Korean customs, from 
30  Rubin is a 1.5er in his early forties. He is the Associate Pastor of a Korean American church in Ellicott 
City, Maryland, where Koreans are the third largest racial/ethnic group only after white and black. (As of 
2007, Koreans made up five percent of the Ellicott City population, at 3,080. Total population: 61,616. 
City-data.com.) 
31  Forni 2002, 161. 
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turning one’s face away from the elder when drinking, to waiting for the elder to pick up 
his utensils before eating. Language, however, is the most explicit and obvious form of 
showing what my informants call respect, and it offers an especially stark contrast to 
English, or rather, the American language. 
Some Korean Americans use language to deliberately reinforce the norms of a 
hierarchical relationship in order to prevent it from slipping into an equal one. Joyce 
referred to her relationship with Hannah, who is three years older, as one between unnie 
and dongseng.32 Unnie means “older sister” but commonly refers to any older female 
acquaintance, and dongseng means “younger sibling” and commonly refers to any 
younger acquaintance. They met at church when Joyce was in college and she recalled 
consciously deciding to speak to Hannah in jondemal—the honorific form of the Korean 
language, which is usually reserved for speaking “up.” She said, 
I’m sure a lot of people can have really good unnie-dongseng relationships by 
having that friend-level. But because I like Hannah unnie and I really respect her, 
I wanted to make sure that shows in the way I talk to her, too. She told me I don’t 
have to, but I said no. [Is it just because she’s older?] No. Actually, Hannah unnie 
was also already married. I think that has a lot to do with it. So it’s also status. 
Plus, she has a kid now. So now she’s somebody’s mother and wife. And that 
made me view her at a higher level. Not a better person, but a higher level. 
At the core of Joyce’s decision is displaying the behavior and using the language that she 
deems appropriate for this particular relationship. Joyce’s choice to speak to Hannah in 
jondemal is unusual (because it is a norm that doesn’t require conscientious decision-
making), but preferring a hierarchical relationship to an equal one is not uncommon. This 
is what Korean Americans have in mind when they talk about the respect difference 
32  Joyce is twenty-eight and Hannah is thirty-one. They are both 1.5ers.
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between the two cultures. It is not that Americans are anti-relationships, but there is a 
resistance of hierarchical relationships, perhaps with the assumption that the more 
intimate the relationship, the more egalitarian it ought to be. On the contrary, for Korean 
Americans, an unequal relationship does not necessarily imply distance or stiff formality. 
Joyce said, “Sometimes, the closer you are, you need to show even more respect.” 
The crucial part is what follows the language. For Joyce, the language was just the 
beginning. She said, “I’ve noticed when I talk to older people, and I don’t use jondemal, I 
joke around more. But if I purposely choose to use jondemal, I can’t fool around because 
of the way I have to speak to them. And because of the way I speak to them, I treat them 
differently.” Not all informants were as articulate about how powerful language can be, 
and surely, the more languages one speaks, the greater the sensitivity to language 
becomes. But for Joyce, language set the tone for behavior, not unlike the clothes and 
shoes that force us to walk a certain way, and she was appreciative of it. Is this a 
restricting formality? Perhaps, but it was a restriction she imposed on herself, and it 
served as a means to define and reinforce their relationship. She did not interpret this 
formality as insincerity, but as a sign of proper closeness between unnie and dongseng. 
Does the lack of an honorific form in English have its own restrictions? 
Absolutely. Many Korean Americans find that because there is no English jondemal, they 
feel as though they are being disrespectful when speaking to Koreans in English, so they 
purposely choose to speak in Korean. Kevin always speaks to his mother-in-law in 
Korean, though he admits his Korean is not great and his mother-in-law is fluent in 
English.33 In terms of understanding, it may make more sense for the two of them to 
speak in English, but he said, “I can’t not use jondemal, it just feels so awkward and rude 
33  Kevin is a 28-year-old second generation Korean American. 
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to talk to adults that way.” (Again, the reference to “adults.”) The Korean language 
makes it easy for Korean Americans to show respect, while also pressuring them to do so. 
It may be a burden, but it is a burden that reinforces the due respect of that relationship, 
which is not even an option in English. One informant even commented, half jokingly, 
“We use English when we know we’re supposed to use jondemal, but we don’t want to.” 
For the bilingual Korean Americans, English becomes the language of equals, the 
language providing the option to avoid acknowledging a hierarchical relationship—to 
avoid having to show respect. 
Jim is a Korean American who is dating a white American girl. Describing their 
relationship, he said, “We all get along. Her dad and I play golf. [What do you call her 
dad?] What do you mean? What do I call who? [Her dad.] My girlfriend’s dad? What do I 
call my girlfriend’s dad? [Yes.] Frank. What else would I call him? Mister? Lindsay’s 
dad? [Well, would you if he was Korean?] Oh, of course not. But haven’t you ever been 
in an office environment?” Jim didn’t quite understand what I was asking at first, and 
even once he understood the question, he seemed to be baffled by it. What else would he 
call him, other than his first name? Why would he treat him any differently than how he 
treats the people he works with? 
This is not to suggest that English is the language of disrespect. Kevin would not 
suddenly disrespect his mother-in-law if he were to speak to her in English, nor is Jim 
disrespectful to his girlfriend’s dad. It is not impossible to show respect through English, 
or through any language for that matter. However, Korean Americans see their use of 
jondemal in marked contrast to English, which provides no honorific option, and thus 
cannot as easily reinforce a hierarchical relationship. We should note here, however, that 
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language is not static. Just as language shapes its speakers, speakers shape their language, 
and it is not a coincidence that there is no option of jondemal in today’s American 
vernacular. Words like “My lord,” “My lady,” or the general addressing of another that 
simultaneously reinforce a hierarchical relationship, are only to be found in books and 
films of what seem like a distant era (though not very distant in actuality). They have 
been replaced by the standard “Mister” and “Miss,” (and “Missus”) which do not 
reinforce any relationship, let alone a hierarchical one. (“Sir” and “Ma’am” are closer to 
showing an elevating respect, which also seem to be fading.) If language is any indication 
of its speakers’ character, America is increasingly a society of equal and independent 
individuals. 
America’s love of equality
Democratic peoples love equality, as first observed by Tocqueville, who wrote, 
“[F]or equality they have an ardent, insatiable, eternal, invincible passion; they want 
equality in freedom, and, if they cannot get it, they still want it in slavery. They will 
tolerate poverty, enslavement, barbarism, but they will not tolerate aristocracy.”34 What 
was once a foreigner’s astute observation has become a distinctly American trait. 
Americans show an increasing preference for equality over hierarchy, horizontal over 
vertical, peer over authority. As Alan Ehrenhalt pointed out in his 1995 essay, “Learning 
From the Fifties,” “There are bumper stickers all over Washington that say, in big block 
capital letters, QUESTION AUTHORITY. There are none that say, LISTEN TO THE 
BOSS.”35 Ehrenhalt was critical of the equalizing phenomenon, and a great part of his 
34  Tocqueville 2000, 482. 
35  Ehrenhalt 1995, 10. 
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work was aimed at reviving a sense of authority. Since then, the swing toward peers and 
friends, and away from leaders and superiors, has only gone further. As much as we value 
leadership and positive role models, the lack of respectable leaders and the refusal to be 
role models by spotlight figures are all too familiar today.36 Promoting equality and 
egalitarianism is always more agreeable with the democratic spirit of America, and many 
political theorists have enthusiastically chimed in. 
In Making Democracy Work, Putnam claimed “horizontal alliances” in our 
political, religious, and social institutions, (among other things) make for a more civic 
community, ultimately strengthening democracy.37 Putnam’s work was met with much 
criticism (and praise), but his claim about horizontal alliances was hardly a problem. The 
claim seems almost intuitive—equality and democracy are inherently and conceptually 
intertwined, why wouldn’t horizontal alliances work better for democracy? 
Mark E. Warren’s Democracy and Association also prioritizes equality in 
contemporary American civil society. Warren names two ideals of democracy: 1) equal 
power to make collective decisions, 2) equal participation in collective judgment.38 If the 
opportunity to partake is not available to all, neither the process nor the outcome is 
democratic, and autonomy, what he claims is the fundamental democratic ideal, cannot 
be realized. Democratic society requires democratic associations, and that means equal 
power and equal participation. 
36  A Washington Post article, “Where are the leaders?” by David Rothkopf, a former Commerce 
Department official for the Clinton administration, was published at the height of recession woes in 2009. 
Rothkopf pokes fun at the Secretary of Treasury who looks like Harry Potter, and at the President who is 
making “Tonight Show” appearances. (Rothkopf 2009.) In 2010, another article is published, by Steven 
Pearlstein, “It’s past time for President Obama to show some leadership.” (Pearlstein 2010.) Articles like 
these are interesting because on the one hand they express a frustration with the lack of leadership, and 
on the other, they show how unapologetically critical we are towards existing leaders. 
37  Putnam 1993. 
38  Warren 2001, 60. 
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This is not difficult to accept. Since equality is the defining principle of 
democracy, it would seem to follow that associations promoting and practicing equality 
make for a richer democracy. An association, where all participants have equal say (equal 
power), and all are willing to listen to one another (mutual respect), is a vision of 
democratic politics at its best. A great deal of political theory, especially since Rawls, has 
been devoted to this vision, with autonomous individuals of various backgrounds and 
beliefs (diversity!), engaged in a fair and civil exchange (deliberating!), arriving at 
decisions that all participants have contributed to in one way or another. 
To be sure, I am not opposed to the principle of equality. It is indeed equality that 
has provided the rhetoric for some of the nation’s greatest accomplishments, from 
Women’s Suffrage to Civil Rights. In addition, the belief in equality extends beyond 
politics, providing the basis for a widespread belief in self-sufficiency, also a cherished 
American value. Tocqueville wrote, “The inhabitants of the United States learns from 
birth that he must rely on himself to struggle against the evils and obstacles of life.”39 
Whatever successes or failures one has, they are his alone. And because Americans 
answer to themselves alone, not to a master or a superior as in an aristocracy, their deeds 
are more authentic. An act, whether of virtue or vice, must be attributed to the actor 
alone, because he acts autonomously. There is no one above, commanding him to be nice 
to his neighbor or to chaperone a field trip. Because we are equal, and thus capable of 
acting autonomously, our actions toward one another are that much more sincere and 
meaningful.The rhetoric of equality is further used as a means of creating community, of 
creating obligatory and egalitarian relationships—I will not look down on you and I will 
treat you with respect, because we are equal. That is what “treating one another as 
39  Tocqueville 2000, 180. 
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equals” means in America. The idea of reciprocity fits well with a society of equals, 
which Putnam described as, “I’ll do this for you now, in the expectation that you (or 
perhaps someone else) will return the favor.”40 Reciprocity is only possible amongst 
equal and autonomous individuals, who have the capacity to willingly do for others as 
well as to return the favor. 
Americans are quite uncomfortable with inequality, politically and economically, 
though they know it exists. The rhetoric of equality provides an ideal, a language for 
individuals to rely on, in the face of blatant injustice or discrimination that they 
instinctively know as unfair. In matters where hierarchy is arbitrary and seriously 
damaging, like race, the equality ideal is good news. However, is equality also the ideal 
in our small places of interpersonal relations? Should our civil societies and our 
communities also uphold equality as an ideal? 
Warren’s answer is no, as he points out that autonomy is a political good, and that 
it does not work in primary relationships.41 However, even in theory, and as well as in 
terms of the political good, hierarchy is not necessarily destructive to autonomy, and it 
can have a place in a vibrant community life. This may seem counterintuitive, as 
hierarchy is by definition opposed to equality, and equality may seem to be a good thing 
anywhere in a democratic society. However, we ought to revisit our love of equality, our 
reliance on horizontal alliances—they may have a hand at breaking down communities, 
isolating individuals, more so than we care to realize. Like many civil society scholars, 
community life in America is my concern, and I have no doubt that a lively civic 
community is essential to democracy. But equality, as an ideal, which is supposed to be 
40  Putnam 2000, 20.
41  Warren 2001, 62.
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the great democratic achievement, may be starting to show long-term side effects that 
ultimately hinder community life rather than enhance it. 
What’s wrong with equality?
What happens in a society of equals when the reciprocity cycle stops? What 
happens when I do for you, and you don’t do for me? What happens when I offer my 
hand you leave me hanging? What happens when I am the only one who repeatedly 
chaperones field trips? Reciprocity is broken, trust is replaced by insecurity, suspicion, 
and defensiveness. “I do for you, you do for me” becomes “I’ll do for you as long as you 
do for me,” or skips right to “I won’t do for you and you won’t do for me.” This is the 
other side, the ugly side, of reciprocity—a sincere and mutual mind-your-own-business. 
Just as reaching out can be reciprocated between equals, ignoring can also be 
reciprocated between equals. 
The ugly side of reciprocity is not the immediate result of a society of equals, but 
it seems Tocqueville was quite insightful about the long-term character of a democratic 
citizenry—“The same equality that makes him independent of each of his fellow citizens 
in particular leaves him isolated….”42; and this isolation changes the way we see 
ourselves and one another—“These owe nothing to anyone, they expect so to speak 
nothing from anyone; they are in the habit of always considering themselves in isolation, 
and they willingly fancy that their whole destiny is in their hands.”43 The conditions of 
equality that free us from arbitrary vertical chains also free us from any and all chains, 
which makes an atomized citizenry that much more likely. 
42  Tocqueville 2000, 413. 
43  Tocqueville 2000, 484. 
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This is not to suggest that only selfishness motivates individuals to be in equal 
relationships. Generosity could very well be a motive—I don’t want to be a burden on 
you, so let’s mutually not do for each other. There is nothing malicious or blameworthy 
about such an attitude, but whatever the motive, a relationship between perfect equals 
(which doesn’t exist in reality) is inherently more fragile, because it expects more of a 
balanced give and take, and undermines an independent obligation. Let us explore this 
further. 
First, in a world of equals, it is instinctive to return self-interest with self-interest, 
or what game theorists call tit-for-tat.44 An egalitarian relationship can easily turn into, if 
it did not begin as, a contractual one, where scorekeeping becomes all too easy, and 
nobody wants to give more than he has received. Why? What equals do for each other is 
perceived as easily comparable, whereas what unequals do for each other is not. Between 
equals, such as friends, it is the expected norm for the give and take to be relatively 
balanced—I’ll buy lunch today, you buy lunch tomorrow, and so on. But if I buy lunch 
today and you refuse to buy lunch tomorrow, I will probably not buy lunch again. The 
decision is fair, justified, and ought to be expected. Perhaps I even “have a right” to not 
buy lunch again. After all, no one can be expected to continuously buy lunch. 
My informant, Jiae, encountered this very phenomenon at her workplace.45 She 
said, “My co-worker and I go to lunch together all the time, and at first I covered for her 
whenever she was short a few bucks. It wasn’t a big deal, I didn’t care. But after awhile, 
it was adding up, and she never offered to pay me back, or cover for me. I mean, I was 
44  It is worth noting here that game theory, as well as Rational Choice Theory, fundamentally assumes 
equality, as well as autonomy. 
45  Jiae is a 27-year-old second generation Korean American.
36
never short, so I don’t know if she would have covered for me if I was. But I wish she 
would have at least offered to buy me lunch once in awhile, because now we’re like nam-
nam (strangers) over a few bucks. We don’t go to lunch anymore, and I don’t like that. I 
don’t want to be stingy, but I have to be. She made me stingy.” Meanwhile, Jiae’s boss 
buys lunch for her pretty consistently, and she sees nothing unfair about that. 
Clearly, Jiae’s co-worker didn’t “make her” stingy. But between equals, it is 
instinctive to want to even the score, because the two by definition are supposed to be 
balanced, whereas between unequals, it is impossible to keep score. Jiae never offered to 
buy lunch for her boss, and her boss does not expect a pay-back, as the very idea of trying 
to equalize an obviously unequal relationship is absurd. Is a student supposed to return 
the favor to her teacher? Is a daughter supposed to pay back her mom? What would that 
even entail, anyway? It is impossible to adopt a tit-for-tat strategy with an unequal, and 
while there may still be reciprocity, it is of an asymmetrical nature—I will buy you lunch, 
you will work diligently; I will give lectures, you will do homework. And asymmetrical 
reciprocity is impossible to even out—how many lunches are equivalent to how many 
days of diligent work? The impossibility of comparison in an unequal relationship makes 
imbalance the norm, and it further makes the relationship less likely to turn into a deal. A 
teacher does not look to his students’ effort to see how much effort he ought to put into 
his lecture, whereas co-workers look to each other and measure themselves up to the 
other. Therefore, a relationship between equals is likely to become uneasy or even break 
as soon as an imbalance occurs, as with Jiae and her co-worker. And once reciprocity has 
come to a halt between equals, it is unlikely to spark again. Jiae is probably cautious 
about lending other co-workers money since then, and who can blame her? As long as 
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they are equal, why shouldn’t their give and take be equal? 
Secondly, in an egalitarian relationship, obligation to the other is less 
recognizable. Stark inequality often creates a sense of obligation—the older feel 
obligated to look after the young, the experienced feel obligated to show the way, the 
leader feels obligated to be an example. It is the “bigger person” who feels obligated, 
who is associated with being an example, overlooking mistakes, forgiving, etc. It is not a 
coincidence that charity organizations portray the recipients, often children or more 
recently, animals, as helpless, unable to do for themselves, and “they need our help.” If 
they were “equal” to the audience, nobody would be moved to give. The audience is 
assumed to be the “bigger person,” otherwise, there is less of an obligation. Between 
equals, the instinctive reaction may sound like this: “We have the same capabilities and 
opportunities; why should I, or would I, do for you?” This is very related to the principle 
of self-sufficiency, which is not a bad thing in itself, but it contributes to undermining 
any obligation to the other. 
Just as the give and take is expected to be asymmetrical between unequals, the 
nature of obligation is also expected to be asymmetrical. The smaller person has a 
different set of obligations from the bigger person’s, and the two sets of obligations are 
not dependent on each other. For instance, the teacher is obligated to give constructive 
criticism on students’ performance and the student is obligated to attend class and put 
effort into his performance—and each party’s obligations stand, even if the other does not 
fulfill theirs. The teacher understands that his obligations are separate from the students’ 
obligations, simply because he is the teacher and they are the students, and no amount of 
the students’ refusal to do his work would justify the teachers’ refusal to do his. It is their 
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difference, their inequality in positions, that gives each their respective obligations. 
The lack of obligation to one another (or the refusal to acknowledge obligation) is 
precisely the issue raised by Alan Wolfe, in the now classic Whose Keeper?46 The enemy 
here is laws of self-interest, which Wolfe associates with the laws of the market, and he 
blames the market for much of the self-interested mentality among the American 
citizenry. Wolfe is neither the first nor last to make this argument, and it is an absolutely 
valid claim that the language of the market turns individuals into anonymous consumers 
and producers, nothing more and nothing less. The only relationships are economic, the 
only goal efficiency. We need to remember, however, that while self-interest may be 
exacerbated by the market, it is by no means created by the market. As we learned from 
Hobbes, self-interest is an inherent part of the natural condition of mankind—where the 
market, or the state, did not exist. What did exist in the Hobbesian state of nature, along 
with self-interest, was equality. 
Hobbes is credited as the theorist of equality—we are made equal by our ability to 
kill one another, and our mutual interest in survival. Our equality enabled us to recognize 
and act upon those mutual interests, but we also knew that the only way to prevent any of 
us from pursuing the self-interest of killing the other would be the creation of the 
sovereign—which, in order to be effective, must be utterly paramount in power over the 
subjects. The subjects created a relationship with the sovereign, not with each other. In 
other words, the contract was vertical, not horizontal—and this is the genius of Hobbes. 
If the contract was, instead, between free and equal individuals, to not kill each other at 
the very least, the deal would have been broken in no time, because it would have been in 
every individual’s interest to do so. As soon as one individual failed to keep up his end of 
46  Wolfe 1989.
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the deal, the reasonable and intuitive reaction would be to seek revenge. (And to be the 
first one to break the deal would only be a result of self-interest and reason.) But the very 
concept of revenge does not quite fit in the unequal relationship between the subjects and 
the sovereign, because the sovereign remains the insurmountable bigger person over his 
subjects. A match between the two is no match at all. Subjects by comparison are too 
weak to even try to destroy Leviathan, or to leave the commonwealth, both of which 
would surely result in death, and that makes this unequal relationship, whether a pleasant 
one or not, permanent. The subjects do their part, the sovereign does his, and the 
obligations and benefits for the two parties are so utterly unequal, that they can neither 
forget it or alter the nature of the relationship. 
It is not until Locke’s Second Treatise of Government, where individuals 
(citizens, not subjects) make horizontal alliances with one another, and there is, in the 
long run, a sense of mutual obligation. However, the way to fulfill the obligation to the 
other is indirect, primarily by pursuing one’s own interest. In other words, their 
obligation to the other is to act in accordance with their self-interest. Today, economists 
take this for granted—help others by helping yourself, which assumes that human beings 
don’t have direct obligatory relationships with one another, only contracts that must be 
worth the payoff for the individual. (And if the payoff is not worth the contract, any self-
interested individual cannot be expected to keep the contract.) With Locke, we began to 
hail equality and autonomy not only as a natural condition, but as a worthy principle in 
itself. And here sets in the paradox—we uphold equality and we value mutual obligation 
to one another, but in a society of equals, it is in everyone’s interest to break any and all 
obligatory ties. 
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The point here is not that all obligatory and community-building relationships 
must be hierarchical, but that a relationship between equals makes score-keeping more 
likely, and obligations less recognizable, thereby making relationships more deal-like and 
obligation-free. Loose relationships that can and ought to be dropped as soon as there is 
an imbalance or it no longer serves one’s interest, are fragile building-blocks for a 
community. Furthermore, the language of equality is habitual, as any language is, and can 
rub off on the most obviously unequal relationships, making them seemingly contractual 
and obligation-free, which is explained away or even made legitimate by the language of 
equality. In other words, the ideal of equality becomes the cause as well as the effect. 
It would be quite an exaggeration to say that American society is on the path 
toward isolation as a result of the equality ideal, but recent trends of “generational 
cocoons” and “sibling societies,” to which we now turn, seem to indicate that we are 
increasingly resisting the bigger person in our interpersonal worlds, from workplaces and 
schools, to families and neighborhoods. Now, not having bigger persons wouldn’t be a 
problem, if we could be responsible self-sufficient individuals as equals, keep up with our 
reciprocity with others, and become our own critics. (And in many ways, this was the 
great vision of the Enlightenment.) However, the side-effects of relationships with equals 
only perpetuates itself, reproducing and legitimizing more fragile and obligation-free 
relationships with equals. The more we see each other as equals, the more accustomed we 
become to only equals, and the more uncomfortable we become with bigger persons. 
Result: sibling societies
Suppose a teacher says, “I’m not going to prepare for class because the students 
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are not doing their work,” (which unfortunately does happen), or a parent says, “I’m 
going to live long enough to get back at my kids.” (I once saw a hat with this statement.) 
All kidding aside, this sort of mentality clearly disrupts the maintenance of obligatory 
relationships. Sure, a teacher with enthusiastic students is going to be more motivated, 
and every parent feels frustration with his kids at some point. But such a teacher or parent 
seriously undermines the nature of his relationship, by turning the relationship into a deal, 
not feeling the obligations of his position, and refusing to be the bigger person. The more 
we speak the language of equals, the more we only have relationships with equals, or, put 
another way, the more we equalize our relationships. Few works I find particularly 
compelling will be mentioned here, and while each describe different crises with different 
causes, they commonly highlight Americans’ increasing preference for equals with 
damaging results. 
Poet and author Robert Bly calls contemporary America a “sibling society,” 
where “the teaching is that no one is superior to anyone else.”47 Adolescence is now 
stretching to the mid-thirties, and the absence of fathers and mentors are wreaking havoc 
in our homes, schools, and politics. Daughters are more likely to become teenage moms, 
and sons face two hazards: “One is that he will plunge on into life too far or too quickly, 
and end up as a coarse person, cheating on everyone, unfathered, unmothered, insatiable, 
addicted, in jail. The other is that he will retreat into isolation and make his life perfect 
with a computer.”48 What the sibling society clearly lacks is vertical ties, bigger persons. 
Instead of autonomous and equal individuals forming vibrant communities, reciprocating 
each other’s good deeds, and becoming their own responsible masters, the sibling society 
47  Bly 1996, 132. 
48  Bly 1996, 126. 
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is made up of orphans, who have no one to look up to, and no one to look after. 
Political theorist Benjamin Barber critiques the market and its “infantilizing” 
effects in his latest work Consumed, 49 which describes the love of equality in new 
heights. “Age denial is everywhere”—grandmothers have no wrinkles, pre-teens wear 
thongs, and supposed role models (i.e. athletes) live like children. “Acting one’s age” 
doesn’t mean anything anymore—we want to be “kidults” for as long as possible, 
surrounded by our peers. The desire to be with and amongst one’s equals is rapidly 
spreading, and is mutually reinforced by the culture of consumerism. Barber’s ultimate 
concern is the democratic citizenry, and his target is the market—which is not necessarily 
a shared point across disciplines. But his emphasis on Americans’ refusal (or rush) to 
grow up, increasing signs of equalizing, is revealed in the works of scholars of various 
academic backgrounds. 
Mark Bauerlein’s Dumbest Generation is, at heart, worried for young Americans’ 
intelligence (anyone under thirty), and he places the blame on digital technology. But 
more than the simple criticism that computers make us think less, a crucial part of his 
argument is the “generational cocoon” adolescents wrap themselves in through their 
texts, blogs, and Facebook. Adolescence was once a “tenuous middle ground between the 
needs of childhood and the duties of adulthood… Not anymore.”50 We live well into our 
thirties as “Twixters,” as if “mature identity is entirely a social matter developed with and 
through their friends.”51 What is more, the mentors have also thrown in the towel, in an 
effort to not seem “mean-spirited.” The youth are encouraged to remain young by their 
computers, friends, and teachers, though the fact of aging is not so different in the digital 
49  Barber 2007. 
50  Bauerlein 2008, 168.  
51  Bauerlein 2008, 173. 
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era from what it was ages ago. 
To be sure, recent emergence of generational cocoons are not equivalent to the 
love of equality in Tocqueville’s time. Then, democracy was new, equality was new, and 
though Tocqueville saw potential problems, he was relatively optimistic. Community, 
family, religion, the market—none of these institutions were in danger of breaking down 
or being the cause of a breakdown, and they were the very pillars that would prevent (or 
fix) the potential isolationism, the long-term worst-case scenario built into conditions of 
equality. Today, though we cannot pinpoint a breakdown in any one of these institutions 
as the source, much of Tocqueville’s fears of an isolated citizenry seem to be coming 
true. Conditions of equality has stretched to new heights of extremes, far surpassing the 
political. Love of equality is not a problem in itself, but it is not a coincidence that 
equality-loving America faces community-declining woes.
Bly, Barber, and Bauerlein are not advocates of strict, hierarchical structures 
within our society, market, or school. (Neither am I, for that matter.) They do, however, 
point out worrisome trends that are clearly related to a stretched-out concept of equality. 
Whether we blame parents, the market, or the Internet, we are increasingly preferring 
relationships with our equals, and making ourselves equal to those who are not.52 We are 
increasingly leaderless, traditionless, directionless—but we’ll take that over demanding 
bosses, authoritarian teachers, and arbitrary superiors, any day. We don’t want to look up, 
we don’t want to be looked up to; we don’t want to judge, we don’t want to be judged; 
we don’t want to be responsible, and we certainly don’t want to be held responsible. By 
surrounding ourselves with equals, we are not obligated, nor expected, to do any of the 
above. Looking up or down is much more burdensome than looking sideways, and thus 
52  Also see the growing trend of “best-friend moms.” Goudreau 2009. 
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loose friendships with our “peers” suit us just fine, a pool which evidently grows 
everyday.53 
Americans are uncomfortable with judgment, on both giving and receiving ends, 
which is quite logical in a society of equals, where everyone is supposedly his own 
judge.54 If judgment comes from an equal, we are not as likely to receive it well, because 
who are they to judge? Equals may exchange, compete, even fight, but judgment has a 
one-way, and vertical, connotation, that it seems unwarranted coming or going from 
equals. 
Again, the reluctance of judgment may come from a benevolent motive, not a 
selfish one. We see so much of our own faults that we know we cannot be the bigger 
person to others. There seems to be an unwritten rule among equals, that if you’re not 
taking your own advice, don’t give any out. Even when we do criticize, we may begin 
with a disclaimer, such as “I’m not perfect, but…” or “I don’t do this well, but…” 
Looking at ourselves before judging others is not a bad rule in itself. In the Gospel 
of John Jesus himself set this standard when villagers were about to stone an adulterer, 
and he said, “If any one of you is without sin, let him be the first to throw a stone at 
her.”55 No one threw a single stone and the woman lived. 
But was the woman blameless? No, she was not, but no one else was, either.56 
Jesus’s point was not that the woman’s sins are not deserving of punishment, but that the 
53  Generational cocoons are not just for the young—the booming number of retirement communities is also 
evidence of this trend. See FitzGerald 1981, on one of the first retirement communities of America, Sun 
City.   
54  Even television seems to reflect Americans’ reluctance to judge. Notice, just in the last decade, how 
many popular competitive Reality TV shows have featured a foreigner, usually British, as the judge. 
Examples include American Idol, America’s Got Talent, Dancing with the Stars, Hell’s Kitchen, etc. 
55  John 8:7. New International Version.
56  The modern version of this lesson is the popular saying, the kettle calling the pot black. The kettle is not 
incorrect in calling the pot black; it is overlooking his own blackness. But the kettle’s blackness does not 
undo the pot’s—they are both black. 
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villagers also have sinned, and that they ought to look at their own faults before pointing 
to someone else’s. While it is certainly a good thing that people don’t take matters of 
serious punishment into their own hands anymore, this lesson only works where there is 
an ultimate judge, in this case, God. In a society of equals, however, the result may be a 
lack of judgment altogether, and perhaps, even the lack of the capacity to judge. Some 
may say this is a good thing, that we need less judgment, not more, but the fact that we 
should not judge others does not make our capacity to judge any less necessary. If 
anything, because equals don’t judge one another, individuals ought to actually sharpen 
their capacity to judge, because they now have to act as their own judges. A sibling 
society is inherently in tension with the concept of judgment, but the complete lack of 
judgment does no favors for any society.
A hierarchical structure is not the unequivocably better option for society. 
However, in an unequal relationship, the obligations of each respective place is more 
recognizable, and that is precisely what the relationship culture reinforces. And once the 
language becomes familiar, we recognize that every relationship inherently carries a set 
of obligations, even relationships between equals—a friend has obligations to the other 
simply because he is the friend. My informants placed much more importance on 
knowing their place in relationships, as opposed to maintaining equality, and that was 
what created and held together obligatory relationships within the community. 
Knowing your place
As part of my research, I set out to join a Bible study group organized by a 
46
Korean American church. The church provided three separate groups—college students, 
post-college young adults, and married couples. I joined the only one I could, the post-
college group, where there were about ten other Korean Americans in their twenties. At 
my first meeting, the leader of the group (who was also the oldest) asked me my name 
and age. This is not uncommon among Koreans. Age is almost always a part of the 
introduction. 
Around the same time I joined another Bible study group, organized by an 
American church, with no ethnic affiliation, and here the members were racially diverse 
(4 white, 2 African American, 3 Korean American, 1 Mexican American). We met 
regularly for four months, and only halfway through did we find out everyone’s age—and 
even then, the question was initiated by a Korean American member. 
In America it is considered rude to ask people their age, and even more so at the 
initial meeting. However, age, or rank and order, carries much weight among Koreans. 
Koreans want to know everyone’s age so they can place each other in proper order (size 
them up), even if the age gap is relatively small.57 (In both groups, all members were no 
more than ten years apart.) Only then, can they call each other by the proper name, use 
the proper language, and show the proper etiquette. This was certainly the case in the 
Korean Bible study group—almost all of the talking was done in English, but the 
members younger than me started calling me unnie or noona,58 even asked me for advice 
at times, while the older members did no such thing. I also began calling the older 
members unnie and oppa,59 seeing that that is the norm for this group. In my American 
57  During my research, I came across Korean American twin sisters, who called each other unnie (older 
sister) and dongseng (younger sister). The unnie commented, “Twins care even more about order than 
typical siblings.” 
58  Unnie is what a girl calls her older sister; noona is what a guy calls his older sister. 
59  Oppa is what a girl calls her older brother.
47
group, however, finding out each other’s age made no difference. We began as friends, 
we remained friends. We each had distinct personalities and roles within the group, as 
with the Korean group, but age had nothing to do with our roles. Age was just one more 
piece of information we learned about each other, and the group carried on as they had. 
There is a Korean saying, which I heard numerous times during my research, 
which literally means to “watch my place.”60 The closest English translation is probably 
“to know my place,” or “to keep my place,” though the Korean is almost always used in 
the context of duty. Age is a major part of understanding where one’s place is, because 
that is how one figures out how to behave, how to relate to others. The members of the 
Korean Bible study group could not even begin to have a conversation with one another, 
until they were able to see everyone in their respective places. 
In the Korean family, ranking most obviously begins with siblings, and each 
sibling-position comes with a set of responsibilities, tendencies, and even personality 
traits. The oldest is the mature and responsible one, while the youngest is the baby and 
thus the most spoiled but lovable one.61 Each place has its costs and benefits, but more 
importantly, each has its responsibilities. Recall Dain from the beginning of this chapter, 
who worked for his parents on the weekends, by choice, because he was “the older one.” 
He didn’t work because he was the responsible one, or the one his parents relied on—
rather, he was responsible and relied on by his parents because he was the older one. His 
place made him, not the other way around. 
Because each sibling has its own place, sibling rivalry takes on a different 
meaning to Koreans. Rivalry is done between equals, not between the above and below. 
60  Jagi jari jikyuh. 
61  See Pak 2006, especially Chapters 5 and 6, for similar and more detailed narratives on being the 
firstborn. 
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This is not to suggest that Korean siblings get along any better, that is beside the point, 
but rather, that sibling dynamics is often explained in terms of their order. For instance, 
Dain doesn’t exactly get upset with his younger brother, but he disapproves of him. He 
doesn’t fight with his brother, but he scolds him. Most importantly, and this is what 
makes the relationship culture endure, Dain fulfills what he believes are his 
responsibilities as the oldest son regardless of whether or not his brother is fulfilling his. 
At the time of the interview I had the impression that Dain was not so happy with his 
brother, but it didn’t make him any less of an older brother. It didn’t matter how bad of a 
younger brother Dain’s brother was; the family arrangement was not a deal, and he was 
the oldest, period. 
There are certainly families where the oldest is not at all the responsible one, but 
there seems to be an understanding that the oldest one is supposed to be the responsible 
one. Esther’s family was one of those cases.62 Though Esther has an older brother, she 
was designated as the one her parents relied on more (for mundane tasks that require 
knowledge of English, from calling the telephone company to filling out paperwork). She 
complained, “I don’t know why I get stuck with stuff like this. I’m not even the older 
one.” This is the form sibling rivalry takes in Korean families, if we can call it that. It is 
not that the responsibilities of each place are always fulfilled, but that there are 
responsibilities that ideally, as revealed in their language, come with the territory of each 
place. 
Even when addressing conflict, the language of the relationship culture is used. 
Mindy’s dad left her family years ago and she hasn’t heard from him since.63 She is 
62  Esther is a 27-year-old second generation Korean American. 
63  Mindy is a 27-year-old second generation Korean American.
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getting married soon, and her friend asked her what she would do if her father showed up 
to walk her down the aisle. Mindy answered, “He can’t walk me down the aisle. Can he 
even call himself my dad? It would be like a relative coming to my wedding. Dads don’t 
walk out on their family; he gave that up when he left.” To Mindy, her dad was not 
exactly a bad father, but not a father at all, because he did what fathers don’t do. He had 
left his place as a father, and as far as Mindy was concerned, that made him no longer her 
father. 
“Knowing your place” may carry an authoritarian, perhaps even a chauvinistic, 
connotation. However, in the relationship culture, hierarchical relationships do not entail 
a top-down, dominating, command-control, where individuals merely obey the 
instructions of those above, and completely lose their autonomy. Rather, each individual 
willingly keeps his place and voluntarily stays within its expectations, limits and 
boundaries, because he identifies with the place he is in. In this way, the place in a 
relationship can become a source of autonomy, since the duties of that place does not 
depend on how well others fulfill their respective duties. Maintaining one’s place, as 
opposed to simply obeying or keeping a deal, is what gives the individual an identity, and 
keeps him connected to the various relationships he is in. 
The relationship culture is perhaps most obvious in the family, but it goes far 
beyond, and age is not the only factor determining one’s place. Rather than a ladder with 
each rung representing one’s place, the more accurate picture would be a web. Not only 
are other positions above and below, but also beside, diagonal from, few degrees away 
from, and so on. Each individual occupies a place or a position in society, and they are all 
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linked, with each link being a specific kind of relationship, with a specific set of 
expectations. Not knowing one’s place, or improperly fulfilling one’s place, would be a 
source of disorder in the web. And not having a place would be a void that the 
relationship culture does not allow. 
A group of Korean ladies were talking about a woman, who had become the 
center of gossip for having an affair. Instead of attacking the woman as an individual, 
they talked about her places, or more specifically, the abandonment of her places: “She 
calls herself a mother?”; “That’s no mother”; and “Isn’t she a deacon at so-and-so 
church?” Because she had not successfully “watched her place,” she was being demeaned 
as a mother and a deacon. And by referring to the respective places occupied by the 
woman, the conversation served as a reminder of what mothers and deacons are (not) 
supposed to do. 
But what if she wasn’t a mother? What if she didn’t have a family? What if she 
didn’t go to church?64 She would have been an isolated individual—and that would be 
unthinkable. In the relationship culture, the potential danger is bad relationships, but not 
no relationships, which is an absurdity. My advisor, Fred Alford, discusses the horror of 
no relationships in his work Think No Evil—a field study conducted in South Korea.65 He 
argues that Koreans’ definition of evil is isolation, or having no relationships, but because 
it is such a horrifying thought, they can hardly conceive of it, hence the title. Though the 
study was conducted more than twenty years ago, my informants displayed a similar 
discomfort with the idea of no relationships. One informant described a family she knows 
as, “They’re one of those isolated families,” and she said it in such a disapproving 
64  For one, the ladies probably would have said, “No wonder she doesn’t have family.” There’s a harshness 
in Koreans’ speech that even I was at times shocked to hear.
65  Alford 1990.
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manner, lowering her voice, as if this family belonged to a cult. The normalness of the 
relationship culture that was found in Koreans in Korea years ago was also found in 
today’s rising generation of Korean Americans.
When thinking about the relationship culture, I am often reminded of Plato’s just 
city built on the noble lie, where according to the metal in your blood, you have a place, a 
function, a purpose. By staying in your place and fulfilling its purpose you are “minding 
your own business,” which is the best, or the most just, thing you could be doing. Staying 
in your place is what contributes to the whole of the city and keeps you connected to the 
city. Now, it would be quite bad if you tried to squeeze into a place other than where your 
metal indicates—you would cause a disturbance for everyone, a rift in the city as a 
whole. But it would be even worse, it would be absolutely horrifying, if you didn’t have a 
place at all. You would have no place, no relationships, you would be utterly alone—you 
would be, what the Greeks called, an “idiot,” or alone.  
Undergraduate students typically find Plato’s city horrifying—you’re stuck in a 
class! What could be worse than a system that dictates where you belong? The whole 
notion is totally un-American. But in today’s liberal democracy, not having a place is a 
greater problem than being stuck in a place, especially for young people. The problematic 
trend is no longer strict parents who dictate their children’s lives, or small towns where 
individuals don’t have the option of branching out. It is rather placelessness, the 
insecurity of not having a place, that drives this extended period of “soul-searching” 
adolescence. Libertarians may treasure that kind of freedom, but as Ehrenhalt said with 
brutal honesty, most of us don’t have what it takes to be libertarians! Most of us are not 
“bright and articulate and individualistic and wanting nothing more than the freedom to 
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try all the choices and experiments that life has to offer and express our individuality in 
an endless series of new and creative ways. … Most people want a chart to follow….”66 
Most of us long for a place to belong more than the freedom to be utterly without a place. 
Alford’s work was about Koreans in Korea, and how the age of globalization was 
a threat to traditional relationships. If Koreans do become atomized, if they do become 
more isolated, much of it will occur without their awareness of it. (Rarely does the spirit 
of community deliberately decline.) Korean Americans, however, are very conscious of 
the individualist tendencies of American society precisely because they see the contrast 
between their Korean community and the American society at large. (This is the sort of 
awareness that minorities, or even travelers, develop.) Korean Americans consciously 
understand that Koreans are more relational, that Americans are more egalitarian and 
individualist, and they are aware of the advantages and disadvantages to both because 
they face both on a regular basis. 
This is not to suggest that the relationship culture makes for all healthy 
relationships, or that equality makes good relationships impossible. What the relationship 
culture does is provide a language that reinforces the place and relationships of an 
individual, and that language becomes a tool to counter self-interest in order to keep a 
relationship alive—often times, even if an individual has been wronged by a self-
interested other. “You don’t do for me, I don’t do for you” is a meaningless statement in 
the relationship culture, because “I” am never merely an “I,” apart from my positions, 
and what I do for you depends on what place I am in, not what you do for me. The 
relationship culture provides an answer to “What if I do for you, and you don’t do for 
me?” I do for you anyway, because that is what I—the older brother, the student, the 
66  Ehrenhalt 1995, 23. 
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pastor—am supposed to do; that is what older brothers (and teachers and pastors), by 
definition, do. 
Know and do
Much of the literature on Korean Americans portray them as though they are 
under pressure from their family, community, and other traditionally Korean 
expectations, to conform to roles and what is expected of them. This is indeed the case 
for many Korean Americans, but the part that is not as highlighted is that much of the 
pressure is self-imposed.
Another often-repeated phrase I heard during my research was “al-ah-suh-heh” 
which literally means “know and do,” but can be translated as “do on your own” or “do 
without having to be told.” The relationship culture expects voluntarily self-imposed duty
—it expects individuals to know and do what they are supposed to. This is not to suggest 
that Korean Americans always do what they are supposed to do—that is far from the 
truth. But there seemed to be an understanding among Korean Americans that upon 
reaching a certain level of maturity, individuals simply ought to know better and 
voluntarily perform their duties, defined by their relationships and places in life, without 
incentives or threats hanging over their heads. Each place voluntarily maintains its 
position, not under an order, which would make it not voluntary at all, but as a result of 
learning to identify oneself with the positions occupied. And in the event one does not 
voluntarily know and do, there will always be a relational other in the proper place to tell 
him so. 
A few years ago I volunteered as staff for a youth group retreat at a Korean 
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American church. The theme of the retreat was Know Your Role, primarily focusing on 
the different roles for men and women as biblically commanded. At the retreat, boys and 
girls were frequently separated, and many gender issues were covered—the difference in 
roles between mother and father, husband and wife, and men and women in the church. A 
repeated point at this retreat was that one role was not better or more powerful than the 
other, but that they were simply different roles God had designated. And if you don’t 
know your role, or you don’t fulfill the role properly, not only would you be disobeying 
God, you would also be blundering the relationship with your church, your spouse, your 
children, and so on.67 
The relationship culture is not particularly Christian, but the theme of this retreat 
was consistent with both. By fulfilling the roles we are given, we keep our relationships 
going, and even strengthen it. When we don’t fulfill the roles, we are challenging the 
nature of those relationships, or threatening to break them off (and there are definitely 
circumstances where it is better for a relationship to end). And because different 
relationships have different expectations, (what my friends expect from me is not what 
my boss expects from me), maintaining good relationships requires knowing those 
differences.68 
The expectation for individuals to “know and do” creates its own communication 
methods, since, as one informant put it, “Koreans aren’t good at direct communication, 
especially to someone above.” In other words, because individuals are expected to know 
67  I am not certain if non-Korean churches have similar themes in their youth retreats, but the ethics of 
keeping one’s place is a commonly preached and practiced theme throughout Korean churches.
68  The tricky thing about Koreans and their expectations is that it is rarely discussed. Koreans have a word, 
noonchi, which many of my informants mentioned as a major difference between Korean and American 
cultures. Noon means eye, -chi can be translated as sense, and noonchi is usually translated as the ability 
to sense something without being directly told so. It is like a sixth sense—but primarily used to refer to 
sensing the mood in the room or sensing what the other is trying to say without their having to say it. See 
Chapter 3 for more details on noonchi. 
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and do on their own, if they end up doing something wrong, others don’t quite know how 
to react. One informant, Jae, shared such an incident at his Korean church, which is 
predominantly first-generation and Korean-speaking.69 A few months ago, some of the 
church members started talking about a complaint they had with the pastor, who 
evidently had said something inappropriate on several occasions, deeply offending one of 
the members. Nobody approached the pastor about it, though a few members repeatedly 
discussed it amongst themselves. But what they emphasized during these talks was not 
how to approach the pastor with the complaint, but the fact that the pastor should have 
known better not to make such mistakes. Jae said, “If the pastor would just ‘know and do’ 
on his own, we wouldn’t have had a problem.” I asked, “How is the pastor supposed to 
know that he did anything wrong, if no one will tell him?” to which Jae replied, “He’s the 
pastor. He should know. [But what if he has no idea?] Then what kind of pastor is he? 
Well, somebody had to tell him, but it wasn’t going to be us. And it’s insulting to him, for 
one of us to have to tell him what he did wrong.” Eventually, one of the members 
discreetly talked to the pastor’s wife, who then notified the pastor, at which point the 
pastor immediately contacted the member he had offended and apologized. Problem 
solved. 
What seems like a very inefficient and roundabout way of problem-solving has its 
own logic. Jae and other disgruntled members did not directly approach the pastor 
because then, they would be going against what they, as members, should know and do. 
Talking to the pastor’s wife was one thing, talking to the pastor was another—not even an 
option. When I first asked Jae why they did not directly talk to the pastor, he looked at 
69  Jae is a 1.5er in his mid-thirties. 
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me, stumped, and said, “We don’t do that. Would you do that?”70 I then asked, “So it’s 
okay for the pastor to approach you, but not the other way around?” Jae replied, “Right. 
He’s the pastor. … I mean, none of this would have happened if the pastor just didn’t 
make the mistake, but that doesn’t mean we should make a mistake, too.” So it is not that 
direct communication is simply frowned upon, but that there are appropriate ways of 
communication for different relationships. Somebody was in the right place to talk to the 
pastor, but it was not Jae. Jae seemed satisfied that things turned out the way they were 
supposed to. No relationship was damaged beyond repair, and everyone, including the 
pastor’s wife, played their part well. 
Each particular relationship has its do’s and don’t’s, and maintaining the proper 
etiquette was key to maintaining harmonious relationships. The only way to be successful 
is to know one’s respective position well and adhere to its boundaries. 
Titles
Importance of individuals’ respective positions means there is also an importance 
to individuals’ titles, the names we have for one another. Koreans make quite a deal of 
what to call one another, and not knowing what to call someone is just as rudely awkward 
as not knowing someone’s name. Like the earlier example of Joyce calling Hannah unnie, 
referring to others by a title is a sign of respect and the kind of relationship, but there is 
more to it than that. Titles also serve as a reminder of one’s duty and obligation. 
Because families tend to immigrate together, it is not unusual for Korean 
Americans and their entire extended families to live in the same area. Claudia’s extended 
family lived within an hour’s drive from her, and she married a Korean American whose 
70  To which I had to admit, “No, I wouldn’t do that, either.” 
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extended family also lives within an hour’s drive.71 (Claudia and her husband met at 
church, and both families still attend the same church.) Keeping in mind that older 
generations tend to have more siblings, a family gathering for Claudia is no small event. 
During the interview Claudia talked about the different titles she has to use for each one 
of her and her husband’s family members, and she laughingly commented that she 
doesn’t even know the proper names for all, because there are so many. For instance, 
there are eight different ways to say “brother-in-law” in Korean—one for every possible 
combination between age order and gender—and each title implies a different kind of 
relationship with its own set of norms and expectations. 72 Aunts are not simply aunts—
they are either paternal (gomo) or maternal (eemo), and each aunt on either side has an 
order (first gomo, second gomo, etc.).73 
A similar attention to titles go on in places like the church or the workplace. 
Vinny worked for a large Korean company, based in Maryland, and when I asked what 
that was like, he responded, “I think working there I learned more about Koreans than at 
any other time in my life.”74 He only worked there for a few years, and by the time of the 
interview he was working for an American company. I asked him what some of the 
differences are, and he said, 
71  Claudia is a 34-year-old 1.5er. She immigrated at age 7. 
72  A man’s older sister’s husband is maehyung, a man’s younger sister’s husband is maejeh, a man’s wife’s 
older brother is hyungnim, a man’s wife’s younger brother is chuhnam, a woman’s older sister’s husband 
is hyungboo, a woman’s younger sister’s husband is jehboo, a woman’s husband’s older brother is 
ajoobunim, a woman’s husband’s younger brother is doryunnim. A similar pattern exists for sister-in-
law, uncle, aunt—just about any possible position in the family tree has its own specific name. 
73  One informant passionately described the difference between gomo and eemo. Accordingly, gomo is 
more “strict” because “her nieces and nephews are carriers of her maiden-family-name,” whereas “eemo 
is the cool aunt who just has fun with her nieces and nephews” because her nieces and nephews are the 
name-carriers of her sister’s husband, who she has no blood-relation to. 
74  Vinny is a 29-year-old second generation Korean American. 
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I don’t expect every other Korean company to be like this, but the one I worked 
at, everybody had a very specific title. Yeah, so it’s almost military-like in there. 
There’s rank and who’s responsible for what and things like that. I mean there’s 
definitely a camaraderie there, but I would liken it to how it would be like, how I 
would imagine, in the military. And the job I’m at right now is much more of 
everybody working together, much more lax, there’s no formal titles. Like the guy 
I’m working with right now, technically he’s two positions above me, but you 
don’t even really think about it…. When we’re talking we’re just two people. But 
at the Korean company, there’s definitely a distinction between who has a 
position and who doesn’t… It’s in the way people talk to you, really. 
Vinny clearly prefers his current job over his previous one, and it is indeed the case that 
many Korean Americans dislike the degree of importance Koreans place on titles, seeing 
it as unnecessary or empty formality.75 
But when does formality become empty formality? When do titles become 
nothing but titles? When the individuals who hold those titles don’t live up to them. 
Claudia articulated this very complaint: “In some ways the titles are good, but sometimes 
there’s too much emphasis on the title instead of the person holding the title, as if the title 
is all that matters.” When individuals insufficiently fulfill the positions they hold, they 
diminish the significance of that position. If all mothers of the world started abandoning 
their children and doing very un-mother-like things (let’s use our imagination), “mother” 
would quickly become an empty formality. If there was nothing special about mothers, if 
there was nothing mothers had in common, if there was nothing to being a mother other 
than being called mother, the title “mother” would surely become meaningless. Likewise, 
if all CEOs turned out to be heartless money-grubbers, if all elders of the church began 
shoplifting, if all leaders turned out to be better at following than leading, the weight 
these titles once held would significantly diminish. The standing that the titles once gave 
individuals, and the expectations that made the individuals worthy of such titles, would 
75  See Danico 2004, Chapter 7 for similar examplse among 1.5ers.  
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fade. 
Titles themselves don’t have meaning; they have meaning so long as the 
individuals who hold those titles breathe meaning into them, by living up to them. Only 
then do titles reinforce the places we are in, keep up the obligations attached to those 
titles, expect the individuals who hold those titles to uphold them. It may even be that 
those who resist titles do so precisely because they know they have failed to live up to 
them, and titles are only a constant reminder of a guilty past they cannot change. 
However, the failure to live up to titles is no reason to lower the standards of titles or to 
abandon them altogether. If anything, the failure ought to remind the rest of us what the 
proper role of a given title is. Forgiveness is essential to life, but forgiving is not 
equivalent to forgetting. 
Vinny used the military metaphor to mean strict, authoritarian, hierarchical, and to 
pay no compliments to the company. However, anyone with military experience may also 
speak of the satisfaction of contributing to something bigger than oneself, together with 
others, each with different roles, to produce something that cannot simply be reduced to 
the sum of its parts. The choir, theater groups, sports teams, are also fitting metaphors. By 
performing individual parts well, each becomes an essential part of the whole, creating an 
obligation between the parts, as well as a mutual understanding that each part needs all 
other parts. This is the alternative method of creating obligatory relationships—not the 
rhetoric of equality, where I do for you because we are equal, but the rhetoric of 
inequality, where I do for you precisely because we are unequal (e.g. sopranos need altos, 
and vice versa). 
Admittedly, there is the other-extreme danger to taking roles and titles too 
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seriously, where too great of an obligation is attached to the title, that living up to it 
requires much sacrifice and risk by the individual. (Who can forget the climactic moment 
in Arthur Koestler’s Darkness at Noon, when after hours of torturous interrogation, the 
main character Rubashov finally decides to confess to a crime he didn’t commit, at the 
mention of his title, “Comrade Rubashov.”)76 Titles can be burdensome, demanding, with 
ugly consequences, and many Korean Americans complain about this dimension—not 
the empty formality but the strict duty. 
There is no magical balance to be identified here. Not one extreme is better than 
the other, and it is by no means easy to avoid either extreme. However, the potential 
danger of either extreme is no reason to ignore altogether the obligatory function of titles. 
Furthermore, America’s individualist tendency is closer to the former extreme than the 
latter—we are more likely to scoff at titles as mere formality than to take our titles too 
seriously to the point of danger. Revisiting the purpose of titles, the consequences of 
using titles, could certainly be a useful exercise.  
76  The full quote: ‘“Comrade Rubashov, I hope that you have understood the task which the Party has set 
you.’ It was the first time since their acquaintance that Gletkin called Rubashov ‘Comrade’. Rubashov 
raised his head quickly. He felt a hot wave rising in him, against which he was helpless. His chin shook 
slightly while he was putting on his pince-nez. ‘I understand.’” Koestler 1968, 193. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE HABITUAL NATURE OF THE RELATIONSHIP CULTURE
“It seems, in fact, as though the second half of a man’s life is usually made up of nothing 
but the habits he has accumulated during the first half.” (Fyodor Dostoevsky. The 
Demons.)
A layered self
Is the relationship culture, then, merely role-playing? Aren’t we terrified of that? 
Yes, we are—Milgram and Zimbardo taught us how dangerous human beings can be 
when they take their roles too seriously. By “simply doing one’s duty,” 77 ordinary men 
and women became (potential)78 accomplices to harming others—as research assistants in 
Milgram’s experiment, and as prison guards in Zimbardo’s. Evidently, taking on a role 
can make individuals do things they would not otherwise do, justifying such horrendous 
acts. 
There is a distinction, however, in the understanding of the self, between 
Milgram’s explanation and the relationship culture. Keeping in mind that roughly about a 
third of Milgram’s subjects refused orders to administer shocks to the maximum voltage, 
many of those who did obey underwent what Milgram calls an “agentic shift,” where the 
person “no longer views himself as acting out of his own purposes but rather comes to 
see himself as an agent for executing the wishes of another person.”79 And because he is 
77  “The most frequent defense of the individual who has performed a heinous act under command of 
authority is that he has simply done his duty.” Milgram 2004, 146.
78  In Milgram’s study, the subjects were not actually inflicting harm, though they were told they were. 
79  Milgram 2004, 133. 
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no longer acting out of his own purposes, “the individual no longer views himself as 
responsible for his own actions….”80 Metaphorically speaking, it is as though the 
individual steps out of his own autonomy (where he would be responsible for his 
actions), and steps into the shoes of another individual, the agent of the authority (where 
he is no longer responsible for his actions). The individual first goes through a 
detachment—there is no entering the agentic state unless he first leaves his state of 
autonomy. And because he has left his autonomy, he can rationalize that he is not acting 
according to his own will. He is not causing harm, he is not hurting anyone, because he is 
not autonomously choosing to do so.81 It is the authority’s will he is obeying, and he is 
merely doing his duty. 
The relationship culture, as much emphasis there is on fulfilling one’s duties, is 
not quite the same as the agentic shift. The more accurate metaphor of the relationship 
culture is the Matryoshka doll, more commonly known as the Russian nesting doll, where 
the opening of one doll reveals a smaller version inside, then another and another.82 Each 
doll or layer represents a role, and though the individual may not take all of his layers 
with him everywhere he goes, each layer is no less a part of him. His autonomy does not 
get left behind as he puts on a new layer, so there is no psychological detachment as in 
the agentic shift. In other words, he is those roles, even when he is not actively playing 
them, because his autonomy is in every layer at all times. He cannot simultaneously 
fulfill the practical responsibilities of every role, but he never leaves his autonomy. Thus 
80  Milgram 2004, 134. 
81  The burden of choice is also a major element in Christopher Browning’s Ordinary Men, a work on the 
German police battalion that provided significant manpower in the killing of Jews during WWII. 
Browning supports Milgram’s theory, though peer pressure was a stronger force for the police battalion 
than official authority. See Browning 1992, particularly Chapter 18. 
82  This metaphor is also used by Alford to describe Koreans’ approach to relationships (Alford 1990). 
63
the relationship culture’s self is a layered self—the layer he has on indicates what he is 
doing at that moment, but all of those layers are his at all times. 
Americans often refer to a true self or a core self, “who you really are,” as if there 
is a more authentic self that exists underneath all of the roles we play. This is precisely 
what scares us about Milgram’s and Zimbardo’s studies—that we are capable of leaving 
our core selves, along with our moral centers, when we step into a role. But this is an 
impossible task for the layered self, who does not have a separate core self, because all of 
the roles that one plays is the make-up of the authentic self, and no layer is without a 
moral center. 
Jenny, an elementary school teacher, talked about the the contrast in the idea of 
the self, which she put in terms of the difference between Koreans and Americans.83 She 
recalled an incident where she and the principal of her school, her boss, had run into a 
disagreement and they had met to talk. He had evidently not been very responsive to 
teachers, rather taking the side of other administrators in the school system, which Jenny 
criticized as an insufficient performance on his part, as the principal or the boss. She 
brought her complaint to him, and when the conversation was more or less over, the 
principal had said, “Well, I hope you still consider me a friend, that you still like me as a 
person,” to which Jenny said to me, “He just wants to be liked, even though I just told 
him I don’t like him as a boss, that he’s not a good principal, as if liking him as a person 
would make up for that. He’s not even offended that I criticized him as a boss, as long as 
I’m not attacking him as a person. It’s just a job to him. … This is a cultural difference. 
Koreans don’t do that.” In the relationship culture, you are your position, there is no 
“person” beneath the positions one occupies. Jenny knew and could articulate the 
83  Jenny is a 29-year-old 1.5er. 
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difference between the two understandings of the self, and she understood it as a cultural 
difference, but she seemed almost offended that he didn’t quite take her critique 
personally, that he saw his position as merely a position, and not an extension of his true 
self. 
Separating ourselves from our roles is rather common in America. Take the 
Monica Lewinsky scandal. There was certainly public outrage, but there were also many 
who defended President Clinton using the logic of separation between our true selves and 
our roles. At the height of the scandal, the Gallup poll asked, “Do you approve or 
disapprove of the way Bill Clinton is handling his job as president?” to which 62 percent 
approved, and 32 percent disapproved. The following question asked, “Now thinking 
about Bill Clinton as a person, do you have a favorable or unfavorable opinion of him?” 
to which 40 percent answered “favorable,” and 48 percent “unfavorable.”84 The change in 
the numbers indicates that many Americans held an attitude of, “He may not be a good 
person, he may even be a lousy husband, but he’s doing fine as president. What does one 
have to do with the other?” What does one have to do with the other? The relationship 
culture would say a whole lot. Failure in one position says a lot about the person, and 
cannot be separated from his other positions. The fact that polls even ask questions 
distinguishing between “as president” and “as a person,” and the fact that the results 
reflect a distinction, actually feeds our fears of the agentic shift, while simultaneously 
validating it as a legitimate excuse for wrongdoing.85 
There may be potential danger in shifting from one role to another, but only if the 
84  Gallup/CNN/USA Today Poll. August 17, 1998.
85  This is perhaps the most disturbing part of discussing the Milgram experiment with college students—so 
many of them say (often with a shrug) that they would probably administer the shocks, using the same 
excuses Milgram’s subjects did—“It’s my job. And it doesn’t make me a bad person.”  
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roles are mere roles, meaning autonomy, along with responsibility, is left out of the role. 
If autonomy does follow, and each role is an essential part of the self, then taking one’s 
roles seriously can be a safeguard to one’s judgment, rather than an abandonment of it. 
The roles make for even greater responsibility, not less, because every role requires full 
envelopment of the self, which at least includes autonomy and responsibility. In other 
words, being aware of the many roles we play, even during the times those layers are not 
on, can function to keep us in check. There are things we would not do if we were 
reminded of our parenthood, our profession, our various positions and relationships. Even 
if an act does not interfere with our other roles, and even if the act is done in secret, the 
reminder of our positions serve as self-disciplining guides. Would a mother do this? 
Would a teacher do this? Would a president do this? Oftentimes it is not our own 
willpower or good judgment that keep us from making bad decisions, but rather the 
reminder of who we are to others, what we would do (or would not do) if they could see 
us, and the sense of pride and shame, that have a greater effect on our behavior. And that 
is why the habit of seeing ourselves in various roles and positions are so valuable—they 
remind us of the many layers that belong to us, obligations and responsibilities included, 
even when we don’t have them on. 
My informants saw themselves as being in between two worlds, each with its own 
distasteful extreme in defining the self—the American conception that allows for a “true 
self” as distinct from the roles one plays, and the Korean conception that clings to duty-
defined roles to the point that individuality is engulfed by the roles. Describing their 
parents’ generation, who they call “traditional Korean,” the strict duty-dimension of roles 
66
was a common observation. My informants were, for the most part, ambivalent about 
taking one’s role-as-duty too seriously. On the one hand, they certainly admired their 
parents’ generation’s commitment to duty, their willingness to do what they were 
supposed to do and what they had to do, rather than what they wanted to do. On the other 
hand, they felt pity for them, because their commitment to duty had left them without a 
freedom. 
Anne, describing her mom, said, “She has such a sacrificial heart. Everything she 
does is for her family. She’s always, just constantly, serving us. That’s one thing I would 
want to be like.”86 At a later point in the interview Anne said, “My mom and dad, they 
don’t have a good relationship. They’re still married but they don’t love each other. I 
don’t think I would want to do that. But even though my dad is not loving towards her, 
she’s, in her actions, so loving towards him. She’ll still make him food, like the best stuff. 
And I wouldn’t do that. Even though he’s like, ‘What is this, this tastes horrible,’ she’ll 
make him something better the next day. I’m thinking, ‘Are you kidding me?’ She’s so 
loving, I don’t know how she does it.” Similar testimonies were given by other 
informants, particularly by females, about the older women in their lives (not always their 
mothers). 
Compared to a political culture that values free speech and open communication, 
Anne’s mom seems to live a pretty stifled life. But compared to a popular culture that 
prioritizes individuality and fulfilling one’s dreams, Anne’s mom seems peculiarly 
mature. Where we are constantly told to express ourselves, to follow our dreams, and to 
free our inhibitions, commitment to duty at the expense of our expressions, dreams, and 
inhibitions, can be a display of selflessness. She is the unhappy but dutiful wife and 
86  Anne is a 28-year-old second generation Korean American. 
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mother, as Anne sees it, and Anne’s response is a sincere ambivalence. She wants to be 
like her mom, but she doesn’t at the same time. 
Emphasis on duty does have serious disadvantages. For one, it is probably 
responsible for han, the angst that builds up resulting from suppressing so much inside. 
(Pastor Rubin attributed Korean churches’ ritual of daily morning services, typically 
around 5 or 6 a.m., to the fact that Koreans have a lot of han, and their need to cry out to 
God, because they don’t cry out to anybody else.) Indeed, one of the biggest cultural 
differences between Korean and American is the expression of feelings. Jenny, the 
elementary school teacher, recalled having to explain this difference to Korean parents 
who had recently immigrated. She said, 
American teachers are actually trained, whenever a situation occurs, to ask, “How 
did that make you feel?” So even if the kids weren’t feeling anything specific, 
they would have to say, “Sad, bad, happy,” and because they said it, they instantly 
feel it. And because they’re forced to express how they feel, they hold on to that 
feeling. And we teach the kids that they have every right to feel that way, and that 
they should be able to express it. With Koreans, if a boy is crying, we say, 
“Namjaga weh ool-uh” (boys don’t cry) or “Ddook geu-chuh” (stop crying), and 
that’s harsh but they get over it faster. My mom never asked me how I felt, I don’t 
even know how to ask that in Korean. We just don’t do that. So on the one hand, 
Americans are way too sensitive, always talking about feelings…. Well, I guess in 
the long run, it’s healthier to express your feelings. Though that makes it easier to 
dwell on your bad feelings…. 
Like Anne, Jenny’s ambivalence and mental weighing of the different cultural norms is 
common in the 1.5/second generation of Korean Americans. Their concluding values 
often clash with that of their parents,87 as well as their American counterparts, which 
87  There are numerous works with similar observations. One particularly memorable example, from an 
ethnographic work of Sociology, is a quote from a male Korean American 1.5er: “I tried saying ‘I love 
you’ [to my father] one time and he looked at me and said, ‘Are you American now? You think this is 
The Brady Bunch? You don’t love me. You love me when you can support me.’” Pyke 2003, 247. 
68
allows them to see and evaluate the advantages and disadvantages of both cultures. 
Though I cannot claim that my informants practice what they preach, nearly every one of 
them talked about the need for some balance between the two cultures in their own lives, 
and many of them talked about the need to balance proper fulfillment of duty with a 
healthy dose of self-expression. 
Relational golden rule
Without deliberately intending to do so, Jenny articulated a general rule of thumb 
she adheres to: “I treat my husband the way I think all wives should treat their husbands. 
I treat my kids the way I think all parents should treat their kids.” It is a variation of the 
golden rule, do unto others as you would have them do unto you, while accounting for the 
particularity of relational positions. 
The golden rule has withstood the test of time and space, and its adherence 
assumes a moral capacity—we have to imagine ourselves in hypothetical interactions, 
then act in the way that we determine to be good. We generally expect most people to at 
least be capable of following the golden rule, if not to follow it, and it would seem that 
the adherence to this rule would yield desirable, community-building results: I will be 
friendly to you, as I want you to be friendly to me. I will not ignore you, as I would not 
want you to ignore me. I will fulfill my obligations to you, as I would want you to fulfill 
your obligations to me. Like many rules, however, the golden rule is only as good as how 
we choose to use it. The problem today is that this rule can be used to actually encourage 
isolation, providing the rationale behind much of today’s voluntary withdrawal from 
relationships and communities: I will leave you alone, as I want you to leave me alone. I 
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will not talk to you, as I want you to not talk to me. I will not expect anything from you, 
as I do not want you to expect anything from me. 
Of course, this would not happen if we used the golden rule properly, namely, 
treat everyone the way you would have anyone treat you. The golden rule is supposed to 
be anonymous and universal—“you” can be anyone, and you must imagine being in 
anyone else’s shoes. The anonymity and universality may even be considered necessary 
qualities to any rule—after all, what good is a rule if not everyone can follow it? Perhaps 
Kant, an Enlightenment thinker, had the right idea of universalism with his Categorical 
Imperative, which, grossly simplified, is: “Don’t do anything that the universal doing of 
which would make you not want to do it.” In other words, whatever act you are about to 
perform, imagine a universe full of individuals performing the same act, and only if you 
can desire that universe, should you proceed with the act. Since we, assuming we have 
moral capacity, would not desire the universal doing of killing, lying, stealing, and 
cheating, we are to conclude on our own that we ought to refrain from such acts. And by 
universalizing any act we are about to do, we make it impossible to use the Categorical 
Imperative selfishly—just as we would not want a universe full of killing, we would not 
want a universe where everyone ignores one another, doesn’t talk to one another, and 
doesn’t have any expectations from one another. Leaving each other alone in isolation is 
among the things we should not do because we would not desire the universal doing of it. 
For those who understand themselves primarily in terms of relationships, 
however, where no one is an isolated individual, and everyone has a relational identity, 
the very universality and anonymity of rules make them difficult to use. For instance, 
what does it mean for me (your daughter, your employee, your constituent) to treat you 
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(my mother, my boss, my representative) as I would have others treat me? What does it 
mean for me to treat my mother the way I would have everyone treat everyone else? Or is 
it that I should treat everyone the way I would have my mother treat her daughter? Can I 
desire a universal doing of being a good mother? Can I even conceive of a universe of 
mothers? 
Yes, I am playing with words. The point here is that the way I want to be treated, 
and the way I treat you, depends on what our relationship is. And the two treatments are 
not always mirror images, because we don’t all occupy the same positions. Do bosses 
want to be treated by their employees the same way employees want to be treated by their 
bosses? Do diners want to be treated by their waitresses the same way waitresses want to 
be treated by their diners? No; diners want their waitresses to be knowledgeable and 
quick, while waitresses want their diners to be hungry and generous (for instance). And it 
would be absurd to desire a universe of the quick and knowledgeable or the hungry and 
generous. One part (waitresses) requires the other (diners) to even make a desirable 
universe. This is why the relationship culture requires more particularity in any standard 
rule—the basic assumption is that one needs the other to fulfill his place. The two 
different places must be present together to complete one relationship. 
Thus, the relational golden rule, as articulated by my informant, is universal 
enough to be applicable to anyone, but particular enough to suit the various relationships 
we identify with: treat your husband the way you would have all husbands treated; treat 
your employees the way you would have all employees treated; treat your neighbors the 
way you would have all neighbors treated. The rule habituates us to imagine what would 
make those relationships good or better, and to think of individuals as participants in 
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those relationships. 
In adhering to the relational golden rule, there are two forms of reciprocity that 
emerge. The first is more direct and immediate, which is the more familiar form of 
reciprocity. Take for instance, my informant Jessica’s weekly small group organized by 
her church.88 In this group, all members took turns hosting, which meant opening their 
home and providing the food. This kind of short-term give-and-take is horizontal 
reciprocity. Every member had the responsibility of hosting, as well as the opportunity to 
be the guest. The second form of reciprocity is more long-term and indirect, vertical 
reciprocity, which was also present in Jessica’s group. In addition to their regular 
meetings amongst themselves, the group held special gatherings once in awhile inviting 
younger members of the church, with the aim of “training them to properly lead and 
partake in a small group.” Doing for the future members in this way does not yield any 
direct return to the present members, but the hope is that the payoff will go vertically, 
into the future when the future members are in the position of present members—also 
known as pay-it-forward. Anticipating long-term reciprocity is an example of what 
Robert Bly calls vertical thought—“the Native American view that whenever one makes 
a decision, one should think of its effect down to the seventh generation….”89 By 
understanding ourselves as relational beings, in addition to the anonymous and universal 
“I do for you and you do for me,” a teacher does for his students, anticipating that one of 
those students will one day become a teacher, and do for his students. A boss does for his 
employees with the anticipation that one of those employees will one day become a boss, 
and do for his employees. A mother does for her daughter with the anticipation that she 
88  Jessica is a 33-year-old second generation Korean American. 
89  Bly 1996, 211.
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will one day become a mother, and do for her daughter. Relational roles actually 
encourage vertical thought, especially in hierarchical relationships where keeping score is 
not as easy.90 Sometimes the only way to return a favor is to do the same for a different 
person in the same relationship down the line, and the relational golden rule provides the 
language for such vertical reciprocity. 
The proper role
If the relational golden rule is to be followed, then, the question is, how would we 
have all employees treated? How would we have all neighbors treated? What is the 
proper role of a CEO? What defines a friend? A soldier? 
The problem of defining roles is impossible to overcome. There would be 
countless answers to the question “What is a friend?” and none would be perfectly 
adequate. Of course, the question is missing the point—we cannot define many relational 
roles in words, but not because we do not know what a friend is. We know a friend when 
we see one. We also know what a friend is not when we see a bad one. Most of us hold 
familiar images of what various roles look like. In fact, entire cultures hold familiar 
images of what certain roles look like, and when the images are so different, we call that 
culture shock. To my informants, this form of culture shock occurred so often, that it no 
longer shocked them. 
Charles (from Chapter 1) recalled his first time going over to a non-Korean-
friend’s house, and feeling “strange,” because “the father would play with us. And I 
thought, ‘Why is he playing with us? He’s so like me, he’s like a young kid.’” For a 
Korean American boy who was familiar with only Korean fathers, who he described as 
90  See Chapter 1.
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“stern, not very emotional or expressive,” and who “never plays with us,” his friend’s 
father presented a totally foreign image of what a father looks like. Another informant, 
Jeannie, female and recently married, talked about the notorious stereotype of the Korean 
mother-in-law, more specifically, the husband’s mother (si-uhmuhni).91 She sarcastically 
commented, “We have so many horror stories about our poor in-laws. They’re supposed 
to mistreat you (haha) so when they don’t, that’s good but we’re weirded out, like they’re 
pretending to be nice.” Fortunately, Jeannie’s mother-in-law, who was “so 
Americanized,” did not fit the Korean stereotype. She said, “My husband’s whole side is 
so Americanized. Even when I tried to do her dishes, she wouldn’t let me touch anything 
in the house. And I like that, but sometimes it makes me uncomfortable because I’m not 
doing enough. What if she’s just saying ‘no, no, no,’ but I’m supposed to say, ‘please, 
please, let me do your dishes?’”92 
From the role of parents to in-laws, teachers, and colleagues, my informants 
recalled experiences of initial discomfort when their familiar images were shattered, but 
they eventually learned to anticipate the difference and understand the difference as just 
that, without determining one as correct and the other as incorrect. The dad who plays 
with his kids is different, but not wrong, and perhaps an even better dad, according to 
Charles. In other words, my informants understood that others held different images of 
certain roles, and that they were not necessarily wrong, but they still prioritized fulfilling 
roles properly—the dad must still be a dad—and they firmly held on to their own image 
of what a dad looks like.  
91  Jeannie is a 30-year-old second generation Korean American. 
92  Based on how well-known this stereotype is, it would seem that the horrible mother-in-law is common. 
Interestingly, however, all of my married female informants talked about how their mother-in-law is not 
the “typical si-uhmuhni.” And yet, all of them considered themselves uniquely lucky for not having the 
typical si-uhmuhni. 
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The relationship culture does not dictate “The teacher is supposed to be x, y, and 
z,” but it does say “Don’t forget he is the teacher.” Recognition of the relationship, or 
bothering to ask, “What am I to you? And what obligations follow from that?” is the 
important part, not so much a consensus on what certain relationships’ obligations are. It 
is one thing to disagree on what the proper role of a teacher is; it is another to declare that 
because there is no consensus, it matters not what kind of teacher one is or we can forget 
that one is a teacher at all. Disagreement is no reason to turn relativist, or to neglect 
altogether the significance of relational roles. 
Like other rules, the greater purpose of the relational golden rule is not so much to 
arrive at a consensus to enforce the rule, but to think seriously about what roles look like 
when properly fulfilled. There will be disagreement, and there will be a range of answers, 
though no absolutely right answers. There are, however, wrong answers, or improper 
ways to perform roles—the actions that put an end to that role or relationship. The proper 
role of a friend may cover a wide range, but it would not include no longer being a friend; 
the proper role of a husband may cover a wide range, but it would not include no longer 
being a husband (or divorcing his wife). The point of thinking about proper roles is not to 
condemn those who disagree, but to remind ourselves that we do, in fact, have such roles, 
and to perform them in the way we believe fulfills the obligations inherent in that role. 
Just as the golden rule assumes a moral capacity of the individual, the relational golden 
rule assumes a moral capacity of the relational individual. Mothers are capable of 
envisioning a good mother, and teachers are capable of envisioning a good teacher. 
Is the relational golden rule asking too much? Is imagining various proper roles 
too difficult a task? I think not. There is a great book called I am the Teacher, You are 
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the Student, by Patrick Allitt (a British professor of American History, who has taught in 
the states for decades but still calls himself a foreigner), which promotes a “stay within 
your role” motto for today’s college professors.93 He begins the book by urging teachers 
to resist becoming friends with their students, which evidently is increasingly common, 
and he repeats this mantra throughout the book. Allitt does not get philosophical about 
what exactly a teacher is, nor does he offer a grandiose explanation of a teacher’s 
obligations. But he does not have to. He is assuming that the simple reminder of “I am a 
teacher” is sufficient. He certainly gives examples and suggestions for teachers, but the 
underlying message is not “This is what makes a teacher,” but rather, “Be a teacher.” For 
ordinary people in ordinary places, the sheer recognition of one’s position in relation to 
the other can be the beginning of fulfilling the proper role, and it need not be a difficult 
task. 
It is worth addressing here a question that any East Asian scholar would have 
asked by now: Is the relationship culture the same as Confucianism? There are certainly 
parallels between the two—the relationship is the basic unit, hierarchy is essential to any 
interaction, and properly playing one’s role is central to the goal of social harmony.94 The 
Confucian influence on Koreans is undeniable, and in form, the relationship culture can 
certainly be Confucian. However, the content is where the two diverge, and thus I am 
hesitant to label the Korean American community as Confucian. Confucianism models all 
relationships after the family, but as noted by Mary Yu Danico, the nature of immigration 
dramatically alters the Korean American family, making it very un-Confucian. For 
93  Allitt 2005. 
94  From translated works of Confucius and Xunzi, classic Confucians, respectively: “[T]he ruler must rule, 
the minister minister, the father father, and the son son.” Ames 1998, 12.11; “Where the classes of 
society are equally ranked, there is no proper arrangement of society; where authority is evenly 
distributed, there is no unity; and where everyone is of like status, none would be willing to serve the 
other.” Knoblock 1988-1994, 9:3. 
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instance, parents become more dependent on their children (something as mundane as 
calling the cable company, or translating a letter, is an all-too familiar task for young 
Korean Americans); both parents contribute to the household income; and because both 
parents work, grandparents (who often cannot communicate with the grandchildren) 
become the caretaker.95 In other words, Korean Americans prioritize properly fulfilling 
roles (form), but their idea of what the proper roles looks like is far from the Confucian 
ideal (content).96
Habits of language
Recognizing one another in terms of relationships is largely acquired as a 
linguistic habit over time. Mostly in their late twenties or early thirties, my informants 
held rather solid ideas of what certain roles are supposed to look like, though they did not 
always live up to them. This is, I suppose, the predictable product of individuals raised 
within the relationship culture. Regular reminders of what brothers do, what friends do, 
what students do, become ingrained in their minds and habits. Language is largely 
habitual, and even small comments made in passing, when done regularly, can become 
the voices in their heads when they are not spoken anymore. 
At a Korean American church I was visiting, several children were playing while 
their parents watched nearby. Two boys, David and Jacob, were fighting over the same 
toy. It eventually led to both of them in tears, at which point one of the moms came over, 
95  Danico 2004, Chapter 4. 
96  To be sure, as many scholars argue, contemporary Koreans are Confucian, whether they know it or not. 
(See Koh 1996 and Lee 1998.) However, if Koreans are not identifying themselves as Confucian, and 
further, if many Koreans are explicitly against Confucianism, I hardly see any worth in insisting that 
Koreans are, in fact, Confucian. When addressing Korean Americans of the 1.5 and second generations 
in particular, Confucianism becomes even remote, as most of them are not at all familiar with term 
Confucianism. 
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took the toy and handed it to Jacob. David cried (in Korean), “Why does he get it?” The 
mom replied (in Korean), “because you’re the hyung (older brother). You have to give in 
to your dongseng (little brother).” This is actually not a reasonable answer at all—being 
younger is no logical reason to get the toy. But this is how the language of the 
relationship culture goes. The response to “Why do this?” is “because I am the so-and-
so.” It is not a utilitarian answer (because this produces the best outcome), or an emotivist 
answer (because I feel like it), or even a just answer (because this is fair). 
David didn’t like the answer much, and there is probably no answer he would 
have been satisfied with. But the lesson from this short interaction is that hyungs, just by 
virtue of being older, are supposed to give in to their dongsengs.97 And with a repetition 
of such lessons, we can imagine how David will eventually not need someone else to tell 
him what to do as the hyung. He will, on his own, do the things that he believes hyungs 
simply do. And Jacob, also having heard the mom, will learn the same lesson that hyungs 
give in to dongsengs, and when he is one day the hyung, he will know that he is supposed 
to give in to his dongsengs (hence vertical reciprocity). 
Recognizing our obligations to others does not happen over night. As much as we 
want to foster responsibility toward others, if we don’t acquire the habitual language that 
regularly remind us of our obligatory relationships to each other and the reasons why, we 
will not see the obligation in our relationships. If our primary language is one of 
individualism and not that of relationships, we are going to look more like self-interested 
individuals than a community. This is precisely the angle taken by Robert Bellah (and 
company) in Habits of the Heart. While the authors’ evidence for the claim that ordinary 
97  I found out later that David and Jacob are not actually brothers, and I never found out if the mom who 
settled the dispute was either one of the boys’ moms. But David is older, and both families are members 
of the same church.
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Americans do, in fact, derive their morality from some form of individualism is 
questionable,98 they compellingly argue that language is largely habitual, and that habits 
acquired over time shape the character of individuals and that of a collective. In their later 
work, The Good Society, the authors point out that utilitarian individualism works to 
neglect any moral meaning and the common good, but instead promotes the calculation 
of means and ends. The utilitarian language, “Does it work? Is it effective?” is 
increasingly becoming the only common language in American society. If it works, it’s 
good; if it doesn’t, it’s bad. Because we live in a liberal democracy where we believe that 
everyone is free to formulate his own idea of the good, we expect utility to be the only 
agreeable version of the good; that is, we expect to disagree on “the good,” but we expect 
to at least agree on whether or not something works. So at times, we resort to the 
utilitarian language, even if we don’t mean it, simply because we don’t have any other 
common language.99 We do not aspire to be purely utilitarian, or to neglect the common 
good, but we end up sounding and acting as if we do. And precisely because language is 
habitual, in more ways than one, we need to be attentive to the kind of language we use, 
especially with our children. 
Recently, cash incentive programs for students, programs that pay students for 
good grades, have begun in various parts of America. There are many variations of the 
program, and they are being implemented from elementary schools to college, but the 
general idea has attracted much attention and debate. Studies claim that it works—cash-
98  See Stout 1988, Chapter 9, for a critique on the interview methods in Habits of the Heart. 
99  I was quite disturbed but not very surprised when a discussion of torture with my undergraduate students 
quickly turned into a utilitarian one—“Does it work?” was determined to be the only question that could 
decide whether or not a state ought to use torture. Applying the same question to significant issues such 
as slavery or, more recently, universal healthcare, is also disturbing. 
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for-kids schools, as they are called, show significant improvement in grades.100 I have not 
looked into the studies themselves, but I have no doubt that it works. What I find 
troubling is the habitual language spoken in such a practice, even if the language is not 
the intention of the program. By paying students for good grades, students are getting the 
message that they should study hard in order to get paid, not because that is what simply 
students do. Proponents of the program say, “But it works! Grades are up!” as if results 
are the only thing that matter. If the answer to, “Why do I study?” is consistently 
“because you want to get paid,” we are habituating young Americans to only do what 
pays. We shouldn’t be surprised if these students grow up to be adults only capable of 
speaking the utilitarian language, only looking to maximize the payoff. Bad habits, as 
well as good ones, are hard to break.
What the relationship culture does, that the individualist culture cannot, is to 
habituate us to recognize ourselves as being in relationships, and thus move us to 
voluntarily fulfill the obligations inherent in those relationships. To some degree, that is 
precisely what many scholars, those concerned with the decline of community, are trying 
to do. Communitarian Alasdair MacIntyre’s Dependent Rational Animals reminds us that 
human beings are interdependent on one another, just by virtue of being human.101 
Stephen Carter begins his book Civility by stating that our isolation, the assumption that 
we have no passengers, is an illusion.102 In profound ways, the relationship culture has 
similar veins, and the promotion of community is certainly a shared aim. 
100 See New York Post article entitled “Learn & Earn Plan Pays Off: Scores soar at cash-for-kids schools” 
by Kelly Magee and Yoav Gonan. June 8, 2009. 
101 MacIntyre 1999. 
102 Carter 1998.
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To be sure, there are limits to the relationship culture, in addition to the risks that 
were mentioned thus far. For one, not every human interaction can be a sustainable, 
meaningful relationship, as it is difficult to see some human interactions as anything 
beyond strictly contractual. It is much easier to think of primary relationships as being 
inherently obligatory, and even they are difficult (perhaps more so at times) to maintain. 
What the relationship culture does is make contracts more like relationships, rather than 
make relationships more like contracts, as the language of the market does. Relationship 
culture assumes fundamentally that there is something more to every human interaction 
than a contract, even in a relationship as explicitly economic as between a diner and a 
waitress. As soon as a relationship is recognized, they are no longer strangers, no longer 
anonymous consumers and producers, and that is what a sense of community is. The 
ideals of the relationship culture is not unique to Korean Americans, but it inadvertently 
is what lays the foundation of the Korean American community. 
About choice
If the relationship culture is habitual, is it voluntary? Is the habitual language of 
the relationship culture a form of brain-washing, beginning at a young age, indoctrinated 
into seeing oneself and others as being in relationships they did not autonomously 
choose? How important is the “voluntary” part of “voluntary associations”? How 
important is the “freedom” part of “freedom of association”? 
The subject of choice and freedom in relationships and associations is by no 
means a simple matter. It may seem as though the relationship culture only emphasizes 
the fulfilling of one’s relational obligations, regardless of whether or not one voluntarily 
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signed up for those relationships—duty over choice, collective over self, relationship 
over autonomy. While such an impression is not entirely incorrect, the dichotomy is quite 
an exaggeration. Prioritization is perhaps a more helpful tool than stark dichotomization. 
Rather than parting people, ideas, and scholarly camps, into oppositions, framing debate 
in terms of the order of priorities is not only more accurate, but more appealing. Very few 
scholars, and even fewer ordinary Americans, intentionally position themselves in one or 
other extreme, and the real differences between major camps often lie in the order of 
priorities. 
For instance, in civil society discussions, liberal scholars prioritize the 
“voluntary” aspect—the freedom to associate (or not), and what that freedom entails. 
Rosenblum’s priority is the experience of pluralism, the freedom to go from one group to 
another, not so much the existence of pluralism, or the variety of groups (and never mind 
the commitment to a group).103 Of course, the experience of pluralism would not be 
possible if it were not for the numerous groups, but that is essentially a given background 
factor. She is (correctly) assuming that plenty of associations exist, but concerned that 
even with so many, individuals are prohibited from experiencing pluralism, due to any 
number of reasons—from exclusive and greedy groups, to lack of access to any group for 
certain individuals. She writes, “The principal thing is that alternative associations are 
available for the alien or unwanted. And that associations do not keep their members 
captive or permanently cut off; that members have a real choice of discontinuing 
affiliation.”104 And this is precisely why the underclass is a major concern—associations 
103 Rosenblum 1998, 17. “But it does not suffice for moral development that the social stock of values and 
practices carried by associations is abundant if the lives of men and women are terminally fixed and 
situated, if they are unable to exploit freedom of association. The possibility of shifting involvements 
among associations—the experience of pluralism by men and women personally and individually—is 
what counts.” (Emphasis in original.)
104 Rosenblum 1998, 64. 
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are not available to them, so they do not have the option to join any, even if they wanted 
to. 
Liberal scholars also recognize the costs that come with the territory of freedom 
of association, including the freedom to exclude, to not associate. (The exemplary case 
heavily cited is Roberts v. Jaycees, where liberal scholars mostly agree that the Court’s 
decision infringes upon the members’ freedom to not accept women as full members.)105 
The correct solution to exclusion is not to coerce groups to be inclusive, but to make 
more inclusive groups available to more people, so that they can choose to join a group 
(or create their own). In essence, by prioritizing freedom and choice, liberals are not anti-
community or anti-relationships, but pro-freedom and pro-choice. A tight-knit 
community is not bad in itself, and neither is not belonging to a group, but the first 
question is always, “Did you freely make this choice? Can you freely walk in and out of 
this group?” 
The rhetoric of choice and freedom has always been fundamental to liberalism, 
though as Barber notes, the meaning of choice has changed over time. Whereas the 
concern was once with “pluralism of the human condition and the openness of human 
development” (which is, I believe, what Rosenblum is talking about), “choice” has now 
been distorted to refer to “endless trivial choices,” in the market and society at large, 
which was not the vision of liberalism nor capitalism.106 Still, however evolved the depth 
and scope of choice may be, freedom of choice is the fundamental element of liberalism 
and of liberal democracy. Thus, not only liberal scholars but general attitudes of the free 
market and the free society, may look unfavorably upon the norms of the relationship 
105 See Rosenblum 1998, Chapter 5, and Gutmann 1998, Chapters 1, 3-6, 8. 
106 Barber 2007, 335. 
83
culture, which often treats relationships as a given, and prioritizes the obligations inherent 
in those relationships, whether or not one voluntarily entered the relationship. In other 
words, the relationship culture assumes individuals are always in relationships, but how 
they got there is not of primary importance. This is by no means to suggest that the 
voluntary aspect—the freedom to enter and leave relationships, especially if they are 
harmful—matters not at all in the relationship culture, but rather that the order of 
priorities are different. “What are the obligations of this relationship I find myself in?” is 
the first question. “Did I freely enter this relationship? Can I freely end it?” is not the 
most pressing matter. The recognition of the relationship comes first, in chronology and 
significance. 
To be sure, Rosenblum is talking about associations in general, not only 
interpersonal relationships or tight-knit communities. Nonetheless, the un-liberal stance 
of prioritizing relational obligation over individual choice raises important questions 
about the connection between relationships and choice. Do we, in fact, choose our 
relationships? Should we? And if we don’t choose our relationships, should we still be 
expected to properly fulfill our relational roles? 
In actuality we seem to have very little choice in much of our relationships. Just 
as Stephen Carter (and Tocqueville) claimed that isolation is an illusion, the ability to 
choose our relationships is also, to a large degree, an illusion. Just as we live amongst 
passengers but fancy that we live alone, we often find ourselves in relationships but fancy 
that we choose them (or we simply refuse to recognize them). Even the relationships that 
we do choose bring with them a whole host of relationships we did not choose. For 
instance, we choose a spouse, but not our in-laws. We choose a professor, but not our 
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classmates. We choose a job, but not our bosses and colleagues. We choose a roommate, 
but not our neighbors. We choose our friends, but not our friends’ friends. As much 
emphasis as civil society scholars place on the voluntary association, most of us have 
more relationships with those we had little say in than those we deliberately chose. 
It may be argued that meaningless interactions and by-products of chosen 
relationships do not constitute relationships at all, and that until the individual chooses to 
form a relationship with the in-laws, classmates, and others, there is no meaningful 
relationship. The liberal sentiment is that the direct aftermath of an individual’s choices 
ought to be his to deal with, but not much else. The saying, “You’ve made your bed, now 
lie in it,” is a nice sum-up, point being that choice comes first—the bed gets made before 
one lies in it. And because the bed was made by choice, one ought to lie in it. The flip 
side to this attitude is that what an individual did not choose is not his to deal with—if 
one did not make his bed, he does not have to lie in it. (Perhaps the bed isn’t even 
considered his anymore, if he didn’t make it.) Following this logic, individuals cannot be 
expected to recognize relationships they did not choose, let alone fulfill the obligations of 
those relational roles. 
There is a reason Americans are perplexed by ancient Greek tragedies. The 
characters often pay the price for choices they did not freely make—the ultimate tragedy, 
what Alford calls “responsibility without freedom.”107 Why does Oedipus have to suffer 
for an act he was doomed to commit? Why does Antigone have to suffer for an act she 
107 See Alford 1992, Chapter 5. An excerpt: “Consider the case of a young man, one of ten thousand 
children born to cocaine-addicted mothers each year in New York City. … Finally, imagine that he gets 
caught up in drug dealing, finally kills someone, and is arrested and bound over for trial. What is a just 
resolution? Was this young man truly free to choose to do otherwise? … He was not free. Nonetheless, 
he is responsible for what he has done and should be punished. But that is not fair, it might be argued. In 
fact, it is tragic. Absolutely. That is the point. tragedy means, above all else, that people are responsible 
without being free.” 115. 
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was doomed to (born to) commit?  Did either of them have the freedom to do otherwise? 
No, they had no freedom, but they are still responsible. That is tragedy, according to 
Alford. The whole notion is utterly contrary to liberalism and Western ideals, which 
essentially associates choice with legitimacy. There is no satisfying explanation for an 
unhappy ending when there was no freedom of choice involved. 
At any rate, what is more important than whether or not we have a choice, is 
whether or not we believe we have a choice. The belief that we choose our relationships 
feeds the illusion, and just as the language of isolation can lead to actual isolation, the 
emphasis on choice can lead to individuals trying to choose all of their relationships in 
actuality. While the attempt at total control over entering/exiting relationships could have 
fortunate outcomes (freedom! empowerment!), there could be unfortunate outcomes as 
well—one, we may be severely disappointed when we realize we can’t choose all of our 
relationships; two, we may end up cutting off a lot of our ties (of course, by choice) and 
eventually become isolated. 
As Michael Walzer pointed out, many relationships are not freely chosen, but that 
does not make them any less legitimate. In fact, those involuntary associations are 
necessary for us to learn how to exercise the freedom we have. In his contribution to a 
work titled Freedom of Association, edited by Amy Gutmann, Walzer writes, “The ideal 
picture of autonomous individuals choosing their connections (and disconnections) 
without restraints of any sort of an example of bad utopianism.” He continues, “Many 
valuable memberships are not freely chosen; many binding obligations are not entirely 
the product of consent. … We join groups, we form associations, we organize and are 
organized—within a complex set of constraints. These take many different forms, some 
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of which I shall try to describe in such a way as to suggest their legitimacy.”108 Walzer is 
perhaps taking the concept of freedom too far—few liberal scholars believe in total and 
utter freedom from childhood, and even they would find eliminating all forms of 
involuntary ties unimaginable and impossible. He is, however, making the very valid and 
much needed point in a culture (and discipline) in love with freedom—free choice 
requires involuntary association.109 
Walzer’s first legitimate and involuntary form of constraint is familial and social 
(family, country, social class). The family is arguably the most obvious form of 
association where exercising little choice is accepted and expected. The attitude regarding 
choice toward family members is very different from the attitude of choice toward others. 
We largely don’t choose our family, and though we do exercise some choice (through 
marriage, divorce, etc.), our general attitude towards family is that they are permanent 
(and even unconditional) relationships. The question of choice—did I choose this family 
member? can I leave this family if I so choose?—does not quite fit in a family. Family 
tends to be viewed as “given,” the people in our lives who we cannot pick or kick out—
not because we chose to be related to them and we must live with our choices, but 
because we are related to them. They are a part of who we are, and vice versa, which 
makes the power of choice in a family hardly empowering. 
Of course, there are plenty of instances where considerable amount of choice is 
exercised in the family, most notably through marriage or divorce, but also in more subtle 
ways like who to see more, who to get along with, etc. There are also instances of 
108 Walzer 1998 (Ed. Gutmann), 64.  
109 The full quote: “The point is obvious, I think, but still worth stating clearly: free choice requires 
involuntary association. Without it, there won’t be individuals strong enough to face the uncertainties and 
difficulties of freedom; there won’t be clear and coherent alternatives among which to choose; there 
won’t be any political protection against the enemies of free choice; there won’t even be the minimal 
trust that makes voluntary association possible.” Walzer 1998 (Ed. Gutmann), 72. 
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harmful families where the choice to leave actually is empowering or even a matter of 
survival. For the most part, however, in just about every culture known to man, family is 
still largely a treasured place, and the involuntary nature of the family is still largely 
considered a norm. What may not be universal is treating non-family members like 
family—to see them as somehow related, and to accept those relationships as involuntary 
and “normal,” without the element of choice being a priority. This is the relationship 
culture—habitually recognizing others as related. 
Listening to my informants talk about their community, their social circles, and 
their associations, the term “family” was used again and again—sometimes referring to 
actual family, and sometimes highlighting the family-like dynamics of the not-
necessarily-family. When we habitually use the language of the relationship culture with 
those who are not family, we inadvertently create a community that is as normal and 
inherently obligatory as the family. As Philip Selznick writes, “The prime virtue of 
community is an ethos of open-ended obligation.” He continues, “Parents have open-
ended obligations to their children, and children to their parents. In these relationships 
people often make choices—whether and whom to marry, whether to have children, and 
how many—but once the commitment has been made, choice fades in importance.”110 For 
my informants, their community was a normal and open-obligatory staple in their lives, 
just as their family was. 
Normalness of community
I asked my informants, “Do you consider yourself a part of the Korean 
community?” to which most responded, “I guess,” or “I think so.” Some shrugged, and 
110 Selznick 2002, 24. 
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some weren’t sure what I meant by Korean community. One informant answered, “No, 
but I know all the Koreans around here.” Though none responded with a clear “No,” few 
were enthusiastic about belonging to the Korean community. Based on this observation 
alone, it may seem as though there is no vibrant Korean community, at least not among 
the 1.5/second generation. It turned out, however, that almost all of my informants were 
part of large networks primarily consisting of Koreans (social, familial, business, and 
religious), with those networks almost always overlapping. 
Why, then, the apparent lack of enthusiasm about their community? For one, my 
informants seemed uneasy with the idea of belonging to a community solely identified by 
ethnicity. They often talked about “the Korean community” as a group separate from 
themselves, and sometimes in a negative light, referring to the stereotypes of Koreans. 
But when they claimed (or realized) that their regular contacts, social circles, and 
intimate relationships—in other words, their communities—were mostly Korean, they 
seemed to have the attitude of “my community happens to be made up of Koreans, but it 
didn’t have to be.” This attitude is what ignited and confirmed my belief that the Korean 
community is dependent not so much on the ethnic make-up of its members, but 
primarily the values, ideals, habits, and customs. (This will be further elaborated in 
Chapter 3.) 
The second reason (and the focus here) my informants were not very enthusiastic 
about belonging to a Korean community, is that they were too used to it. Most of them 
had also been living in the Washington area since childhood—comments like “We grew 
up together,” “Our parents have been friends for twenty years,” “I’ve been going to this 
church since I was born,” were very common. Seen in this light, the Korean community 
89
my informants belonged to resembles the traditional community, where the rules are 
unwritten and enforced by norms and mores, circumstances have unintentionally created 
a community (such as immigration, mobility, job, suburban lifestyle, etc.), and the 
community itself becomes so present in everyday life that it becomes the backdrop, 
which often goes unnoticed. So it is not that they decided to enter the Korean community, 
or that they like or dislike being in it, but rather that they have never been without it. 
Though there are Korean Americans more explicitly aware of the Korean community, the 
majority of young Korean Americans are not. Several of my informants even commented 
that they had never reflected so much on their own lives as a part of the Korean 
community until the interview. Accordingly, among this generation of Korean 
Americans, it is more accurate to speak of a “sense of community,” as opposed to an 
identifiable “community.”111 
This is not to downplay the enormity of ethnicity, immigration, or the concrete 
ethnic associations that initiate and renew the sense of community. However, as stated in 
the Introduction, the ethnic community is viewed very differently between the first 
generation and the 1.5/second generation. The 1.5/second generation does not so much 
need or seek out the ethnic community, nor deliberately tries to maintain its livelihood, 
quite like the first generation has done and continues to do. Thus the backdrop factor is 
unique to my informants’ generation, and they primarily think of their community as a 
personal or social one, people they simply know or have known for a long time, and not 
necessarily distinguished by ethnicity. 
111 See McMillan 1986, 9, for a definition of sense of community: “In a sentence, the defnition we propose 
is as follows: Sense of community is a feeling that members have of belonging, a feeling that members 
matter to one another and to the group, and a shared faith that members’ needs will be met through their 
commitment to be together.” 
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My informants repeatedly commented, “We all know each other”—“we” meaning 
fellow Koreans in the region. The church was evidently a vital place in bringing Koreans 
together (perhaps the most vital for first generation), but it was by no means the only one. 
One informant recalled her high school as having “Korean lunch tables” where all of the 
Korean students just knew to sit from the first day, for four years straight. Another 
informant remembered being sent to a private elementary school, where she met the only 
two other Korean girls, who she remains best friends with to this day. And another 
informant talked about a Korean family who moved across the street long ago, who 
became friends, classmates, church members, and eventually business partners. There is 
serious overlapping of relationships amongst Korean Americans; their claim that they all 
know each other is hardly an exaggeration. 
Lotte is a Korean grocery store in Ellicott City, and it has become a regular stop 
for Koreans in the area. Mark, an informant, said, “A Korean couple should not go to 
Lotte together unless they want everybody to know”—“everybody” meaning Koreans.112 
Brooke said, “Going somewhere like Lotte, chances are, ninety percent, you’re going to 
run into somebody you know.” Of course, knowing everybody does not mean they enjoy 
regularly running into them. Brooke continued, “Sometimes I don’t want to go there 
because maybe I don’t feel like doing my make-up or taking a shower, when I just need 
to go pick up something.” Running into Koreans they know happens so frequently, not 
only because they go to places where there are a lot of Koreans, but because they know 
so many Koreans. 
The dating scene has its own patterns among a population where they all know 
each other. Set-ups by a third party are common, as meeting somebody at a bar or striking 
112 Mark is a 32-year-old 1.5er. 
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up a conversation with a stranger are extremely rare—because chances are, they are not 
strangers. (And how embarrassing would it be to find out you unknowingly hit on your 
friend’s sister?) Joyce (informant mentioned in Chapter 1) was set up with her to-be-
husband by a mutual acquaintance, and she recalled one of their first dates: “We talked 
about all the people we know, and it turned out we know a lot of the same people. He’s 
been around for awhile, he knows everybody.” Likewise, Brooke recalled a similar 
experience, of finding out her and her husband-to-be had many mutual friends. 
“Knowing everybody” is so common, that Korean Americans actually assume 
beforehand that they know each other, that they are no more than a few degrees apart. 
Lois, an informant, said, “Especially since my sister’s married now, I’m pretty sure we’re 
related to everybody, because his family is huge. You meet someone new, you may say 
their name and it’s ‘you’re so-and-so’ and ‘oh how do you know them’ and ‘oh their 
sister’s cousin is married to my brother,’ and it’s crazy. So not only do we all somehow 
know each other, we’re all related. (Pointing to me) we could be distant second 
cousins.”113 Lois is exaggerating a bit, but the point is that discovering mutual 
acquaintances happens so frequently among Korean Americans that it does not surprise 
them anymore. In fact, they are surprised when they meet Koreans they have absolutely 
no connection to. 
After an interview with Esther (from Chapter 1), a friend of hers joined us. The 
friend, wanting to set Esther up on a date with a guy, said, “He’s Korean, lives around 
here, went to Hebron (a high school in the area). His name is Peter, I don’t think you 
know him.” Esther responded, “He’s Korean and he went to Hebron and I don’t know 
him? Why don’t I know him?” as if to say, “Is something wrong with him?” This is the 
113 Lois is a 28-year-old second generation Korean American. 
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flip side of the belief that community is normal—those who are unknown are strangers, 
or just strange. 
Take the Virginia Tech shooting of 2007, which shook the Korean community 
and ignited all kinds of conversations in Korean circles. The attacker was 23-year-old 
Seung-hui Cho, a Korean American 1.5er, and a student at Virginia Tech. I asked all of 
my informants what their reaction was, and one informant answered, “I remember 
thinking, ‘Who let him get away with that? Where was his family? Where was his 
church?’” The thought that a young Korean American 1.5er, “just like me,” with parents 
who own a business, lives in the area, and grew up in the church, could have done 
something so unthinkable, was difficult to swallow. Something must not be right when a 
Korean American is not connected to fellow Korean Americans. (We will elaborate 
further on other reactions to this incident in Chapter 3.) 
When a sense of community and the assumption of “knowing everybody” is 
believed to be normal, then those individuals already speak the language of the 
relationship culture. They assume that they are a part of the web-like structure—and that 
is what a community is. To be sure, this community does not have to be an ethnic one, 
but the ethnic community that the first generation created has become the community 
where the second generation grew up in and belong to. As a result, my informants 
perceive the ethnic community as their community. Of course, as mentioned in the 
Introduction, there are plenty of Korean Americans who leave this community for 
whatever reason, but for those who stay connected to the community, there is a 
widespread belief in the normalness of it all. The ethnic dimension does not have to be a 
part of that normalness, though it inadvertently is. 
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The relationship culture is not unique to Koreans, and there is no reason it has to 
be. Many informants used the language of the relationship culture with non-Koreans, 
though such examples were usually limited to the workplace and not intimate 
relationships. It could be argued that sociologists have claimed for years that all human 
beings, in fact, are in some sort of relationship at all times, which is the basis of the 
relationship culture. We can imagine, however, an interaction between an individual who 
adheres to the relationship culture and an individual who adheres to the individualist 
culture, and its outcome; or what happens when one acknowledges a relationship and the 
other does not—the relationship does not exist. A relationship is not tangible; it cannot 
exist, be nurtured, or endure, unless it is regularly recognized, reinforced, and maintained 
by both (or all) participants. Like Jiae (Chapter One), who became “strangers” with her 
co-worker, my informants told stories of how they have to relate to Americans differently 
because they do not recognize the relationship as easily or habitually. Clearly, a 
relationship or a community cannot begin to form unless the recognition is mutual. 
The relationship culture may seem rather tautological or self-fulfilling—Korean 
Americans see each other in terms of relationships and therefore they are in those 
relationships. As unsatisfying (and unreplicable) as this sounds, today’s belief that 
community is normal is perhaps the most powerful predictor of tomorrow’s community. 
Building a community does not happen overnight, and the relationship culture, like any 
culture, did not emerge overnight. As much as we want to revive a sense of community in 
our society, habits are hard to break. And it is the habits, the habitual norms and mores of 
the Korean community, that has sustained and continues to sustain the community. 
When I first described to my advisor the relationship culture using references to 
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my informants, he said, “It’s society through the eyes of family.” This seems right. Like 
family, they understand individuals as related in some form, they see those relations as 
not necessarily chosen, and yet there is a legitimacy and a normalness in those 
relationships. As previously stated, the recognition of relationships does not always lead 
to healthy maintenance of relationships, but the relationship culture rubs off in the form 
of linguistic habits—giving individuals a vocabulary to uphold and reinforce their 
respective places in relationships and communities.
The assumptions of the relationship culture has much in common with the 
assumptions of communitarianism, the Western movement that emerged as a counter to 
liberalism and the hyper-individualism it encourages. Are Korean Americans, then, 
communitarian? Does the Korean community have anything beyond a communitarian 
message? Is the Korean community a good community? We turn to these questions next. 
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CHAPTER THREE
THE GOOD KOREAN COMMUNITY?
“Milosz: They live in that world, they fall in love there, marry, and spend all their time 
there. 
Wat: The warmth of brotherhood. Fraternité. Obviously, it took the genius of Dostoevsky 
to understand that this was fraternité ou la mort. Dostoevsky foresaw what that fraternité 
was capable of turning into.” (Aleksander Wat. My Century.) 
The relationship culture discussed thus far may sound similar to a growing 
movement, communitarianism. Leading the call for reviving communities in Western 
academia, communitarianism cannot be ignored when discussing any community, and the 
relationship culture explored thus far conveys much of the communitarian principles. At 
the very least, the relationship culture essentially presupposes a community by presuming 
the existence of relationships. Thus the more appropriate question for Korean Americans 
is not whether or not they constitute a community, but rather, what the nature of that 
community is. How does the Korean community measure against communitarian ideals? 
Is it a good community? And is that even the right question? What are the particulars of 
this community? Is it merely an ethnic community? Does this community have a place in 
today’s and tomorrow’s American civil society? What does civility have to do with this 
community? These are the questions that will guide this chapter. This chapter will first 
consider the Korean community alongside communitarianism, attempt a more realistic 
(or less utopian) take on the nature of communities in general, then consider the 
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relevance of the Korean community with the “civil” part of civil society. This chapter 
will also, compared to the first two chapters, rely more on the interviews and the 
participant observations of my informants. 
Communitarianism
In The Spirit of Community, Amitai Etzioni makes a call for rediscovering a moral 
voice and a sense of “we-ness” in America. He rightly points out that such a call is 
particularly appropriate for the time, 1990s, and the place, America. He writes, “The 
people of China, Eastern Europe, and Japan for that matter may well need to move in the 
opposite direction…. But this is not our problem at this stage of American history. To 
worry about excessive ‘we-ness’ is like suggesting in the depths of winter that we 
shouldn’t turn on a space heater because it might make us sweat.”114 I couldn’t agree 
more—the brilliance of any idea depends on the context in which it springs and is 
applied. But this begs the question, what about the people of two worlds? What direction 
do the Polish Americans, Japanese Americans, and Korean Americans need to move, on 
this spectrum of we-ness? 
Communitarianism is, for the most part, in a debate with liberalism or, its greater 
(easier) target, libertarianism. Though communitarians insist that they are not urging a 
return to traditional communities (neither possible nor desirable), they insist even more 
on halting the path we are now on, to isolated individualism. Balance is the magic word 
for communitarians, and their primary opponents are liberal camps that promote 
individual over collective, rights over duty, and freedom over responsibility. And because 
communitarians are trying to pull their audience toward the direction of “we” and away 
114 Etzioni 1993, 25-6. 
97
from “me,” it may seem as though communitarians do not have much to say to those who 
are already closer to the we-extreme—those already in communities, including members 
of tight-knit ethnic communities. In fact, members of ethnic communities may better fall 
under the category of those who need to shift towards the other direction, the “me” 
extreme, and thus not be the appropriate audience for the communitarian agenda. After 
all, while ethnic communities may not be the ideal community, they are at least 
communities. Do ethnic communities, then, not have much to learn from 
communitarianism? 
I am not certain how obvious it is that ethnic communities are, in fact, 
communitarian. For one, the assumption of a linear spectrum with “me” on end end and 
“we” on the other, may sit well with both communitarians and liberals, but not with 
ethnic communities, or more precisely, with the Korean community. In his book, The 
New Golden Rule, Etzioni creates the communitarian rule that essentially sums up the 
need for balance within the me-we spectrum: Respect and uphold society’s moral order 
as you would have society respect and uphold your autonomy.115 (The book is aptly titled, 
for the running theme from cover to cover is finding the happy medium between a social 
order that has a clear moral voice and an individualism that leaves everyone on his own.) 
The point I want to make here is that the golden rule assumes that “you” (the audience) 
would uphold your autonomy—that anyone in this day and age would likely prefer a lean 
towards the “me” end, and that this is an assumption shared by the opposing liberal 
camp. 
The me-we spectrum is certainly useful in providing the language for much of the 
communitarian argument, in conveying the communitarian message, and in 
115 Etzioni 1996, xviii. 
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demonstrating the push and pull with their libertarian opponents. To be sure, the essence 
of communitarianism does not rest on the spectrum alone, and one can be communitarian 
without necessarily agreeing with it. The me-we spectrum, however, is one with Western 
roots, which is perhaps why it is not noticeable (or not worth pointing out) to a Western 
audience. To non-Western peoples and communities, however, such a spectrum may 
make the entire debate nonsensical. 
The spectrum is especially ill-fitting for the layered self of the relationship 
culture, illustrated by the Russian nesting dolls, as discussed in Chapter 2. For the layered 
self, one’s relational position and autonomy is embedded within every layer, and every 
layer is simply one more sense of “we” as well as “me.” As a result, the layered self does 
not experience an inverse relationship between the “me” and “we” (as “me” strengthens, 
the “we” weakens, and vice versa). Rather, the two have a direct relationship—as “me” 
strengthens, so does “we.” This is not a push-and-pull, but a push-and-push. Alford 
briefly comments on this contrasting understanding of the self. He writes, “The 
individualism-collectivism continuum is misleading because it almost succeeds in 
rendering incomprehensible a fascinating empirical finding: Koreans who score highest 
on many measures of individualism also score highest on many measures of 
collectivism.”116 How can communitarians persuade an audience to “embrace community 
just as your embrace autonomy,” when that audience’s idea of autonomy is community? 
This is not to suggest that Korean Americans cannot be communitarian, but that 
theories themselves are often embedded with cultural assumptions, resulting in their 
inability to translate well to all audiences. The relationship culture conveys a subtly 
different version of communitarianism. It assumes the existence of a community, which 
116 Alford 1990, 51. 
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is not equivalent to advocating or embracing community, and in the relationship culture, 
embracing community is embracing autonomy. The key is not finding a balance between 
the two but figuring out which layer to put on when. 
Not only is communitarianism Western in its roots, it also contains a rosy-colored 
utopian character—a point often raised by critics, and not just the liberals. Jeffrey Stout, 
who doesn’t necessarily identify himself with either the liberal or communitarian camp, 
candidly summarized, “The main problem with communitarian criticism of liberal 
society, then is its implicitly utopian character. The critics do succeed, at times, in 
articulating quite reasonable misgivings many of us feel concerning life in our society. 
Yet they very rarely give us any clear sense of what to do about our misgivings aside 
from yearning pensively for conditions we are either unwilling or unable to bring 
about. ... Liberal responses to communitarian criticism, on the other hand, often show 
what seems to be smug insensitivity.”117 Herbert Gans, also not necessarily on either side, 
commented, “When Bellah insists that genuine community is ‘an inclusive whole, 
celebrating the interdependence of public and private life and of the different callings of 
all,’ he simply asks too much.”118  Stout’s work, Ethics After Babel, was published in 
1988 and primarily focused on MacIntyre as the spokesperson for communitarianism. 
Gans’s work, Middle American Individualism, was also published in 1988, and treats 
Bellah as the communitarian spokesperson. At the time, the communitarian movement 
was limited to a small group of outspoken and sometimes controversial scholars, who 
managed to sound pessimistic and at times even bitter while simultaneously delivering a 
utopian message. Since then, the communitarian movement has gained an impressive 
117 Stout 1988, 229. 
118 Gans 1988, 113. 
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following, created journals with prominent scholars, and published numerous popular 
books in its name. The criticisms, however, remain valid. Communitarians still seem to 
provide eternally optimistic happy-medium answers, and while it is difficult to disagree 
with them, it is also difficult to overlook their utopian tone.119
The argument here against communitarianism is not so much an attack, but a 
critical reminder. The Western root of contemporary communitarianism is 
understandable, even if that is not the authors’ intention, given that communitarians and 
their audiences are primarily Western. Their utopian character, however, largely ignores 
or downplays much of the problems inherent in community, that not only liberals, but 
communitarians themselves, can readily point out. Though I am largely sympathetic to 
the communitarian agenda, communitarians often seem to get so swept up in their vision, 
that they forget to mention the inherent costs associated with communities. 
It is worth noting here that a communitarian is not necessarily a member of a 
community and vice versa. Embracing community, or embracing the idea of community, 
does not require the real commitment of time and effort to any existing community. 
However, it would be difficult to imagine a genuine and knowledgeable communitarian 
who has no real experience as a member of a community—an experience which would 
inevitably expose the warts-and-all of that particular  community, while teaching a lesson 
about belonging to communities in general. 
119 Take, for instance, Etzioni’s The Spirit of Community (1993), which is filled with optimistic happy-
balance solutions: “[W]e need to strengthen the communitarian elements in the urban and suburban 
centers, to provide the social bonds that sustain the moral voice, but at the same time avoid tight 
networks that suppress pluralism and dissent.” (122); “Communitarian proponents of pluralism-within-
unity urge that everybody learn English while maintaining or regaining a knowledge of Hebrew, Italian, 
Japanese, or whatever as part of their subculture.” (157). Such goals are so much easier said than done, 
that the ease with which Etzioni declares them almost mocks the difficulty with which they would have 
to be carried out in real life. 
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Talking about community (a digression) 
Scholars who worry about the decline of community often provide arguments as 
to why it is beneficial, or in our interest, to be more engaged in community. A section of 
Bowling Alone titled “So What?” is dedicated to just that, a list of the categories that 
would benefit from a rise in social capital: education and children’s welfare, safe and 
productive neighborhoods, economic prosperity, even health and happiness, and of 
course, democracy.120 While Putnam may be right that participation in group life leads to 
advantages in other areas of life, framing the argument in terms of why it is better for us 
to be in communities invites a line of criticisms. The most common is a straightforward 
“you are wrong” approach, that a strengthening of community does not always result in 
positive outcomes, that in fact, some groups and associations are only destructive to safe 
neighborhoods, prosperity, and health and happiness. Liberal scholars lead this line of 
argument, but they are not the only ones, and of course, both sides are right—some 
groups produce good outcomes while some produce bad ones. But at this point, the 
temptation is to become consumed with defining what constitutes a good association or a 
good group. 
When Putnam’s Bowling Alone first appeared as an article, Michael Foley and 
Bob Edwards wrote, “[W]e must pursue nagging empirical questions about the ways in 
which social power is constituted, distributed, and managed in contemporary societies. 
One avenue… would be to inquire more deeply into the sorts of associational life likely 
to produce the ‘social capital’ on which Putnam has put so much weight.”121 Many 
scholars have made similar claims, and numerous case studies have been conducted, with 
120 These are the titles of Bowling Alone Chapters 17-21. 
121 Foley and Edwards 1996, 48-49. 
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the question, Is this association good or bad? This sort of categorization, then, tends to 
dominate the debate, though most groups are not wholly good or bad, and such labels 
only miss the point of the more important concerns of group life in general. 
There is another line of criticisms, one that does not result in a superficial 
categorization, but in messier empirical research that deserves more attention. During the 
course of my research, I enrolled in a course in the Department of Urban Studies and 
Planning. The course was, broadly speaking, about communities, and the first paper 
assignment was, “What is a good community?” The question is simple, but I quickly 
realized the impossibility of the assignment. Good for whom? Its members or its society? 
Good in what way? A sense of belonging, self-respect, or charity? Good from my 
perspective or others’? And what exactly constitutes a community? I came up with more 
questions than answers, which, I suppose, was the point of the assignment. 
Identifying and defining a good community is no easy task, and in order to do 
justice to any group, we must resist the urge to categorize a group as “good” or “bad,” 
and even more so, the urge to base goodness on whether a group produces civic virtue or 
not. Every group is its own small world, and sweeping generalizations do more harm than 
help to answer the important question of what the nature of a particular group is and what 
it has to do with the society at large. This is a much broader topic, perhaps so broad 
which makes the study more difficult, but that is no reason to drown ourselves in 
categories and definitions or to throw out the important inquiry altogether. 
Years before Putnam became famous, Roland Warren wrote in The Good 
Community Revisited, “There is no one good community.”122 Warren began the work with 
a list of “desirable characteristics that are often mentioned,” but warned that the degree of 
122 Warren 1986, 35. 
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one characteristic is going to affect the degree of another. For instance, autonomy is on 
the list and so is community viability, but as the former increases the latter decreases.123 
In other words, the characteristics are inseparable and interdependent, which would make 
increasing each characteristic to the maximum a backfiring exercise, and get us no closer 
to defining a good community. Warren continued, “Rather there is a whole series of good 
communities, depending on what weight you’ve given to each of a whole spectrum of 
different values. But this is not to say that serious consideration of the characteristics of 
the good community is meaningless or futile.”124 
Warren also noted that characteristics like apathy and ambiguity, conventionally 
believed to belong on the bad community list, are actually necessary to make a 
community better. In a wry tone, he wrote, “[T]hose apathetic people who don’t really 
care enough to take sides, but who only don’t want their peace disturbed. Good for them! 
We need controversy. We need issues portrayed emphatically and with strong 
representation. But we also need constraint. We need bystanders. In this sense, we need 
apathy. We need people who will clamp the lid on excessive partisanship.”125 Warren 
concluded the work with the following remark: 
Yes, I believe in the beloved community—whatever that means to you. I am not 
sure I know what it means even to me. But I’m going to keep trying to think and 
act in ways that help us to reconstruct our communities to be more worthy of 
human beings, and although we may occasionally disagree, I know that you will 
be dealing with the same things, but in your own way.126 
123 “You can’t have both beyond a certain point, and the hard choice is to find that point which gives the 
greatest amount of one at the least cost to the other.” Warren 1986, 26. 
124 Warren 1986, 35. 
125 Warren 1986, 37. 
126 Warren 1986, 38. 
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Once we acknowledge that there is no one good community, that the goodness of 
a community need not be measured by any specific number of things, and that every 
community inherently produces costs and benefits, we can move away from categories 
that are altogether unhelpful and move on to more careful studies of existing 
communities to ask what the nature of that particular community is, which would 
certainly include effects on the members’ health and happiness, effects on democracy, 
amongst others. For instance, rather than stating that a community ought to provide room 
for individual autonomy as well as the collective voice, we ought to study the dynamics 
of autonomy and collective within a particular community—question the members’ 
attitude regarding it, how the community deals with a clash between the two, what the 
outsiders’ perception of it is, etc. Rather than asking, “Is this a good community?” we 
ought to ask, “What is the nature of this community?” or simply, “What is this 
community like?” 
Numerous recent works have made such attempts, including Putnam’s later work, 
Better Together, a collection of rich stories on various communities, none of which can 
be simply summed up as good or bad, for democracy or otherwise.127 Likewise, we 
should not be so quick to categorize our findings, that we go in with a criteria in our 
hands and leave once the checklist is complete. Warren was not dismissing categories, 
but he emphasized the depth with which we ought to look at particular communities, 
prior to making broad generalizations, and prior to making normative judgments. I end 
this digression with a reminder that my intention is to do just that. 
We now turn to discussing “warts” within the Korean community—minding 
others (noonchi), representation, and shame, which are shared values of this community 
127 Putnam 2004.
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that were repeatedly mentioned by my informants, and I call them warts because they are 
an inherent part of this community but are not without harm. Furthermore, these are the 
concepts that are, in some shape or form, present in any group life. What I wish to argue 
here is that every community has its warts, which the communitarian literature does not 
discuss well, and that while communities are no panacea, they are still to be preferred 
over an isolated citizenry—warts and all. 
Minding others: noonchi (1)
At the sheer presence of another human being, we automatically become, at the 
very least, aware of them or mindful of them. Minding others is not equivalent to having 
feelings for them, conversing with them, or even thinking about them—all of which may 
result from their presence, but not necessarily. The bare minimum effect is minding, and 
even that alone can be stifling, since it demands more heightened senses than if they were 
not there. How well we mind others may also be known as social skills or people skills, 
but whatever we call it, it is only learned, practiced, and tested with others. As with most 
activities, the more we do it, the more accustomed to it and the better at it we become, 
and minding others, an inherent part of group life, is no exception. 
I use the phrase “minding others” because it has no obvious normative 
connotation, whereas terms such as “comforting” is clearly good and “stifling” is clearly 
not. Critics often say communities can be stifling, precisely because we have to mind 
others, and communitarians respond by reassuring audiences that the traditional 
communities of fast-gossip and no-privacy are long gone, and that embracing community 
does not have to be equivalent to embracing a stifling community.128 They then go on to 
128 See Etzioni 1993, 122. 
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elaborate on all of the good communities have to provide, inviting the criticism of 
utopianism. While communitarians are right, in that the traditional communities are 
indeed less common today, communities are inherently stifling, as some degree of 
minding others goes on in any kind of group life. We need not, however, try to hide or 
make up for this fact, or determine that it is a price we pay for the benefits of community. 
We ought to look more closely at what it means to mind others in particular communities 
and what the effects of minding others are. 
My informants demonstrated instances of minding the members of their 
community, and for them, it was not so much a matter of being pressured to do it or even 
being aware of it, but rather, something subtly weaved into their everyday interactions 
with one another. Most of them shrugged it off (just as they shrugged off their 
membership in the community; see Chapter 2) and minding others had become “normal” 
behavior. Mark (from Chapter 2), who was a member of a Korean church I visited, was 
contemplating when to visit his brother who lives out of town. He eventually decided to 
go during weekdays, taking time off of work, so as not to miss church on a Sunday. He 
said with a smile, “There’s too many eyes here.” An outsider may easily determine that 
Mark’s church puts too much pressure on him, making him feel not even free enough to 
visit his brother on a day of his choice. Mark, however, would simply rather give his 
church less to question him about, than to miss church and deal with having to explain his 
absence. Mark added, “It’s not a big deal either way, but still.” Likewise, recall Brooke 
(from Chapter 2), who would rather not go to Lotte without make-up than go and run in 
to an acquaintance. Either informant’s choice is, to a degree, stifling, in the sense that it is 
made while keeping others in mind, and they probably would have made different 
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choices had they not minded others or had no one to mind. But they seemed to accept 
minding others as part of the territory of belonging to their community, and it was, as 
they said, “no big deal.” 
When my informants talked about having to mind those in their community, they 
were pretty nonchalant about it. However, when they talked about minding others as 
something that Koreans in particular do, and thus from the third-person perspective and 
not the first, they were more judgmental, or even angry. Jiae, at her dad’s insistence, had 
bought her car from a dealer managed by a Korean, which meant paying more for the 
same car than if she were to buy it elsewhere. Like Mark and Brooke, Jiae talked about it 
as an inconvenience, still went along with it, but was sure to note, “This is how ridiculous 
Koreans are. They have to do everybody favors, remember everybody, even strangers, 
just because they’re Korean.” Of course, if strangers are remembered, they are not 
exactly strangers. To Jiae, however, the dealership manager was no personal 
acquaintance of hers, and thus no different from a stranger. When Jiae had protested to 
her dad, he simply responded, “Geu-ruh-neun-guh ah-ni-ya,” which essentially means, 
“That’s not right,” or “We don’t do that.” To Jiae’s dad, the manager was no stranger, 
because no Korean was a stranger. And though Jiae is here talking about Koreans as 
though they are a group apart from herself, she did add that the favor was somehow 
returned to her dad and her family. Jiae concluded, “I get that Koreans look out for each 
other and that’s great, but sometimes it’s just ridiculous.” 
Though minding others is a part of any community, Korean Americans especially 
uphold it as a shared virtue, even if it is “ridiculous” or “borderline paranoid,” as another 
informant put it. Several informants talked about minding others as if it were a uniquely 
108
Korean trait, referring to the concept of noonchi, which is the ability to sense what the 
other is thinking or feeling without their having to say it.129 Emily, a counselor at a 
Korean non-profit counseling center, said, “Amongst Koreans there’s this concept of 
noonchi.”130 She continued, 
It’s a skill, an individual skill, I know Korean people who don’t have it. But in the 
Korean community you’re expected to at least cultivate some form of it, you 
know? So you don’t necessarily have to say stuff to know what’s going on, or 
know what someone’s thinking or feeling, or that something’s not right. You can 
look at each other and know, “This is not gonna fly.” But with my white friends, 
everything has to be said. There’s no noonchi, there’s nothing assumed. Of 
course, on some level there is, like the more familiar you are with someone, 
there’s that, but on a functional level you’re expected to say what you think, say 
what you feel. Nothing is taken for granted. So when I’m in the Korean 
community I don’t necessarily have to say a whole lot because I know people just 
know. But when I’m with my white friends I have to readjust. My friends look at 
me like they’re waiting for me to tell them what I’m thinking or feeling, whereas 
I’m sitting there thinking, “Can’t you see my face?” 
Noonchi evidently appears early (or is taught early) in Korean families, as an 
interesting study shows. Researchers observed Korean American and Anglo-American 
pre-school children playing, comparing the two groups’ speech and behavior.131 They 
found that while Anglo-American children speak their minds and use direct speech, 
Korean children tend to talk around an issue, hoping playmates will pick up on it—
meaning not only do Korean children have noonchi, they expect or hope others do as 
well. In addition, Korean children were more receptive to playmates’ suggestions, using 
more relational techniques such as agreeing statements and polite requests, while Anglo 
children rejected playmates’ suggestions more often. 
129 See Chapter 1, Footnote 43. 
130 Emily is a 29-year-old 1.5er. 
131 Farver and Shin 1997. 
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It is doubtful that children consciously understand the difference between the 
virtues of one community over another, or that children feel the need to “readjust” from 
one group to another as Emily did. Adult Korean Americans, however, understand that 
noonchi is a Korean virtue, so they expect it only from Koreans. They may be frustrated 
with non-Koreans who don’t have it, but they are not surprised. And thus noonchi takes 
on an ethnic character, though technically, it is not. Noonchi may be a Korean term and a 
shared value in the Korean community, but it really is nothing more than a heightened 
version of minding others, which is embedded in any community. 
At local traffic intersections where the same drivers pass each other everyday, the 
traffic laws are broken less. Stop signs and traffic lights are obeyed, and the obedience 
has more to do with fellow drivers than the driving etiquette of individual drivers. The 
knowledge that we are going to have regular interaction with the same people is enough 
to influence our behavior, from trivial matters like keeping our yards neat, to more 
serious ones like not stealing from our neighbors. Regular interaction with others 
transforms any stranger into a familiar face, creating a sense of community, and the 
familiarity is enough to mind them, or to naturally provide noonchi. While too much 
noonchi can certainly be dangerous, if it becomes more like paranoia than consideration, 
the experience of community naturally and inevitably cultivates a sense of minding others 
in participating individuals, to the point that they see minding others as “no big deal.” 
Representation (2)
A second and related shared value of the Korean community is a sense of 
representation, the idea that one represents the group, and vice versa. This point is not as 
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emphasized in the communitarian literature, but it is one of the more real and obvious 
differences between those who belong to a community and those who do not. 
During my years as a teaching assistant, I led a few undergraduate classroom 
discussions on The Cheating Culture by David Callahan.132 The key question was why 
people cheat, and the discussions usually began from a utilitarian angle, in terms of the 
costs and benefits of cheating (usually money, but also status, recognition, and 
reputation.) Some students proudly told tales of their cheating experiences, laughing at 
themselves, but claiming they (and others) would cheat if the payoff was worth it. As the 
discussion went on, a different kind of comment eventually surfaced: “It depends on how 
you were raised. I was raised that cheating is just wrong.” Such a comment had a hushing 
effect. Evidently it is one thing for an individual to cheat for his own gain. It is another to 
cheat (or not cheat), when others are included in the responsible party. 
How one was raised may or may not be the dominant factor in one’s decision to 
cheat—that is an empirical question, one to which there is no simple answer. Clearly, 
however, the introduction of others into an individual’s decision to cheat, in this case, 
one’s parents and family, seemed to make students think twice about what they were 
going to say. For one, no student said, “I was raised that cheating is okay.” Even young 
college students who essentially bragged about cheating just the minute before felt the 
weight of bringing their families into their individual choices—choices they know to be 
wrong. Once others, those with whom we share something, enter the picture, we 
automatically become more conscious of our moral selves, which is precisely the point 
communitarians make. In order for us to ask, “How do I make us look? How do they 
make me look?” there must first be recognition of an “us,” a “we,” a group bigger than 
132 Callahan 2004. 
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the self. Once we recognize that we represent something bigger than ourselves, and the 
more we recognize it, the most accustomed we become to looking beyond mere 
individual interest—whether we like it or not.  
Representation is, like noonchi, a shared virtue of the Korean community; and 
like noonchi, representing more than oneself is not always a pleasant experience. It is 
relatively easier to represent our families, with whom we share so much, and it is often by 
choice or out of pride that we represent them. Representing an ethnic group, however, is 
often not by choice of the member, but rather an inevitable result of ethnic/racial 
prejudices formed by insiders and outsiders alike (which, no matter how “wrong” it may 
be, happens on a regular basis). For instance, one Korean’s behavior may be assumed to 
be common among all Koreans, and whether or not the assumption is correct, Koreans 
believe there is a high probability of that assumption being made by others, and as a 
result, they inadvertently end up representing Koreans. My informants expressed 
ambivalence about the process, and at times resented it, but it was also a regular enough 
phenomenon that they could not get away from altogether. Even with no intention of 
representing fellow Koreans, or the desire for fellow Koreans to represent them, my 
informants were accustomed to the constant representation of their community. 
The complexity of representation became clear when I asked my informants their 
reaction to the Seung-hui Cho incident. Only one informant answered, “I reacted the 
same way I would have with any crazy shooting like that.” All remaining informants, and 
most Korean Americans from what I recall immediately following the shooting, reacted 
in some way that touched on ethnic representation. Lois answered, “My initial reaction? 
‘He gave us a bad name! He gave us Koreans a bad name! We’re good people! We work 
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hard!’ That’s what I thought initially.” Dain answered, “At first when the news broke we 
didn’t know if he was Korean. I thought, ‘Please don’t let him be Korean!’ And when we 
found out he was Korean, ‘Why did he have to be Korean?!’ I was ashamed.” 
The most common response, in fact, was, “I was ashamed.” When I asked, 
“Why?” Dain answered, “You only want to hear good stuff about your people.” Brooke 
answered, “Asians are not very known in America as it is. And I felt very angry because 
the one time we get publicity it’s over an Asian guy who shot up all these people.” 
Charles answered, “I was ashamed. It was like we failed him.” All of my informants 
(with the exception of the one mentioned above) identified ethnically in some form with 
Seung-hui Cho, and had a corresponding reaction. Many informants also said they were 
afraid of retaliation against Koreans following the shooting. However, when I asked if 
there was any, all answered no. Charles added, “But there could have been. And there 
might not have been actual retaliation against Koreans, but we don’t know how 
Americans look at us differently because of that.” 
If the media is any indication, it seems fair to say that Americans did not look at 
Koreans any differently as a result of the shooting, as it did not associate the incident 
with his being Korean in any direct way. Koreans, however, both Korean Americans and 
Koreans in Korea, anticipated Americans to make the association, which is why they 
feared retaliation, and almost braced themselves for it. The Korean president even made a 
formal apology, as though all of Korea was responsible for Seung-hui Cho’s crime. This 
bothered Emily. I asked her, “Why do you think he did that?” She responded, “Because 
we’re a collectivistic culture. One of us represents all of us.” A Korean American church 
also had the notion of collective responsibility. The church of an informant, Nathan, 
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wanted to organize a fundraiser for the victims’ families following the incident.133 The 
fundraiser never happened, however, due to much opposition, of which Nathan was a 
part. He said, “When the idea was first brought up, I said, ‘For what? This guy’s not 
representing the Korean community. He just happened to be Korean—why do we have to 
apologize for that?’ That makes it even worse, as if we are responsible.” In the end, my 
informants’ reaction was layered and complex—they felt some level of connection with 
Seung-hui Cho, but understood that the shooting was an isolated incident and not the 
collective responsibility of Koreans, yet still anticipated that others will make such a 
connection, and was therefore prepared to defend themselves in the event that they did. 
Even if the sense of representation is not always intentional, and no matter who is 
creating or reinforcing the grouping, the group experience forces us to feel responsibility, 
or at least a connection, for something bigger than ourselves. As ethnic minorities, which 
is visible, Korean Americans have grown accustomed to representing the Korean 
population. And while it brings them to shame for Seung-hui Cho, and makes them wish 
stereotypes didn’t exist, it also puts them on their best behavior. 
Emily, though she was bothered by the Korean president’s apology, also felt 
responsibility at times as the Korean throughout her life. Recalling her college years at 
James Madison University, located “in the middle of the country,” she recalled the 
occasional visits she made outside of campus. 
If I were to walk into the Waffle House, all the townies, the old Southern white 
people, would be there, and they would all look at me. And I know some of them 
have never seen Asians. So for me, I thought, “Okay, they’ve never seen an Asian 
person. I better make a good impression.” So when I would go to Wal-Mart and I 
know people are staring at me, I smile and I’m nice, because I want them to say, 
133 Nathan is a 37-year-old 1.5er. 
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“I saw an Asian and they’re not that bad.” It’s not their fault they’ve never seen 
an Asian. So, accept reality, you know? They’re not being mean, so just make a 
good impression. 
A common identity allows (or forces) one to represent a collective and vice versa. 
We often have no say in how that representation is carried out, and in how others view 
the representation, but it is nonetheless an inevitable part of group life. The most common 
and meaningful forms of representation occur in primary relationships. For instance, we 
may say to our friends or family, “Don’t embarrass me,” or “Make me proud,” and even 
if their actions are unrelated to us, it is our sheer acquaintance with them that magnify 
sentiments of shame or pride. No matter what the nature of a group is, however, 
representation goes on at some level, and it is the source of collective pride and/or shame. 
We cannot feel one without the ability to feel the other, and neither would be a possibility 
without a recognized common identity. Strangers, those with whom we have nothing in 
common, cannot make us feel proud or ashamed of them. Such feelings are reserved for 
those who we recognize as part of “we.” 
During the period of my writing and research, the Winter Olympics and the World 
Cup took place. As much as contemporary social scientists highlight the autonomy of the 
individual and the arbitrariness of nationalism or group identity, events like these are 
evidence that deep-rooted shared identities, and the enthusiasm for “we” are alive and 
well around the world. Whether at the national or local level, representation happens in 
groups of all shapes and sizes. 
Shame as motive (3)
Gertrude Himmelfarb wrote, “It is not enough to encourage people to be moral; it 
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is also necessary to shame them into being moral.”134 Just as we can feel ashamed of 
those with whom we share a commonality, we can also be shamed by them into behavior 
that we as a collective approve of. This is the only way shaming people works—if both 
shame-er and shame-ee recognize shared values. Pride and shame in a collective body is 
developed, meaning it cannot be directly taught or un-taught, and is a process that takes 
time. Because that pride or shame is ultimately rooted in some form of commonality, it 
can serve as a strong motivator for individual behavior. Groups will surely differ on their 
method of shaming and what is worthy of shaming. As isolationism becomes widespread, 
however, shaming as a motive is likely to fade, because shaming only works when shared 
norms are recognized. And the more isolated one is, the more shameless one can afford to 
be, because without a “we,” he does not have anyone in his life capable of shaming him. 
The Korean culture is particularly known as one where shaming is a dominant 
motive for behavior. Psychiatrist David S. Rue, in contribution to a sociological work 
entitled Korean Americans: Conflict and Harmony, wrote about the contrasting 
approaches to shame between Koreans and Americans. 
[A]voiding the risk of triggering shame in others and in oneself is a constant 
preoccupation of Koreans. … In contrast, the Americans are proud of their 
rebellious iconoclastic spirit… The undergirding principle in the Declaration is 
the American defiance against tradition, the shedding of shame that ties, binds, 
limits one’s behavior and dreams. This penchant for disinhibition, spontaneity, 
and independence is so highly valued in America that social missteps and cultural 
naïveté are often tolerated and forgiven, especially if faux pas is omitted by a 
“red-blooded American.”135 
My informants were well aware of such a contrast in attitudes toward shame. At a 
134 Himmelfarb 2000, 98. 
135 Rue 1994 (Ed. Kwon), 24. 
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birthday party, to which I was invited by an informant, I had the chance to speak to her 
and her mother, who owns a convenience store in Baltimore. As my informant stood by 
and rolled her eyes apologetically, her mother talked, in Korean, about the shamelessness 
of her customers: “Americans have no shame. My customers tell me everything about 
their lives, from how many divorces they’ve had to how their kids refuse to talk to them. 
I thought they were joking at first, but now I know, they’re just not ashamed. I’m more 
embarrassed than they are when they tell me their stories, but what can I say? Koreans 
don’t do that. And if they did, I’d say, ‘Are you bragging?’ and that’ll shut them up. I 
guess Americans are different.” To be sure, Koreans are not exempt from neither divorce 
nor bad family relationships. They are, however, terribly ashamed of broken 
relationships, and the last thing they would do is share such shameful information with 
strangers. Apparently, it is one thing to be divorced; it is another to be public about it.136  
Koreans have a fierce pride of their groups, whether that group is their family, 
church, or nation. They tend to stay mum about their problems because they believe their 
dirty laundry is nobody else’s business, and more importantly, that they ought to be able 
to take care of their groups. Accordingly, talking about the group’s problems to a stranger 
is only embarrassing the member who is talking, which is perhaps why there is such a 
strong stigma associated with therapy among Koreans. Nathan, who studied Christian 
Counseling, wanted to bring counseling to the Korean church. “Unfortunately, it didn’t 
work out,” Nathan said. “Korean churches, they don’t want it. It’s a big taboo.” Another 
informant, Christin, was seeing a therapist at the time of the interview.137 She said, “I go 
136 James Q. Wilson also makes the interesting point that poor Latino families are only one-fifth as likely as 
black families to receive welfare payments, which he attributes to the stigma of being on welfare 
amongst Latinos. Wilson 2000 (Ed. Eberly). 
137 Christin is a 28-year-old second generation Korean American. 
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to therapy because I don’t want to end up like my mom. [What do you mean?] She has 
issues that she has to deal with but you know how Korean people are about the whole 
stigma with the therapist thing. She’s embarrassed to go. She thinks the therapist is going 
to judge her, and that her friends will, too, which only makes her problems worse.” 
Christin’s mom is shamed into not going to therapy, because she cares too much about 
what other people will say. 
Not surprisingly, Nathan and Christin, who are both raised in America, believe 
that Koreans take their taboos and stigmas too seriously, and that their level of shaming is 
nearly paralyzing, too far beyond the healthy dose for self-discipline and self-control. 
They wish the older generation would lighten up a bit, that they wouldn’t let others’ 
opinions influence their behavior too much. There is, however, something to be said for 
such a strong notion of shared values, caring almost too much about what their 
community thinks, whereas turning too easily to faceless professionals and bureaucracies 
is the opposite problem that is unlikely in communities with a high sense of “we.”138 
Shaming one another is certainly not a comfortable process—for the shame-er nor for the 
shame-ee. Shaming, however, happens naturally in group life, to the point it cannot be 
prevented, while it cannot even be done forcefully amongst isolated individuals. 
This is not to suggest, however, that only Koreans are familiar with shaming. 
Even a cursory look at an introductory-level sociology work would reveal numerous 
American studies that attest to the power of shaming and stigmatizing. Dr. Rue indeed 
exaggerates, when he writes, “Americans are so unfamiliar with shame and shame-based 
behavior that they are befuddled when they are confronted with a shame reaction….”139 
138 See McKnight 1995. 
139 Rue 1994 (Ed. Kwon), 24. 
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Shame may not be as prominent of a motive among Americans relative to Koreans, but 
that does not mean Americans are incapable of feeling shame or shaming one another. 
Americans are also well aware, however, of the disappearance of shame in the last 
several decades. In The Dumbest Generation, Bauerlein discusses not only the 
unwillingness to read and study among today’s young Americans, but their “new attitude, 
this brazen disregard of books and reading.”140 Ordinary Americans, in everyday 
conversations, are also observing the trend of shamelessness. In the Bible study group I 
joined (the non-ethnic one, see Chapter 1), one of the members, Jamie, casually talked 
about this recalling her weekend. Jamie, who is Anglo-American, was standing in line to 
buy tickets at a movie theater, when a few kids began “cursing up a storm” in the 
presence of adults. Jamie said, “We wouldn’t dare do that when we were young; we were 
embarrassed to do that. But these kids were shameless. What’s worse is that nobody said 
anything to them! Including me!” The point is not that kids rebel and curse—kids will 
always rebel—but that kids now rebel and curse shamelessly, and that those who are 
capable of putting the kids to shame, if there are any, are not bothering to do so. The two 
phenomena, of course, go hand in hand—the disappearance of shame is the responsibility 
of both shame-er and shame-ee. 
This is not to suggest that the decline in community is solely responsible for an 
emergence of shamelessness, but the relationship between the two cannot be ignored. A 
community can shame its members into upholding the values of that community, 
meaning, that for the individuals without a community, the pool of those who can 
effectively shame them is going to be significantly smaller. Furthermore, one’s 
community must be recognized prior to the shaming, which means becoming capable of 
140 Bauerlein 2008, 40. 
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shaming and being shamed takes time. The community and its sense of “we” has to get 
under the skin of its members in order to shame them effectively—and it is as unpleasant 
as it sounds. Shame is a powerful yet unbearable emotion. It is not surprising, therefore, 
that as more individuals withdraw from communities, the more shameless we become as 
a whole—which ought to raise an even greater alarm, given that where communities 
cannot effectively shame individuals, little else but the state is left to remind individuals 
of moral or proper behavior. 
Alan Wolfe pointed out that as civil society dwindles, the more we depend on the 
state as moral authority. There are many problems that result from this phenomenon, but 
for one, it certainly pushes us further into shamelessness. The state cannot shame us the 
way our communities can, the state cannot share values or identify with us the way our 
communities can, and more often than not, the rules of the state cannot mean more to us 
than the rules of our communities. We are more concerned with how our communities 
view us than how the state views us, and while the state can coerce us, it cannot shame 
us. And in the end, which strategy allows individuals to autonomously think and act for 
themselves, and exercise their own moral capacities? Neither scaring individuals with 
threat of punishment nor enticing individuals with incentives (sticks or carrots), gives 
human beings enough credit. Even animals can be motivated with punishment and 
reward. 
A powerful authority over isolated individuals is a Hobbesian view, who is not 
only the theorist of equality (see Chapter 1), but credited as the father of Rational Choice 
Theory. The setting in Hobbes’s natural condition of mankind is isolation—every man 
for himself, there are no ties and bonds, there is no community. In a hostile environment 
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where individuals are jealous, suspicious, and fearful of one another, the authority has no 
choice but to rule with an iron grip, with the threat of painful sticks. Nothing can 
meaningfully affect individuals other than whatever resources are available to the 
sovereign, and as a result, whether intentional or not, the sovereign alone wields immense 
power. If there was a sense of community among the individuals, the sovereign’s power 
may not need to be so absolute. The more isolated individuals are, however, the tighter 
authority’s grip needs to be, to ensure order, and in Hobbes’s view, survival, which 
leaves no room for a sense of community to develop. And an authority with such 
immense power can threaten us, but it cannot shame us.141 
By pointing out the three traits, noonchi, representation, and shaming, I am not 
claiming that they are unique to the Korean community. The purpose in discussing them 
is to highlight the shared values of the Korean community that are also, in some form, 
inherent to group life in general, and to suggest that their absence is to be expected in 
individuals who have little experience with group life. Communities certainly do not 
produce benefits alone for its members, and we need not pretend they do, but even a 
community as full of warts as the Korean community is better than a society of isolated 
individuals, at the very least in its inevitable development of we-ness for its members. 
I also wish to point out that the three traits are not assigned to the Korean 
ethnicity, but rather, the Korean community. As strange as it may sound, it is not 
141 In Chapter 1 I make the argument that an unequal relationship, such as one between the sovereign and 
his subjects, is more likely to last, and its obligations easier to recognize. Here, I make the argument that 
the sovereign has no choice but to use coercion because there is no sense of community. It may seem that 
I am both praising and criticizing Hobbes, with respect to Korean Americans. My (very ideal) claim is 
that the Korean community has the best of both worlds with respect to Hobbes—they have the lasting 
and obligatory benefits of an unequal relationship (relationship culture), but also the benefit of 
community which renders coercion as unnecessary. 
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primarily the common ethnicity that sustains this ethnic community. In a 1968 work on 
residential communities, Herbert Gans wrote, “Little is known about what characteristics 
must be shared before people feel themselves to be compatible with others. We do not 
know for certain if they must have common backgrounds, or similar interests, or shared 
values, or combination of these. Social relations are based, not on census data, but on 
subjectively experienced definitions of homogeneity and heterogeneity…”142 In a 1988 
work Sydney Brower wrote, 
We do not know just what it is that makes people feel that their neighbors are not 
the same kind of people as themselves. It does not seem to be based on objective 
measures such as differences in age and length of residence, education and 
prestige of employment, income, household size, or marital status. It does not 
even seem to be based on perceptions that their neighbors are different in age, 
religion, income, or education. Instead, it seems to be a global judgment based on 
such things as childrearing practices, respectability, responsibility, privacy, 
property maintenance, and civil behavior.143 
Then and now, we don’t know precisely what brings and keeps people and communities 
together. We do know, however, that there is more to it than quantifiable and sociological 
factors. 
A sense of community is typically regarded as a good, but deliberately creating a 
sense of community where none exists is a rather oxymoronic and artificial idea—we-
ness develops naturally, and more often as a by-product than the explicit end. We cannot 
force others, or even ourselves, to connect or bond over shared values, if the individuals 
themselves do not recognize them. Communitarians may convince one to agree with the 
communitarian argument or to adopt the communitarian outlook, but that is not 
142 Gans 1968, 156. 
143 Brower 1988, 81. 
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equivalent to convincing one to become a member of a community, to actually develop 
the we-ness in a group. To mind others, to represent others, or to feel shamed by others, 
requires immersion in a group, which is different from, and more difficult than, merely 
agreeing with an argument. And to experience the uncomfortable and stifling nature of a 
community would hardly serve as a selling point, but it is nonetheless an inherent part of 
the community experience.  
To be civil, however, is perhaps an easier point of persuasion for today’s 
audience. Civility has become the closest thing to shared virtue for a liberal pluralistic 
society—why is this the case? Is civility also a shared virtue of particular communities, 
such as the Korean community? Can the Korean community fit into a civil society? We 
turn now to the dominance of civility today, and its relation to the Korean community and 
particular communities.  
Civility: the strangers’ virtue 
In Howard County, Maryland, where I live, a trend has emerged. Green bumper 
magnets all over the suburban towns are demanding, “Choose Civility in Howard 
County.” The slogan can also be found on posters in libraries, schools, and public 
buildings. The magnets are available at public libraries, and are part of the county’s 
program that aims to (what else?) promote civility. What began as a few librarians’ effort 
to promote manners in the library has bloomed to a county-wide movement for citizens’ 
everyday behavior, including but not limited to, traffic behavior. (Choose Civility has 
spawned another movement, “Choose Cycling,” with look-alike bumper magnets. 
Imitation is a sure sign of the original’s success.) 
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At a glance, civility is a simple enough idea. Most of us understand civility 
without difficulty, typically as some version of manners or consideration of others. 
Civility is also a basic expectation, as a matter of course or common sense, in everyday 
actions such as standing in line, being quiet in a library, etc. This does not mean that we 
are civil; in fact, the literature on civility (and our own experiences, I’m sure) would 
confirm that we increasingly face incivility, and perhaps that is why civility has become a 
more pressing issue. Whether or not we are civil, however, civility is not a difficult 
concept to understand. What is worth noting here is the word choice. Why civility? Why 
not goodness? Why not “choose goodness” or “choose kindness”? 
In certain contexts, civility is used interchangeably with goodness or kindness. In 
Choosing Civility, the book that inspired the county-wide initiative (and a mandatory 
reading of the program), author P. M. Forni, a professor of Italian literature, writes, “I 
looked at my students and realized that I wanted them to be kind human beings more than 
I wanted them to know about Dante.”144 Civility can mean, among other things, a 
kindness or generosity that human beings ought to show one another, simply because it is 
the good and decent thing to do. The book goes on to list twenty-five rules of civility, 
ranging from “Pay attention,” “Listen,” and “Speak kindly,” to “Mind your body,” “Be 
agreeable,” and even “Respect the environment and be gentle to animals.” They are rules 
that are commonly accepted as the rules of good behavior. 
Stephen Carter’s book, Civility, another book on the program’s suggested reading 
list, also talks about civility as though it were equivalent to goodness or kindness, perhaps 
even more so than Forni. Carter writes, “The key to reconstructing civility, I shall argue, 
144 Forni 2002, 7. 
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is for all of us to learn anew the virtue of acting with love toward our neighbors.”145 Often 
relying on the Christian command to love one another, Carter argues that we are on the 
road with fellow passengers, who simply by virtue of their being human, deserve to be 
treated with civility. Those of us who do not share the Christian faith may easily disagree 
with Carter, who writes, “[E]very encounter with another human being should inspire in 
us a powerful sense of awe. Why? Because that other human being, whatever his or her 
strengths, weaknesses, and simple complexities, is also a part of God’s creation.”146 
Though Carter himself is clearly a believer, his call to civility, and the urgency with 
which he does so, is directed at believers as well as non-believers. Ordinary men and 
women need no command from a common God to be civil or to agree that civility is a 
good thing. 
In fact, it is the very lack of commonalities required, the assumption of pluralism, 
that make “civility” the appropriate word choice, and not merely a substitute for goodness 
or manners. Civility has become a buzz-word precisely because words such as 
“goodness” invite excessive disagreement in a pluralistic society, where one man’s 
definition of the good is not necessarily another’s, and a liberal society, where that man 
has the right to define for himself the notion of the good. It is not a coincidence that the 
county program uses “civility” as opposed to any other term. 
As MacIntyre forcefully argued in After Virtue, the world no longer speaks a 
common moral language, where, as a result, the concept of virtue disappears.147 It is not 
that virtuous acts disappear or that virtuous people disappear, but rather that the 
consensus on what virtue is disappears, rendering the concept essentially useless. Given 
145 Carter 1998, 18. 
146 Carter 1998, 101. 
147 MacIntyre 1981. 
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such circumstances, dramatically referred to as a moral crisis, some academic camps have 
bluntly and adamantly called for a revival of virtue, though not unanimously for the 
Aristotelian tradition like MacIntyre (Gertrude Himmelfarb calls for the Victorian 
virtues;148 and Alan Ehrenhalt for 1950s America149); and some have instead embraced 
liberalism, given its inherent disconnect from virtue (John Rawls, Nancy Rosenblum). 
Most ordinary Americans, however, probably spend little time pondering the problem of 
common virtue in a liberal society or choosing one theory as its solution. They may be 
well aware of the tension between a pluralistic liberal society and common virtues, but 
that does not mean they have given up on the notion of the common good in the small 
places of their lives. In fact, scholars like Forni and Carter, who seem to use civility as a 
substitute for virtue, help blur the line, as they talk about civility and virtue as related, but 
don’t explicitly equate the two. A polite request for people to be polite? Something like 
that. 
In some scholarly discussions of civility, however, distinctions are made much 
more clearly between the civil and the good, or between the civil society and the good 
society. In these dialogues, civility is not a synonym for goodness at all, but the most that 
can be agreed upon or asked of strangers in a liberal society. In other words, civility is the 
lowest common denominator in terms of virtue—which is insufficient, communitarians 
argue, to deal with the societal breakdown of moral fiber and moral truths, hence their 
emphasis on the good society as opposed to civil society. According to Etzioni, the very 
disconnect between civil society and morality makes the good society necessary, as a 
concept and in actuality, because rather than promoting “one comprehensive doctrine,” 
148 Himmelfarb, 1994. 
149 Ehrenhalt, 1995. 
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civil society “simply provides the forum in which a plurality of such doctrines can be 
debated ‘indefinitely without end.’”150 Civility is more about “respecting each other’s 
differences,” which can become dangerously close to indifference, and civility can hardly 
portray the passionate sense of right and wrong or the triumphant spirit of doing good. 
Communitarians are right in making the subtle distinction, as civility is in no way 
equivalent to solidarity or a consensus on the good. And as much as scholars have tried to 
locate community-building in the realm of civil society, civility is only the bare minimum 
shared virtue within communities. Civility is, more precisely, the virtue of strangers. We 
may admire strangers who are civil with one another, but we expect more than civility to 
and from those with whom we share a we-ness. Civility may be the solution for incivility, 
but it is no solution for isolation. Perfectly civil individuals may also be perfectly isolated 
strangers, because civility does not require we-ness or accountability. In fact, a major part 
of civility is leaving others alone in isolation, if they so desire. Of course, civility can 
lead to we-ness, and civility may even be a pre-requisite of community-building or 
strangers becoming friends. However, once a community is established, or once a we-
ness is recognized, there must be more to the members’ shared virtue than mere civility. 
And in many cases, communities with the greatest solidarity and strongly-shared virtues 
may not value civility at all—they may even be considered deeply uncivil, by insiders 
and outsiders alike.  
Noonchi, representation, or shaming, are perhaps uncivil examples of the Korean 
community when analyzed on their own. As previously noted, there is a degree of pain or 
at least discomfort, that goes along some of the inherent traits of group life. Is shaming 
someone an instance of civility? Is having to represent an entire group without choice an 
150 Etzioni 2000, 360-361. 
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example of civility? Probably not. Any form of collective pressure on an individual can 
hardly be categorized as civil, but it is certainly necessary to reinforce the sense of 
community. On the contrary, when we don’t bother to criticize or to shame one another 
for whatever reason, we remain strangers and reinforce the barriers that prevent us from 
community-building. If the problem of today’s society is isolation, the lack of 
community, or the lack of we-ness, civility is hardly a solution. Some incivility may be 
required as part of the solution, as civility alone can actually promote isolation. 
Some scholars believe that civility among strangers is to be desired over excessive 
solidarity which potentially suppresses individual liberty. Sam Fleischacker, for one, 
describes the “insignificant community,” where members are loosely connected and 
mutually disinterested, as the ideal form of community in a liberal society.151 He argues 
that communities actually flourish when individual members are allowed to leave, 
because active individual commitment is what allows for the natural by-product of 
community, as opposed to a community kept in existence by the need for community 
itself. Rather than assuming “thin” communities are weak, Fleischacker suggests, we 
ought to consider the possibility that communities of strong bonds and solidarity can be 
more dangerous to liberal society. 
I wholly agree with the argument that traditional tight-knit communities contain 
uncivil elements—I have pointed out how uncivil some community-building efforts can 
be, and there are numerous demonstrations of incivility from the Korean community. 
However, the point here is that in a society of strangers, or insignificant communities, not 
only do individuals lack we-ness, they lack the capability of having we-ness. Not only are 
strangers unwilling to mind others, it doesn’t occur to them to do so. Not only are 
151 Fleischacker 1998 (Ed. Gutmann). 
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strangers unwilling to shame and be ashamed, they hold shameless attitudes and don’t see 
the need to shame others. Not only are strangers unwilling to represent others, they don’t 
recognize the prerequisite commonality. Even if individuals were committed to civility, 
civility alone can become its own form of incivility, contributing to the widespread 
problem of today’s atomized citizenry. In other words, tight-knit communities are not 
categorically better than solitude, but solitude destroys any potential of an individual’s 
sense of “we.” It is not a coincidence that some individuals are participating in numerous 
groups at any given point in their lives, and that some participate in none. We-ness is 
habitual and reinforcing. 
When Tocqueville praised civil society as the place where individuals came out of 
their narrow places and into a space where differences can be expressed, heard, and 
worked through, he assumed that individuals had their respective places to come out of. 
We still praise civil society as the place where strangers can come together, but we seem 
to forget the importance of their respective places of origin. Today we see more emphasis 
on tolerance and the acceptance of others, as opposed to the commitment and 
reinforcement of shared virtues, but not having a place of “we” can be just as problematic 
as only valuing one’s homogeneous group. And while our civil society is by no means 
hopeless, it is doubtful just how civil a society can be for strangers who have no concept 
of “we.” 
Of course, the counterargument here is that individuals in tight-knit communities 
are incapable of being civil with strangers, or of stepping out of their respective 
communities. And if Korean Americans are too comfortable in their homogeneous 
community, are they incapable of getting along with strangers? Are they incapable of 
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being civil with non-Koreans?  
The uncivil Korean Community?
In striking contrast to their fierce loyalty to those they know, my informants 
seemed to hold an utter disregard for all others, who, in their eyes, have no relation to 
them, and are thus deemed strangers. This goes back to the relationship culture—if there 
is no relationship, they don’t know how to act, they don’t know where they stand. My 
informants commented on the inability of Koreans to express the in-between or subtle 
politeness, the small acts of civility between strangers. One informant said during an 
interview, “White people are so good at the small talk! I don’t know how they do it. What 
do they talk about?” 
If civil society is the place we connect with strangers, Korean Americans are just 
as absent from it as anyone else. However, Korean Americans’ absence is not due to 
isolation or withdrawal from others. Rather, they are so absorbed in their own circles, that 
they hardly seek relationships beyond those they already have. Nearly every Korean 
American I interviewed or spoke to made obvious references to their very busy social 
lives, filled with family, friends, church, etc. And if anything, the direction of complaint 
was “not enough time” to tend to the people they already had a relationship with, most of 
whom turned out to be Korean as well. When I asked my informants, “The people you 
spend the most time with are Korean?” many had a somewhat apologetic reaction. “Yeah, 
but it didn’t have to be that way,” or “Yeah, I wish I made more non-Korean friends,” 
were some common responses, as though they didn’t deliberately choose the ethnic 
homogeneity of their daily lives, but weren’t unsatisfied enough to do anything about it. 
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Though many Korean Americans stay in their Korean circles, that does not mean their 
social worlds require any less effort. Outside observers may assume that members of 
ethnic communities intentionally refrain from reaching beyond their comfort zone, but 
that was hardly the case with my informants. Most of them simply couldn’t stretch 
themselves that thin, as they seemed to believe that they had enough relationships to 
maintain with their fellow Korean Americans alone. 
It is no surprise that those very involved and committed to their community have 
less connections beyond their community. Keeping up with we-ness is energy- and time-
consuming, and my informants had no real desire to create new connections beyond the 
ones they already had. In fact, the several instances they did become voluntarily involved 
in non-Korean communities was not to make new connections, but to escape or find relief 
from the existing ones—to deliberately become the stranger. My informant, Lois, had 
been a member of Bethel (a Korean church in Ellicott City) since childhood, but she 
recently began going to Bridgeway, an American church with a racially diverse 
congregation. When I asked why, she answered, “Bridgeway is big—so big, I could get 
lost, fade in the background.” Like Lois, several Korean Americans talked about their 
involvement in “American” communities, more to escape the Korean community than to 
become part of a new one. Lois continued, “But I miss those friends from Bethel. [Can 
you make them at Bridgeway?] Yeah, I can. And I’ve tried to get involved, but it’s been 
hard for me to really commit, which I know is not good… I would love to have that 
relationship and friendship with people at church because I know the value of it and I 
miss it.” To be sure, numerous factors other than ethnicity probably contributed to the 
difficulty of making new friends for Lois. Whatever the cause, my informants were on 
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the whole so involved with the people and the goings-on of the Korean community, but 
not much beyond. The intention here is not to portray Korean Americans as good or bad 
citizens, but to suggest that the matter is not so simple. After all, which is worse? 
Individuals who are committed to their homogeneous community but make no effort to 
reach beyond? Or the individuals who are committed to the idea of civil society but have 
no strong ties to any particular group? 
Anyone concerned with the well-being of the American civil society may respond 
that the former is worse. Isn’t America an immigrant country, where foreigners from all 
over the world come to form one united nation? And isn’t homogeneity the very threat to 
such a grand vision? Perhaps the worry surrounding ethnic communities is legitimate, 
given its members’ reluctance to branch out, to meet strangers in their society, or to be 
genuinely civil with their neighbors. The Korean community may even be close to what 
Nancy Rosenblum calls a “greedy institution,” which “immerse[s] members in the 
organization and take[s] up every moment of their lives,”152 preventing them from 
integrating into the larger American society. Indeed, most informants claimed they were 
sufficiently preoccupied within their community. They weren’t exactly victims of racism 
or the minority complex, but they didn’t have much of a desire to integrate. They were, in 
other words, ambivalent about integration. 
Sheryl Cashin claims that black people are ambivalent about integration, and that this is a 
dangerous thing.153 If ethnic/racial integration is the vision of today’s American civil 
society, she is right, and an ambivalent attitude is just as dangerous or uncivil for blacks, 
Korean Americans, and any other ethnic group. However, even if diversity is clearly 
152 Rosenblum 1998, 98. 
153 Cashin 2004. 
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praised everywhere, from university mission statements to church bulletins, diversity is 
not necessarily an unequivocal good. As much as Americans may want to put conflicts of 
race in the past (or pretend it doesn’t exist), there are also significant advantages that 
cannot be ignored in groups with a common race or ethnicity. Though I maintain the 
argument that there is more to the Korean community than mere ethnicity, the ethnicity 
factor cannot be ignored. We now, finally, turn to the ethnic dimension of the Korean 
community, its causes and effects, costs and benefits, and whether those who care about 
civil society ought to reject ethnic communities. 
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CHAPTER FOUR
WHAT’S SO GREAT ABOUT DIVERSITY?
“[A]t 11:00 on Sunday morning when we stand and sing that Christ has no east or west, 
we stand at the most segregated hour in this nation.” (Martin Luther King, Jr.)154
In his book Diversity in America, Peter Schuck wrote, “Diversity is right up there 
with progress, motherhood, and apple pie.”155 Schuck is right. Across America, schools, 
businesses, and churches promote diversity as a good and worthy principle. 
Organizations and even entire university departments are created primarily in the name of 
promoting diversity, and institutions of all kinds declare their commitment to “enhancing 
diversity.” From purpose statements and mission statements, to employment regulations 
and evangelizing strategies, diversity is undoubtedly a buzz-word of our time. 
Homogeneity falls under suspicion, while claims of commitment to diversity are almost 
always met with agreement and approval. 
Therefore, it may be disturbing to find that as diversity increases, civic 
participation decreases;156 or that Sunday morning is the most segregated hour of our 
nation; or that the small crowds in front of McKeldin Library at the University of 
Maryland are often segregated by race. To be sure, a diverse population is not equivalent 
to an integrated one—is diversity, then, merely a euphemism for segregation? Or is it a 
genuine coming-together of individuals of different backgrounds for a common purpose? 
154 King often said some version of this, but this specific quote comes from a speech King gave at Western 
Michigan University in 1963. See http:/ww.wmich.edu/library/archives/mlk/q-a.html. Accessed 
September 16, 2010. 
155 Schuck 2003, 12. 
156 Putnam 2000. 
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Is integrated society a pipe dream? Or is it, if ever so slowly, becoming a reality? 
In the last chapter we discussed some of the particular values of the Korean 
community and how those values work to further solidify and reinforce the sense of “we” 
among Korean Americans, while simultaneously shaping their perspective of themselves 
and the American society at large. In this chapter, we will discuss why diversity is not a 
prized virtue or a priority of Korean Americans, and how they view their own ethnic 
minority status in the American society. I will argue that diversity is not in itself an 
unequivocal good worthy of praise, note the familiar yet crucial benefits of a 
homogeneous ethnic community, and mark my informants’ insistence that there is more 
to individuals than race/ethnicity. In the next and final chapter, we will turn to divisions 
that exist within the Korean community, taking into consideration the subtle but deep 
divisions within this seemingly homogeneous group. I will conclude by referring back to 
the relationship culture of the Korean Americans, and how that demands bridging within 
their own community as a greater priority, rather than bridging out to “other” individuals 
and groups. 
No diversity without commonality
A quick search through the website of any American college is likely to reveal 
that school’s commitment to diversity—explicitly in text as well as by photos of racially 
diverse students and faculty. The University of Vermont, which scored .12 on the 
diversity index, meaning nearly 9 out of 10 students on campus will be of the same 
race,157 has a webpage dedicated to “Diversity on Campus” and posts photos of racially 
157 All college diversity index figures are found on: http://colleges.usnews.rankingsandreviews.com. 
Accessed January 12, 2011. 
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diverse students.158 The University of Ohio, which scored .17 on the diversity index 
(student population is 84.6 percent white), posts similar photos on its website, and has an 
Office of Diversity, Access and Equity, dedicated to “infusing diversity ubiquitously.”159 
The website for Nebraska at Kearney, where the student population is 77 percent white, 
also shows similar photos, with promises of a “rich and diverse campus life.”160 
A quick search through corporate advertisements is also likely to reveal a 
company’s commitment to diversity—also in explicit text as well as images. The 
National Fair Housing Alliance, in a collection of radio advertisements and promotional 
posters under the theme of “A Richer Life,” explicitly made diversity a key selling point. 
With lines such as, “Neighborhood diversity doesn’t just sound good, it sounds great,” 
“Diversity shouldn’t be left behind at work each day,” and “Diversity promotes a greater 
sense of engagement,” and posters displaying racially diverse individuals happily 
working or playing together, the organization packs each advertisement with a 
glorification of diversity.161 Not all corporate advertisements explicitly promote diversity, 
but it is not uncommon to see diversity in advertisements, from commercials for birth 
control pills to posters for a bank. Advertisements of all kinds are filled with images of 
racially diverse and happy people, promoting not only the product, but the goodness of 
diversity.  
Evidently, racial diversity is praised for its own sake—assumed as a good, 
pleasant, and attractive thing in itself. We often pose diversity, whether it is an accurate 
picture of or blatantly contradictory to reality, and this is increasingly becoming the 
158 See http://www.uvm.edu. Accessed January 12, 2011. 
159 See http://www.ohio.edu. Accessed January 12, 2011. 
160 See http://www.unk.edu. Accessed January 7, 2011. 
161 See http://www.aricherlife.org/downloads.html. Accessed September 22, 2009. 
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trend. Racial homogeneity, on the other hand, is rarely praised. Rather, homogeneity is 
often perceived with suspicion or even criticized. We go out of our way to display and 
declare our commitment to diversity, even in cases where there is stronger empirical 
evidence of homogeneity. And in cases where diversity is the reality, well, they are 
simply very proud. 
Nytimes.com praises Hilton Hotel Corporations for having the highest diversity 
index, thanks to the diversity committee of the company’s Board of Directors.162 Hilton is 
credited with being the first in its industry to offer an outreach program “to further 
educate minority and female entrepreneurs on investment.” Hilton also has partnerships 
with several historically black colleges, including mentoring programs, aimed at 
increasing the level of diversity in their own staff as well as the people they do business 
with. There is even a web-based supplier-diversity tracking system, to quantify the 
company’s spending with minority- and women-owned businesses. Hilton likes diversity 
and is committed to fostering it—and there doesn’t seem to be anything wrong with that. 
Is this, however, forcing diversity to some degree? This is precisely the topic of a 
Washington Post article by Kathleen Parker, “You’ll Love Diversity—Or Else,” where 
she cites the National Fair Housing Alliance advertisements as her primary example.163 
Parker writes that while she herself is a fan of having diverse individuals in her 
neighborhood, “[H]appy diversity is an organic process that results when like-minded 
citizens congregate around shared values and interests.” She goes on to write, “But is 
diversity the key to prosperity and happiness? Or is diversity what naturally occurs when 
people from different backgrounds are drawn to a nation where prosperity can be earned 
162 See http://www.nytimes.com/marketing/jobmarket/diversity/index.html. Accessed January 12, 2011. 
163 Parker 2009.  
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and the pursuit of happiness is a founding principle?” Parker is raising an interesting 
point. Is diversity even worth praising, when it is the result of careful and strategic 
planning by the diversity police? Isn’t accidental diversity the only form of diversity 
actually worthy of praise? 
One may answer, yes, accidental diversity is ideal, but unfortunately rare, and 
somewhat-constructed diversity is better than no diversity. After all, where would we be, 
if it weren’t for forced integration in our schools? If there were no policies and 
committees dedicated to diversity, if there was no active push for diversity, then 
companies, schools, and certainly neighborhoods and social groups, would be much more 
homogeneous than they are today—and that would exacerbate segregation or any unfair 
discrimination that may linger in a historically racist American society. The more 
connections that are made between different groups of people, the better—or in Putnam’s 
terms, the more bridging social capital, the better. So goes the argument. 
According to Putnam, bonding social capital refers to connections made between 
similar individuals often in the name of that similarity—for instance, an ethnic 
association that brings together and celebrates individuals of a common ethnicity. 
Bridging social capital refers to connections made by individuals who are not of the same 
category in terms of race, class, gender, etc.—for example, a church where blacks and 
whites  worship together, who become friends and create lasting connections, despite 
their racial differences. Putnam, however, who is an advocate of diversity and social 
capital, came to the disheartening conclusion that bonding social capital is much more 
easily created than bridging, which is not the ideal. He wrote, 
138
If we had a golden magic wand that would miraculously create more bridging 
social capital, we would surely want to use it. But suppose we had only an 
aluminum magic wand that could create more social capital, but only of a bonding 
sort. This second-best magic wand would bring more blacks and more whites to 
church, but not to the same church, more Hispanics and Anglos to the soccer 
field, but not the same soccer field. Should we use it?164 
Putnam’s answer is essentially that there is no simple answer, that it depends on the scale 
of the problem. And while Putnam’s observation that diversity actually makes social 
capital decline is discouraging, it is understandable. It comes as no shock that when 
Americans’ participation in community was at its height in the 1960s, there was more or 
less a consensus on what it meant to be American—“[W]hite, straight, Christian, 
comfortable, and (in the public square, at least) male.”165 
Are we, then, doomed? Are diversity and social capital mutually exclusive? Not 
quite. When discussing diversity, one point that is often overlooked, is that diversity is 
truly worthy of praise when there is some form of commonality there as well. People with 
absolutely nothing in common being in the same room, with no thought or care for the 
other, is not the form of diversity we glorify, and nothing to be proud of. (And is more 
accurately described as segregation.) It is when different people are in the same room to 
work together for a common goal, regardless of their differences, or even because of 
their differences, that diversity is successfully working. We push diversity so much to the 
point of implying diversity is good in itself, but what we really mean, and we must not 
forget this, is that diversity works best when it is assisted by a commonality. That is what 
bridging social capital is—without some commonality, no form of social capital can be 
created. 
164 Putnam 2000, 362. 
165 Putnam 2000, 17. 
139
When put in such terms, the distinction between bonding and bridging social 
capital becomes insignificant, because even bridging social capital is based on some 
commonality. Blacks and whites who worship together are different in terms of race, but 
share in their religious beliefs. Anglos and Latinos who play soccer together are different 
in terms of ethnicity, but share their common interest in soccer. Christians and Muslims 
who volunteer at the hospital are different in their religion, but share their will to help 
those in need. Great emphasis is placed on any path-crossing between the sociological 
categories, (i.e. race, gender, religion, sexuality) as an achievement of diversity, but no 
individual is defined by those categories alone (a point we will return to later in this 
chapter), and commonality, in any minor or major sense of what defines an individual, is 
the basis of what brings individuals together to form a sense of community. In other 
words, commonality is what produces any kind of social capital, including the bridging 
kind. 
In Dry Bones Rattling, Mark R. Warren repeatedly points out the harmonious 
bridges made between different ethnic groups, contributing to the success of the 
Industrial Areas Foundation. His detailed description of the progress, however, shows 
how crucial the common religious values were to those bridges. In a racially segregated 
society, “A set of common beliefs, a shared identity as people of God, helps people to 
identify themselves as members of the same community.”166 It seems that the easiest way 
to enhance diversity is to identify something those diverse individuals have in common—
but is that bridging or bonding? It is both, and at that point, the distinction hardly matters. 
It also hardly matters which similarities bring individuals together, as long as they are 
enough for the individuals themselves. For my informant James, something as trivial as 
166 Warren 2001, 117. 
140
the same form of childhood discipline was a source of bonding.167 James, “annoyed” that 
Koreans only stick to each other, said, 
I mean how do they come to the conclusion that Americans are “different” 
without ever learning whether or not non-Koreans have those same experiences? 
Like me and my  buddies, one of my best friends, is a white guy. And the general 
stereotype of white people is that they don’t punish their kids. And when they do 
they put them in time-out or make them sit in a corner. And that’s not true at all. I 
got my ass beat when I was bad and so did half of my buddies, and we joke 
around about it all the time. I know what he’s been through and he knows what 
I’ve been through and it’s not that different. 
Whether form of discipline, taste in music, or ethnicity, what individuals see as a 
commonality can become a source of bonding. If ordinary men and women don’t put so 
much emphasis race/ethnicity alone, why should scholars? 
In Chapter 3 I recalled attending a graduate seminar on communities. One night in 
class, we had a guest speaker, Sidney Brower, author of Good Neighborhoods and a 
professor at the University of Maryland.168 He asked the class, “What are some of the 
qualities that you think make a good neighborhood?” A student quickly answered, 
“Diversity.” Brower responded, “So, crooks and cheaters are okay, too?” The student 
said, “Well, no,” slightly rolling her eyes, meaning she clearly meant a different kind of 
diversity that excludes crooks and cheaters. Brower raised an important point here. When 
we praise diversity, we are not embracing any and all kinds of differences. We are 
praising a commonality despite the difference—in this case, the shared virtue of not being 
crooks and cheaters, and even something as simple as the mutual caring of the 
neighborhood. Bridges alone cannot be sustained without some form of bonds, and 
167 James is a 28-year-old 1.5er. 
168 Brower 1996. 
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therefore, advocating diversity requires that we remember the commonalities. 
Benefits of the homogeneous Korean community
This is not to suggest that I, or Korean Americans, are against racial/ethnic 
diversity. My informants were, generally speaking, appreciative of diversity, and a few, 
like James, even explicitly rebuked fellow Korean Americans for not actively seeking 
diversity. They were, however, more knowingly cautious about the difficulties of 
achieving diversity naturally and accidentally. One of my informants, Pastor Dan, is the 
pastor at a non-ethnic church in Baltimore, where about eighty percent of the members 
are white, and the rest are mostly black or Asian.169 Though he grew up in the Korean 
American church, he made the conscious decision to be the leader of a non-ethnic church, 
and diversity in his congregation has always been a priority. He said, “I’m not saying a 
diverse church is more holy, but there’s a certain aspect that reflects God’s bigness when 
you’re able to worship with a diverse congregation. But it’s hard. What do they say, 
Sunday mornings are the most segregated times in America? That’s true. It’s very hard to 
grow a church with the goal of being diverse or multiethnic. I’m trying, but it’s tough.” 
Unlike Pastor Dan, most informants, who have little say in the racial composition 
of their workplace, did not think much about how they view diversity or how they were 
going to increase diversity in their own lives. It would be more accurate to say that they 
had become accustomed to diversity in certain parts of their lives, mostly in the 
workplace, and as a result, appreciative of it, rather than to say that they deliberately 
sought diversity. My informant, Lois, a middle-school teacher, recalled an opportunity to 
teach in Korea, which she did not take. She was initially very excited about the idea, but 
169 Pastor Dan is a 37-year-old second generation Korean American. 
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she quickly changed her mind after seeing a picture of the Korean students who “all 
looked the same.” She said, “It’s scary. In my classroom now I can look and see five 
white kids, seven black kids, three Korean kids, two Thai—you know, all different. And I 
love that about them because they come and tell me all these new things, and I learn 
things about them. But to see them all the same, it’s scary.” 
Though my informants were generally appreciative of diversity, none of them 
were opposed to the homogeneous Korean community, either. Even those who currently 
take no active part in the Korean community had done so at some point in their lives, and 
talked about that experience as the time and place where they became comfortable with 
their ethnic identity. Though the effort to accept and protect minorities in American civil 
society has improved significantly, being the minority is hardly easy—especially for 
children, which is what most of my informants were when they first began to recognize 
their minority status in America. Christin recalled, “I was a very insecure kid.” Not only 
was Christin one of the few Asians in her school, her parents were also divorced, making 
her feel different in more ways than one. She said, “I just wanted to be more like 
everybody else—have both parents, be Americanized. It’s good to be different, but when 
you’re a kid, you want to be like everyone else.” Similar experiences of being “the only 
Asian” were shared by most informants, and though they are perfectly secure with, even 
proud of, their ethnic identity today, they clearly remembered the insecurity of being the 
minority in their childhood.170 
170 My informant, Jenny, a teacher at an elementary school, said that there are more Asian children in the 
area today than there were when she was growing up, and that as a result, Korean American children 
today probably feel less insecure about their minority status than they did in her generation. Most of my 
informants are in their late 20s to 30s, meaning their childhood was in the 1980s and 1990s, when the 
Korean population in the U.S. was much smaller. I suspect that there is a regional difference here as well
—in Los Angeles or New York, where the Korean population has remained the two highest since waves 
of immigration began, Koreans may have experienced less of a minority complex, or experienced it 
earlier.  
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In their classic work, To Empower People, Berger and Neuhaus wrote, 
Within one’s group—whether it be racial, national, political, religious, or all of 
these—one discovers an answer to the elementary question, “Who am I?” and is 
supported in living out of that answer. Psychologically and sociologically, we 
would propose the axiom that any identity is better than none. Politically, we 
would argue that it is not the business of public policy to make value judgments 
regarding the merits or demerits of various identity solutions, so long as all groups 
abide by the minimal rules that make a pluralistic society possible.171 
While one’s identity is not confined to an ethnic identity, unbearable insecurity with any 
one of the identities given to (or chosen by) an individual can be detrimental to his self-
respect and dignity. And what kind of pluralistic society can exist with individuals who 
lack self-respect? What good is liberty, progress, or even diversity, if the general 
population lacks sufficient self-respect to participate in society at large? Insecurity, 
shame, and inferiority are all side-effects that are known to often accompany the 
minority, and if homogeneous groups help minorities overcome such complexes, they 
arguably have a crucial stepping-stone role to a healthy pluralistic society. Dignity or 
security within the groups with which they identify is perhaps a prerequisite for 
individuals to branch out and meaningfully bridge with a group outside of their own. In 
other words, though seemingly counterintuitive, homogeneous communities may be 
necessary for a healthy heterogeneous society. 
Of course, ordinary people, especially children, don’t think in terms of dignity or 
its significance in the long-term goals of a diverse society. A minority’s practical solution 
is to find refuge from being the minority, or somehow finding a way to deal with being 
the minority, which is why in immigrant families, encouragement or pep talks on how to 
171 Berger and Neuhaus 1996 (2nd ed.), 202-203. 
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deal with potential teasing or bullying are common. Several informants remembered such 
talks, like Nathan, who said, “My parents always told us, ‘Be proud that you’re 
Korean!’”; or Joyce, who said, “My dad used to tell me, ‘If they make fun of you for not 
knowing English, you make fun of them for not knowing Korean.’” These talks had 
varying effects, some more influential than others. According to nearly every one of my 
informants, however, what really did the job of assuaging the minority status (or creating 
pride in the ethnic identity), was the ethnic association—namely, the Korean church. 
Without deliberately trying to cultivate the self-respect of minorities in order to better 
live in a pluralistic society, the Korean church managed to do just that. 
The significance of the Korean church has been so well documented, that it is rare 
to find a scholarly book on Korean Americans without any mention of the Korean 
church. My informants, however, talked about their church as though it were a unique 
and personal experience. Charles, who “pretty much grew up in the [Korean] church,” 
and to this day attends one, said, 
My church really helped me to feel proud of my heritage. Cool hyungs (older 
brothers) would speak Korean, they would listen to Korean music, and we would 
all get into it. If you don’t know the Korean culture, you’re not one of us. It’s not 
cool, you’re a migooksaram (an American), not one of us. It was the cool thing 
when I was in high school—totally opposite from elementary school, when we 
were all trying to be Americanized. And now, raising my son, I want to teach 
early on that being Korean is something to be proud of, that it’s a cool thing. 
Pastor Dan, though currently the head of a non-ethnic church, recalled and understood the 
appeal of the Korean church. He said, “I’ve heard some Koreans say that they spend all 
week with white people, they want to have a weekend to spend with Koreans. It’s 
understandable, there’s a natural affinity.” Interestingly, in the churches my informants 
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attended growing up (and for some, the churches they attend today), everything was 
conducted in English, from the sermons and worship songs, to the informal conversations 
among the church members. In other words, my informants could potentially attend a 
non-ethnic church with no language problems, which is a completely different situation 
from their parents’ generation and recent Korean immigrants, who, because of their 
limited English, have little choice but to attend a Korean church, if they want to attend 
church at all. However, for a Korean American teenager, who grew up in America but 
was one of the few Koreans at his school, the ethnic church was one of the few places 
where he could find refuge from his minority status, or forget his minority status, by 
being in the majority. Ethnicity was made a source of bond and pride at the Korean 
church, not uniqueness or embarrassment. The once-a-week relief turned out to have 
much more lasting impact than they, or the church, set out to provide. 
For the most part, my now-adult informants’ sense of security and comfort with 
their Korean identity was obvious, either they expressed it directly or indirectly, and all 
of them had little trouble living or working in a diverse environment. Only a few 
explicitly said, “I love being Korean,” or “I’m glad I’m Korean,” but all of them 
recognized their Korean identity as a major defining feature of themselves. This is typical 
for ethnic minorities, and though peace with one’s ethnic identity is not a sufficient 
condition of happily participating in a diverse environment, it is at least a necessary 
condition of the self-respecting minority. Liberals like Rosenblum, however, argue that 
an ethnic identity is one among many identities we adopt for ourselves, and not 
intrinsically more meaningful than the others. She writes, “[I]dentification with one’s 
ethnic or cultural ancestry—or with one idiosyncratically selected thread of mixed 
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ancestry, which is commonplace—is voluntary. It is an option, despite the rhetoric of 
group belonging and the fact that individuals may believe their identity is ascriptive, or an 
inheritance. Intermarriage is well documented.”172 While I grant that participation in an 
ethnic community or the degree of identification with an ethnic identity is under some 
control by the individual (though I hardly see intermarriage as sufficient evidence of 
voluntarily not choosing one’s ethnic identity), the declaration that ethnic identification is 
voluntary does not give due weight to what that ethnic identity means to the individual. 
For the individuals who do identify with their ethnicity, it is precisely the primordial and 
involuntary nature of their ethnicity that makes the ethnic identity so powerful and not 
negligible, and often a source of strong emotional ties. 
The concept of blood often came up with several informants, as they discussed 
their ethnicity and its involuntary nature. As Kibria discussed in her book, to Korean 
Americans, their ethnicity is a “primordial, a matter of blood… an essential, unalterable 
matter, rooted in the deep-seated, biological forces of blood.”173 And rather than the 
involuntary nature of ethnicity becoming a source of resentment due to lack of choice, it 
becomes a source of a connection to something bigger than the self. The familiar rhetoric 
of “I’m born this way” or “This is who I am” may not be sophisticated or even 
persuasive, but it is powerful and genuine for the one who is saying it.174 This is not to 
promote politics of recognition, which is the ultimate target of Rosenblum’s criticism in 
her claim that ethnic identity is voluntary, but we ought to give due weight to what ethnic 
identity means to those who hold it and look for the potential connection between ethnic 
identity and diversity, as opposed to disregarding it as having no place in a contemporary 
172 Rosenblum 1998, 332. 
173 Kibria 2002, 46. 
174 Advocates of other minority groups, such as gay rights activists, use a similar rhetoric. 
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diverse society. 
Furthermore, even if we grant that the individual is free to choose or not choose 
an ethnic identity, such a claim undermines the burden put on the minority by his external 
world. Even if a minority wishes not to identify with his race or ethnicity, that identity is 
often given to him by others. Because race and ethnicity are visible, neither is easily 
negligible, no matter how much the minority may wish to neglect it. Rosenblum accounts 
for this difference between the minority and majority, or non-whites and whites, but there 
is a sweeping sense in which she discusses the “ethnic option,” which in actuality is not 
so optional for the minority. This is precisely why ethnic communities can be a place of 
comfort for the minority—they allow the members relief from being recognized by others 
as “the Asian.” Liberals and libertarians may claim that we ought to not let others shape 
our identities, that rather, we are free to shape our own. But to quote Alan Ehrenhalt 
again, “Libertarian ideas are seductive and would be nearly impossible to challenge if one 
thing were true—if we lived in a world full of P. J. O'Rourkes, all of us bright and 
articulate and individualistic….”175 
To be sure, there are plenty of ethnic minorities who seem to confirm 
Rosenblum’s claim by opting out of the ethnic community. For instance, James was 
different from my other informants, in that he deliberately chose to not partake in the 
Korean community. His social circles were mostly non-Korean, he spent little time with 
his Korean family, and when we first discussed the possibility of an interview (which he 
agreed to), he said, “I don’t know how useful I’d be. I actually try really hard not to be 
associated with that whole Korean thing.” However, opting out of the ethnic community 
is not equivalent to opting out of the ethnic identity, and neither is a totally autonomous 
175 Ehrenhalt 1995. 
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process, to be designed and influenced by the individual alone. James recalled his high 
school and college years, when his Korean friends put him in the category of “white boy” 
and he “began to see people’s attitudes toward me slowly change.” James said, “I really 
don’t like it. It’s one of my biggest pet peeves. Whenever you have a preconceived notion 
of someone, that person begins to mold themselves into that preconceived notion. And 
it’s just not, you know, conducive to growing, as a person.” In other words, James’s 
problem was not only others’ incorrect opinion of him—for one, he was “just as Korean 
as anyone else”; but, more importantly, others’ labeling reinforced his labeling himself. 
At the time of the interview James was in his late twenties and he seemed to embody the 
self-respecting individual who chooses not to identify with his ethnic community. 
However, his experience with the Korean community was clearly not one that was always 
smooth and easy, nor one that he himself had complete control over. 
My informant Lois, who also enjoyed a diverse group of friends, had taken it 
upon herself to frequently point out her minority status when in the presence of non-
Koreans, as though her being Asian is consistently the elephant in the room. She said, 
I know that when I go out with my one girlfriend and all of her friends who are 
white, I’m always like, “One of these things is not like the other!” and they all 
laugh at me and say, “You are!” It’s like a running joke with us, and I’m 
comfortable with that, and they’re comfortable with that, I think. [But you’re the 
only one who makes the joke?] Yeah. [Nobody else would make that joke.] Yeah. 
Nobody else would make that joke. [Why do you make that joke?] I just think it’s 
funny. Because I’ll look at us, and definitely in that situation, it’s like if my whole 
class was white, maybe to alleviate, if anything, you know. [Do you say it because 
you know somebody’s thinking it?] No, I just say it to be funny. And now it’s like 
a running joke. 
I wasn’t sure what to make of Lois’s joke, or if I understood the joke. I did, however, 
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hear from many Korean Americans, the numerous ways in which they deal with being the 
minority in the room, and how the burden is on them, to somehow “alleviate” something, 
if anything. Sometimes, the self-consciousness is self-generated, as though they feel 
others are looking at their race and only their race, even if they are not. For the most part, 
however, Korean Americans understand, realistically, that their appearance or the mere 
sound of their names give away their race first and foremost, and for the bulk of the time 
that they are in non-Koreans’ presence they cannot shed their ethnicity. 
When something that is believed to be innate becomes the source of one’s 
insecurity, or when one has little choice in being identified as a minority, finding peace 
with that innate minority status is a priority to one’s basic well-being. Only once the 
born-with-it identities have been accepted and secured, can we hope for those individuals 
to exercise their liberty in the voluntary belongings and in the pluralistic society. Emily, 
as mentioned in Chapter 3, had decided to make a good representation of Asians by 
smiling and being friendly to strangers who stared at her at the Waffle House—and she 
held her own. Her roommate, however, had not been able to handle similar treatment 
from the locals, and eventually transferred to an area with a bigger Asian population. 
Both women felt they had no choice in their ethnic identity, but they dealt with it in 
different ways. Emily, who reported always having had a secure sense of her ethnic 
identity, decided to take on the additional burden of representing her ethnic group. Her 
roommate, however, had not (yet) found a comfort with her minority status, and thus 
sought relief from it. While ethnic communities do present the risk of keeping their 
members locked in, they first provide the escape from self-consciousness of the minority 
and the grounds for building self-respect given their minority identity, preparing them to 
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eventually be the self-respecting minority in a pluralistic society. Without any kind of 
stepping-stone, it is rather presumptuous to claim minorities can actively and voluntarily 
participate in a pluralistic society, with dignity and all, where they will have no choice 
but to remain the minority. 
The goal here is not a population where everyone respects themselves—as 
desirable as that may be, that is hardly possible, and not the issue. What I wish to point 
out here is that pushing an abstract concept like diversity without first taking seriously the 
diverse identities individuals hold is a superficial and fruitless task. Before dismissing 
homogeneity and embracing diversity categorically, we ought to take seriously the costs 
and benefits of both. My informants were, on the whole, sympathetic to both diversity 
and homogeneity, though in a complex way. Emily said, quite honestly, 
In America, there’s this fad of multiculturalism, and it’s the white people who feel 
like they have to say, “Okay, let’s try and understand them.” So it’s still them and 
us, and they need to lower themselves to understand us and embrace us. It’s not 
an intentional “We’re better than you,” but they’ve just never been racially 
discriminated against. It’s condescending, but not intentionally—they’ve just 
never been a minority. And because of that subtle wall, and I know minorities feel 
it, minorities would rather just not challenge that or deal with it, and would rather 
live in their own comfort zone. And I understand that. 
Out of all of my informants, Emily was perhaps the most ethnic-conscious, if for no other 
reason than her workplace, the Korean American Family Counseling Center. She put 
effort into speaking without prejudice, and genuinely wished Korean Americans were 
more open to befriending non-Koreans. She was also the only informant who talked 
about her white friends and their discomfort at being the minority in her Korean world. 
(Most of my informants didn’t have such tales to share, since they had mostly Korean 
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friends.) She said, “If my white friends were to come to my church or something like 
that, they would feel all kinds of discomfort and they couldn’t handle it. They’re 
uncomfortable but at the same time it’s like them being gracious. It’s really hard to 
explain, it’s like, ‘I’ll slum it for the day, I’ll be ethnic today,’ like they’re exploring 
something exotic or something. Which is insulting to the minority, you know? That’s 
everyday for us. Welcome to our world.” 
In her book, The Failures of Integration, Sheryll Cashin noted the similar 
discomfort white people feel in the rare occasions they find themselves as the minority. 
However, while accounting for all of the benefits of a racially homogeneous community, 
Cashin came to the difficult conclusion that an integrated society is still better—for the 
minority. In order for blacks to truly have equal opportunity, an integrated society is 
necessary. She wrote, 
The point of integration is not to pursue it for its own sake, although it has its own 
inherent social benefits. The point of integration is the same as the core 
motivation of the civil rights movement itself. Integration, then and now, is the 
best route to equal opportunity for everyone. As I argue in Part II of this book, I 
have become convinced of this—even as I recognize the nurturing benefits of a 
racial enclave—because of the virulent inequality that our separation is begetting. 
I have come to believe that racial and economic integration, particularly of the 
social institutions that offer pathways to upward mobility, is the best route to 
closing the egregious gaps of inequality that weaken our nation.176 
While I sympathize with Cashin, she is writing on behalf of blacks, a population who has 
faced and continues to face unfair discrimination on a mass scale, due to the absence of 
an integrated society. Korean Americans, however, are not exactly in the same boat. For 
176 Cashin 2004, 81. 
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one, there are not enough Korean Americans, or even Asian Americans, that can make up 
a majority in any major city or create a genuine ethnic enclave resembling the scale of 
black enclaves. Furthermore, Korean Americans as a group have not, at least not yet, 
fallen into a massive underclass cycle, where they are stuck in ethnic enclaves that also 
happen to be economically disadvantanged. To be sure, it is not the fault of blacks that 
they lose opportunity by forming ethnic communities. In fact, it is not the black 
population who intentionally create black enclaves and black-majority towns and schools, 
but rather, according to Cashin, the result of white flight. And thus the blacks’ cyclical 
underclass is largely due to whites’ response to blacks, which is a completely different 
situation from Korean Americans. If it were the case, that Korean enclaves resulted in 
Koreans’ economic and other opportunities being denied, Korean Americans may be 
more tempted to pursue more integrated lives and I may be more tempted to advocate it. 
However, my informants (nor I) see such a phenomenon among Korean Americans. 
Koreans, and Asians in general, don’t quite experience white flight. If anything, Asian 
Americans have been labeled the model minority, and even if they are, in fact, missing 
some opportunities by not pursuing more integrated lives, the costs are not on a massive 
enough scale for them to be seriously bothered by it. 
By having a place, like the ethnic church, where a sense of pride in “who we are” 
can be cultivated, Korean Americans are ultimately in a better condition to live in a 
pluralistic society as the minority. Most of my informants, who live and work in diverse 
settings, still reserved small Korean places in their lives, whether in church, family, or 
close friends. They were not so much in need of the Korean community (anymore), nor 
did they feel discomfort in being the minority in their daily lives. They did, however, 
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prefer homogeneous settings every so often—not only as a result of “natural affinity,” but 
interestingly, in order to “protect the culture.” 
“Protect the culture”
Many second generation Korean American children attend what they call hangul-
hakgyo, or Korean language school. These classes are often organized and taught in the 
Korean church, the bedrock of the Korean community. Most Korean Americans are so 
accustomed to the affiliation between hangul-hakgyo and church, that they hardly 
question it. However, it is somewhat strange—is a church, a religious institution, the best 
place to teach a language? I raised this question to the pastor’s wife of a Korean church, 
who leads the language classes there. She answered, in Korean, “Where else would we do 
it? Church is the only place where Korean is spoken for so many of our children. We 
have to protect the culture.” Of course, the pastor’s wife, as will the members of her 
church, attests to their priority of faith over ethnicity. However, ethnicity being what it is, 
and the ethnic church being what it is, the order is not always clear. 
Some informants, more so than others, made conscious decisions to maintain the 
Korean things in their lives (and their children’s lives)—language being the most obvious 
and often-cited. Brooke said, “When we have kids and stuff, I’d love for my kids to know 
Korean and be bilingual. [You’re going to teach them Korean?] Yeah, and obviously 
send them to hangul-hakgyo and stuff. [Did you go to hangul-hakgyo?] I did. When I was 
younger I didn’t remember how to read or write Korean or anything like that, so my 
parents were like, ‘This is a no-no.’ So they sent me to hangul-hakgyo and I went and I 
learned how to read and speak. [Did you like it?] I loved it. I loved it. I was like the 
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teacher’s pet. I loved it.” Joyce said, “I love Korean, I love the language. My kids are 
going to speak Korean for sure.” Charles said, with a smile, “My son doesn’t know any 
English, and he won’t until he goes to school!” The old belief that learning one language 
will hinder the fluency of another seems to hold no validity in this group.177 Even 
informants like Claudia, who spoke little Korean, cited one of her reasons for attending a 
Korean church as her appreciation for the language “just being spoken in the building.” 
When I asked why retaining the language is so important, most of them gave 
somewhat vague answers—“I just think it’s important,” “Well, we need to communicate 
with adults,” while some gave economic answers—“It’s so useful,” “It’s going to come 
in handy, career-wise.” David, a 1.5er who attends a church I visited, spoke as though he 
had contemplated this before. He said, “I’m afraid in years and years Koreans are going 
to turn out like African Americans—just lumped together with other Asians, just become 
Asian Americans. Lose the language and the food and the culture. Become just another 
race.” To those like David, who cherish not only the language but all things part of the 
Korean culture, keeping marriages within the ethnic group was important. Sean, a single 
35-year-old 1.5er, had evidently dated non-Koreans in the past, but had recently decided 
to only date Korean. When I asked why, he said, “I would be the first one in my family to 
marry someone not Korean. I would get so much crap for that, and so would my wife. It’s 
not worth it.” Sean, following our interview, invited me to a family event, where sure 
enough, everyone was Korean. I asked a few of his relatives what they think of interracial 
marriage, giving the hypothetical example of Sean marrying a non-Korean. A very 
friendly cousin-in-law said, “There’s nothing wrong with it, but when I married into this 
family, I realized they were all still Korean, which is rare for a family that’s been here for 
177 See Shin 2005, for a compelling argument against this belief. 
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so long. And because of that, I think we all kind of feel a pride about it. And Sean’s next 
in line to get married—so to be the first one to ruin it, yeah, he’d never hear the end of 
it.” 
In the church as well as the family, sentiment of protecting the Korean culture 
was abundant. Charles, who came to learn in the church that being Korean is “cool,” was 
very fond of his English-speaking Korean church in Virginia. While affirming that the 
gospel is the priority of his church, he admitted that the members are not exactly seeking 
ethnic diversity in the church. He recalled the few occasions when an interracial couple 
or a non-Korean individual visited his church, and with a guilty expression, he said, 
“We’re kind of ill-equipped. We don’t really know how to treat non-Koreans when they 
come to our church. We just wonder why they came, and it’s almost a relief when they 
leave. We should learn, but… (shrug).” Nathan’s church, which is also an English-
speaking Korean church located in Baltimore, actually had a few regular non-Korean 
members. He said, “We have this one mixed couple, and a few others, but they’re not as 
part of the group as everybody else. [Why not?] I don’t know. I hope it’s not because 
they’re not Korean.” Like most Americans today, my informants were careful not to 
seem overtly ethnocentric or racist. Instead of being anti-diversity, they tried to sound 
pro-Korean—we don’t have anything against other ethnicities, or even mixing with other 
groups, but we want to keep some things reserved for just us Koreans. It is a delicate 
balance, one which Korean Americans may be unaware that they are doing. 
An increased loyalty to one’s ethnicity is a common phenomenon among 
immigrants or minorities. After all, it is not as meaningful to be pro-Korean in the midst 
of Koreans. Korean Americans, relative to other immigrant groups, however, seem 
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especially protective of their culture—language, food, traditions, and all things Korean, 
or rather, what they believe to be all things Korean. Here, the rapidly-changing and 
growing Korea cannot be ignored, which is not applicable to all immigrant groups. Korea 
is often referred to as a modern success-case of democratization and industrialization. 
And because the 1960s and 1970s were still the early stages of this growth, which was 
also the time immigration waves to the West began, Korea today is utterly a different 
place from the Korea my informants (and their parents) know. To be sure, changes have 
been largely for the better, but not entirely without costs, including the loss of traditional 
values that Korean Americans believe are the essence of Korean culture. As Korean 
Americans realize that Korea is a rapidly-changing nation, whether by seeing how 
different recent Korean immigrants are, or by visiting Korea, they feel responsible for 
saving the Korean values they they know, or what the believe to be the “true Korean” 
values. As one recent immigrant put it, “The Koreans here who have lived in America 
their whole lives are so much more Korean than the Koreans back in Korea.” The Korean 
diaspora (as many like to call themselves) who settled in America, see themselves as 
characteristically different from native Americans, as well as the native Koreans. 
Identifying the real Koreans, then, or the insiders of the Korean American community, 
becomes much more complex, not to mention subjective. 
Nostalgia is always in vogue, but this is no simple longing for the past. Koreans 
living in Korea are plenty nostalgic as well, but because they are inseparable from the 
changes around them, they have little power in holding on to or recreating the past. 
Korean Americans, on the other hand, precisely because they are a minority and have 
formed their own ethnic community outside of the native place, they are outsiders of 
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whatever changes took place in Korea after they left, which allows them to look at the 
aftermath with a critical (and at times judgmental) eye. Plenty of Korean Americans I 
came across spoke disapprovingly of recent immigrants—from “they don’t work hard,” 
“they’re too competitive,” to “they only care about money and status,” “they raise their 
children to be materialistic.” For Korean Americans, it is one more way to distinguish the 
insiders, the real Koreans, from the outsiders. 
In his book The Communitarian Persuasion, Philip Selznick wrote, “It is obvious 
that community is not a comfortable idea, blessed with simplicity. On the contrary, it is 
one of those great concepts from which we learn the perplexities and burdens of social 
life. Most important is the conflict between exclusion and inclusion.”178 In every group, 
there are those who belong and those who don’t, and echoing the previous chapter, the 
fact that there are insiders and outsiders is not necessarily good or bad—just the nature of 
group life. And as we previously discussed, the insiders and outsiders of the Korean 
community are not simply Koreans and non-Koreans. 
However, a notable tendency of Korean Americans, and other racial/ethnic 
minorities for that matter, is to associate or equate their shared habits and values with 
their likewise-shared ethnicity. For instance, Korean Americans speak in ethnic/racial 
terms, such as “He’s so Korean,” or “He’s really white.” Often such terms are used to 
identify insiders and outsiders of the community, which sometimes results in the ironic 
situation of Koreans being outsiders of the Korean community, for not being “Korean 
enough.” Thus, while the boundaries of an ethnic community are not drawn by ethnicity 
alone, they are perceived and spoken about as though they are. In my interviews, 
informants showed more effort in using the correct terms, referring to “the Korean 
178 Selznick 2002, 26. 
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culture” or “Koreanized,” but in everyday settings, Korean Americans freely reverted to 
descriptions such as “so Korean,” “so white,” “trying to be Korean,” “acting white,” etc. 
Once in awhile someone would interject, “Well, we are all Korean,” overtly pointing out 
the incorrect use of the term. More often than not, however, all participants of a 
conversation seemed to understand perfectly what it means to be “Korean.” 
What then, does it take to be an “insider”? In essence, the insiders care about the 
Korean-ness of their fellow Koreans, and if a Korean shows no interest in his own 
Korean-ness, he cannot quite be an insider. As one informant put it, “If you’re Korean but 
‘white-washed,’ you’re kind of ‘out.’ If you marry a non-Korean, you’re kind of a 
traitor.” This sort of comment is rare but honest, and very few informants were as blunt. 
And though most informants held a nonchalant attitude of their insider status, they had 
experienced and understood the awkwardness of being faced with a fellow Korean who is 
an outsider of the Korean community. 
Nathan recalled an uncomfortable event during his college years, when he invited 
his girlfriend to a family gathering. She was Korean, but adopted by a white American 
family. She spoke no Korean and knew little about the Korean culture, none of which had 
bothered Nathan before. Reflecting on the family gathering, however, he said, “My mom 
and my aunts, they were all trying to get along with her, but they just couldn’t 
communicate. And they speak English pretty well, so it wasn’t just the language. That’s 
not why we broke up, but after we broke up, I was like, ‘I want someone who’s more 
Korean.’” Nathan later did marry someone who was “more Korean,” and he talked about 
how much more at ease he is, “when everyone is all Korean American.” From knowing 
“how to interact with parents,” to “not having to explain what food they are eating,” “the 
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little stuff like that” is what marks an insider from the outsider. 
It seems fair to say that ethnicity is a necessary but not sufficient condition for 
membership of the Korean community. The use of ethnic terms, however, makes it sound 
as though ethnicity is the only condition, and creates an image of an exclusive ethnic 
community with signs of ethnocentrism or racism. Furthermore, the members create their 
own idea of what it means to be “Korean,” and when they are met with Koreans who do 
not fit this image, the common response is, as one informant put it, “Are they not 
Korean?” There is a bit of a tautology here—you don’t belong because you’re not 
Korean, and you must not be Korean because you don’t belong. 
To be sure, Korean Americans are not the only group who use racial or ethnic 
terms, laden with values and habits associated with that group. Some degree of group-
identity construction goes on in all groups, and it is a tool that builds solidarity for 
insiders while excluding outsiders. Scholar Karyn Lacy conducted a research study with 
middle-class blacks, many of whom talked about “how black” one was, as though it can 
be measured.179 In one memorable quote an informant recalled her daughter coming home 
from her first day of school asking, “Are we black?”—a confusion in her young mind, 
because though she had always thought she was black, she evidently didn’t “talk black” 
according to a schoolmate. Another informant in Lacy’s study said, “You know, I hear 
people talking about, ‘that little girl don’t know she’s black.’ To me, that’s the most 
ridiculous thing you could ever say!” His point is well taken—it is ridiculous to include 
and exclude an entire racial/ethnic group, including children, based on how they talk and 
act. Not only is it inaccurate, it also exacerbates the narrow stereotypes of groups (like 
James pointed out), for the perspectives of insiders and outsiders alike. 
179 See Lacy 2004, 911. 
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Like the middle-class blacks of Lacy’s study, the “Korean world” is an 
“interpretive community,” defined by a “cultural repertoire” that the insiders rely on to 
define the Korean experience. And also like the middle-class blacks, Korean Americans 
maintain their ties to the Korean community not only as a refuge from racial 
discrimination, but also because they simply enjoy interacting with fellow Koreans. By 
using language, albeit incorrectly, an ethnically defined community establishes the 
insiders’ status and strengthens their solidarity, which inevitably and simultaneously 
establishes outsiders and intensifies their difference from them. In the end, protecting 
their culture may not be without costs, and it may not be a good thing that we use ethnic 
terms to include and exclude. But again, that is the nature of group life, to include and 
exclude. The characterization of insiders and outsiders in terms of ethnicity may be 
unique to ethnic communities, but the fact that insiders and outsiders are identified at all 
is not exclusive to ethnic groups. 
Best of All Worlds—Korea and America, old and new, ethnic and non
Does membership in an ethnic community, then, demand an opposition to a 
pluralistic, integrated, society? No. Korean Americans want the best of both worlds, and 
they have the luxury of choosing not only a mixture of homogeneity and diversity, but 
also a mixture of Korea and America. This picking and choosing from two cultures has 
been given different names, such as strategic assimilation, selective acculturation, or 
accommodation without assimilation.180 No two processes are identical, but all involve 
some mixture between two cultures, and minorities of all kinds follow some version 
180 See Dhingra 2007, Pak 2006, Lacy 2004, Gibson 1988. 
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thereof. 
Minority groups, not exclusive to ethnic minority groups, often have two 
theoretically conflicting desires—to be recognized for their difference, as well as to be 
treated the same as everyone else. The former assumes a special or privileged status and 
the latter advocates an equal-opportunity approach. Instead of choosing one or the other 
consistently, ordinary individuals usually end up with some form of mix between the two. 
It was ironic but not surprising to hear informants say, “We’re Korean, we don’t do that!” 
just to say a few minutes later, “We live in America, we can’t do that!” At times it 
seemed as though Korean Americans chose at their convenience when to be Korean and 
when to be American. For instance, my informant David said, “I’m Korean, so they know 
I’m going to work hard,” when moments ago he had said, “People look at me weird or 
assume I’m Chinese—why can’t I just be American?” When it suited them to be Korean, 
they were Korean, and when it suited them to be American, they were American—which 
seemed to present no real conflict for Korean Americans. In fact, my informants had a 
good-natured attitude about their picking and choosing from the two cultures. Pastor Dan, 
who recently became a dad, became more aware of the selective lifestyle he led as a 
Korean American. He referred to “weeding out some of the things that aren’t as valuable” 
from the Korean world, but “emphasizing what we do think are the strengths.” When 
asked what are some of the strengths of the Korean world, Pastor Dan answered, “Things 
like family, or respecting folks who are older than you, things like that. Thinking of 
others before yourself—not that that’s Americans don’t do that, but it’s different.” 
Pastor Tim, who is the head of a church where the majority of the members are 
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Korean American, held a similar goal of balancing, but for his congregation.181 He said, 
“For me, it was always U.S.A. But now, I’m beginning to embrace a little more Korean 
and trying to understand. But America is my country and I want to embrace the good 
things about the U.S. culture. I want to instill that to the next generation of Korean 
Americans, in a, of course, biblical way. So we need that perfect blend, because we live 
in a country that we weren’t born in, but is now our country.”  
In nearly every interview, my informants talked about “balance”—whether it be 
between Korea and America, or the old and new. And in nearly every interview, my 
informants referred to an identity other than an ethnic one. Perhaps after an hour of 
talking about being Korean, even the most ethnic-conscious informants simply wanted to 
talk about something else. Whatever the reason, most informants insisted, “I’m Korean, 
but that’s not all there is to me.” 
After about halfway through the interview with Joyce, I said, “So, your social 
circles and the people you see regularly are Korean?” to which she responded, “No, 
they’re all Christian. I don’t really look for Korean friends, but I look for Christian 
friends.” If Joyce was the only informant who insisted as such, I may have overlooked 
the significance of the non-ethnic identity. However, the pattern resurfaced in nearly 
every interview—Korean Americans who have Korean-only social circles explicitly 
maintained, “They’re all Korean, but they’re also”—Christians, photographers, mothers, 
Ravens fans, students, coffee drinkers. 
Bora, an informant who, like Joyce, was very “plugged in” (her words) to the 
Korean community, disapproved of some of the actions taken by Korean Americans, 
181 Pastor Tim is a 46-year-old 1.5er. 
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when done in the name of the Korean community.182 When I asked her about the Seung-
hui Cho incident, she said, 
The whole vibe of how the Korean community was, they were just kind of 
apologetic towards the victims. I think that just portrays like a wrong message, 
that we’re still, even though second and third generation are growing up in the 
States, that we’re still sort of seeing ourselves as “I’m Korean.” I think 
individually, it’s good to have that sense of background, who you are as a Korean. 
But as a community, how you handle things, it should be dealt little bit 
differently... It’s like “This happened, he was Korean, we have to say something, 
let’s get together, sorry.”
Bora didn’t use the exact words, but all informants seemed to agree that not everything is 
about ethnicity, and not everything Koreans do have to do with their ethnicity. For 
Pastors of Korean churches, the distinction was sometimes blurred in practice, but in 
interviews, they prioritized the other identity, namely Christianity, over ethnicity. Pastor 
Rubin said, “I’m proud of being Korean American, but I always tell myself I’m a 
Christian first. I’m a Christian, I’m Korean, and I’m American.” 
Insistence on identities in addition to the ethnic one may be interpreted as Korean 
Americans’ way of staying within their ethnic circle without having to admit it. As strong 
as their connection to the ethnic community may be, they don’t want to appear 
ethnocentric or racist, though evidently not enough to actively bridge out of it. To be 
sure, Korean Americans, as a collective, have not yet bridged out of their ethnic circles, 
or actively sought out racially integrated spaces. If the goal is racial integration in 
primary relationships, Korean Americans have a long way to go. If the goal, however, is 
active participation in a community, they are already there. Recalling Rosenblum’s 
emphasis on identities-by-choice, the claim I’ve attempted to make in this chapter is that 
182 Bora is a 28-year-old 1.5er. 
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Korean Americans are able to voluntarily choose more identities, once they have found a 
level of comfort with their ethnic identity—at which point Korean Americans may be 
more willing and able to bridge out of their ethnic communities, to bond over a 
commonality with those not of the same ethnicity. Would that be bonding or bridging? It 
does not matter. 
In Putnam’s most recent work, American Grace, he introduces a Catholic parish 
located in Chicago that is apparently “diverse,” but is actually more like two churches in 
one—the Spanish-speaking congregation and the English-speaking one.183 Each group 
has its own services, bulletins, activities, programs, small groups, and even leaders. The 
two hardly have any interaction, but they use the same space, though at different times. 
An outsider may call this parish “diverse,” noting the racial make-up of the two 
congregations put together. What may seem diverse and an instance of bridging, 
however, does not necessarily indicate meaningful connections over differences. And 
likewise, what may seem like bonding does not necessarily indicate connections over 
commonalities alone, if we allow for the numerous identities individuals adopt for 
themselves. As homogeneous as the Korean community may appear, there are deep 
divisions within, that call for a bridging of a different nature, a bridging within, which is 
one more thing that takes priority before bridging out to other ethnic groups. We now 
turn to the concluding chapter, emphasizing the need for a bridging within the Korean 
community. 




“If anyone does not know how to manage his own family, how can he take care of God’s 
church?” (1 Timothy 3:5. New International Version) 
As Kibria and Danico have argued in their respective works on Korean 
Americans, the Korean American identity is one that is continuously “becoming.”184 The 
1.5 and second generations have yet to (if they ever will) construct a common identity 
that defines and marks the group. They have also not yet grown into old age as a group, 
nor has a significant part of the third generation grown into adulthood. The current 
situation of the Korean American population, bulk of the first generation growing into 
retirement and the second generation approaching middle-age, is one that has not yet 
been seen and will not repeat itself, making for an uncertain future—one that ethnic 
associations and communities will continue to play a crucial role in. In this concluding 
chapter, we turn to the patterns of divisions within this seemingly homogeneous 
community, and how the process of dealing with the divisions can heavily influence the 
future of this ethnic community. We will refer back to the relationship culture, and how it 
requires that bridging within their own ethnicity to be a greater priority than bridging out 
to “other” groups. Here, a special notice will be given to the 1.5 generation. 
184 Titles of the two works Kibria 2002 and Danico 2004, respectively, are Becoming Asian American and 
The 1.5 Generation: Becoming Korean American in Hawai’i. 
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Bridging Within
Every Sunday, members of Bethel Korean Presbyterian Church head to worship. 
Four economy-sized vans pick up members from Ellicott City to Baltimore, and parking 
attendants busily direct traffic in the small parking lot, as Koreans of all ages make way 
to the same building throughout the day. They are not, however, all going to worship 
together. Bethel offers five worship services on any given Sunday.  
 Bethel did not always offer five Sunday services, as churches in their beginnings 
rarely have the resources to do so. Bethel opened its doors in 1979, and after a few years 
of initial settling, began by providing three Sunday services—two Korean services for 
adults, and one English service for the youth. The Korean services were predominantly 
attended by first generation immigrants, and the English service by their children, who 
were, by far, more comfortable with English, and not quite adults yet. At this point, all 
church members fell into one of two groups—Korean speaking adults or English 
speaking youth. 
As the youth grew up, however, English-speaking Korean Americans became too 
old to attend youth service, but lacked sufficient knowledge of Korean to attend the adult 
service. As a result, Bethel created another service for this third group—an English 
service for young adults, also known as the English Ministry. Soon after, Bethel 
continued to grew in size and popularity, and as the region attracted more Korean 
immigrants each year, a fourth group appeared at Bethel—Korean-speaking young adults, 
consisting of international students from Korea and those who immigrated in their late 
teens or older, creating the need for yet another service. As a result, there are now four 
major groups at Bethel—Korean speaking adults (two services), Korean speaking young 
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adults, English speaking young adults, and English speaking youth. (There are not (yet) 
older adults who prefer English, nor youth who prefer Korean.) To be sure, there are 
individuals who are capable of fitting into more than one group—many Korean American 
young adults are bilingual and would have no problem attending any service. However, 
once they become a part of one group they tend to stick to it. 
Each group has its own leaders, and the four groups have hardly any interaction 
with one another. In fact, the English Ministry, the English-speaking young adults’ group, 
is essentially its own church, with its own name, leadership, budget, and agenda.185 When 
asked about the separate groups within one church, the members are not too worried, if 
they even notice. After all, “That’s how all the churches do it,” as several informants put 
it, and they are right—Bethel’s structure is quite typical of the “successful” Korean 
American church. The leaders show slightly more concern, but even they provide 
justifications for the separation. Pastor Rubin, from Chapter One, is the leader of the 
Korean-speaking young adult group, who he describes up as “the 1.5 group.” He said, 
“There’s no interaction between the 1.5 and the English Ministry. It’s not the best set-up, 
but they can’t mesh. Not only the language barrier, but their interests, hobbies, lifestyles, 
what they talk about—they clash.” Like most leaders, Pastor Rubin thinks more about his 
group, and the harmony within, than how well the group interacts with others. The 
separation in this case, however, is somewhat ironic and perhaps surprising, precisely 
because all of the members are Korean and in the same age group. One informant, a 
member of Bethel, even thought the creation of this group was superfluous. Can 
individuals’ time of immigration really create such a difference? 
185 During the time of my writing, the leader of the English-speaking young adults’ group left Bethel and 
set up its own  church, and the majority of the members left with him. Bethel has yet to find a 
replacement for the English Ministry leader, but the services continue with a rotation of speakers. 
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For Bethel, the answer is yes, and there is reason to believe that the phenomenon 
is more pronounced for Korean Americans than other immigrant groups. As we discussed 
in Chapter Four, the economic and industrial growth of Korea, along with the constant 
upgrade and acceleration in technology and the mode of communication, have had a 
significant impact on the cultural and social aspects of Korean society. According to 
Nam-Joon, a Korean male in his twenties who is in America to study, the rate of change 
in Korea is increasingly speeding up. He said, in Korean, “It used to be that a generation 
would pass every eleven years. Now it’s every eight years, and it’s going to get shorter. 
That means in the near future, someone just a few years younger or older is going to be 
considered a different generation—with their own culture, values, personality, likes and 
dislikes.” Though the phenomenon described by Nam-Joon is not as easily noticed by 
Korean Americans, they certainly notice that the more recent immigrants are “different.” 
As referenced in Chapter Four, the 1.5/second generation often take a critical tone 
towards Koreans who recently immigrated. Jenny, who immigrated over twenty years 
ago, said, “Koreans who came, after Korea got rich, they’re different. They raise their 
kids differently, they don’t know the meaning of hard work, and they take things for 
granted. Oh, and, they’re too proud to be Korean. [What do you mean?] We like America
—not all things, but we at least see America as home. But they try to bring all of Korea to 
America, and they judge.” (Never mind the fact that Jenny sounds pretty judgmental 
herself.) Jenny’s criticism was echoed in other informants, and is a pretty well-known 
phenomenon among Korean Americans. It is not quite hostility, but a prejudice placed by 
one group of Koreans on another, that keeps them in their own respective camps, merely 
as a result of the timing difference in immigration. 
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We may be familiar with minorities’ different approaches to assimilation and their 
segregation from society at large. What we may not be familiar with is the effects of the 
different assimilation tendencies, particularly, the effects they have on the inner-workings 
of a homogeneous community, and the ripple-like effect on their attitudes toward each 
other and the world outside of their community, as a result of the divisions within. For 
Korean Americans, as judgmental as they sound, concern with the inside seems to trump 
concern with the outside. For them, bridging within, connecting with fellow Korean 
Americans, is a more urgent and pressing matter than bridging with-out, with non-
Koreans. 
Too busy to bridge with others?
Based on with whom they spend their time, my informants may seem anti-
integration. Based on their insistence on identites beyond their ethnicity, however, they 
may seem nonchalant or ambivalent about ethnicity. Furthermore, my informants did not 
strongly affirm nor deny questions of integration, ethnocentrism, or racism, which when 
put together with previous observations, may be interpreted as an indifference or 
disregard for matters of ethnicity in general. However, my informants, Korean Americans 
who consider themselves a part of the Korean community, have quite strong feelings 
about fellow Koreans as well as about the matters of race/ethnicity in their everyday 
lives. What the outsiders may not easily see is that Korean Americans’ focus is usually on 
each other and the relationships they have within their ethnic community, prior to 
individuals in other ethnic groups. And here we return to the relationship culture. 
A pattern emerged with my informants, one that was not obvious at first. 
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Compared to discussions about non-Koreans, whether personal acquaintances or 
Americans in the abstract sense, my informants were much more energetic, enthusiastic 
and expressive when the topic turned to fellow Korean Americans. Whether expressing 
approval, disapproval, or a simple observation, when referring to fellow Koreans, they 
displayed heightened emotions, using facial expressions, head nodding/shaking, tone of 
voice, etc. Pressing this further in interviews, I found that Korean Americans feel more 
strongly about fellow Korean Americans, or “themselves,” or more specifically, that they 
feel the need to take care of “themselves” as a greater priority than the need to bridge 
with other ethnic groups. 
Many Korean Americans I met held a contempt for those whose personal lives are 
in shambles, no matter how successful they were in another sense. There is a definite 
order of priorities that Korean Americans seem to agree on, and it absolutely begins in 
the home, in the most intimate of relationships. The majority of my informants seemed to 
believe that if things in the home are not right, then any successes outside of the home are 
not worth it—or that they are not really successes. And the home tended to include fellow 
Korean Americans before others. Bora, though she criticized the Korean community on 
many counts (Chapter Four), talked about her change in shopping habits since the 
recession began. She had made the conscious decision to buy, when possible, from not 
only local businesses but local businesses owned by Koreans. She said, “Instead of going 
to eat at a chain restaurant, I’ll go to the Lotte food court. These Korean places only cater 
to Koreans, so we have to help each other out.” Jenny, an elementary school teacher, 
began a monthly informal meeting with the mothers of Korean students, remembering 
how difficult it was for her parents when they first immigrated. She said, “I would have 
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loved to have a Korean teacher, and my mom would have, too. It’s so hard for them, and 
this is something I feel like I need to and should do.” They are do-gooders, but 
predominantly for those included in their idea of “we.” Does this make them against 
integration? 
Pastor Dan, relying on a biblical rationale, also discussed the importance of 
“keeping our homes straight before reaching out to others,” referring to himself and his 
church as an example. He said, 
I have people praying for this, that we keep the right order of priorities. As good 
as planting a church and doing the work of the gospel, it can become a horrible 
idol. And the cases of marital strife in church planters, it’s horrendous. I 
constantly ask people to pray that priority will be God first, then my wife, even 
before kids, then church after that. If that priority’s not right, the church is just 
going to be a mistress. [And that’s biblical, right?] Oh, it’s very biblical. You 
can’t be an elder if you don’t have good kids. How can you shepherd a church if 
you can’t even shepherd your family? 
Though Pastor Dan is referring to his church which is mostly non-Korean, the same 
rationale of “How can you take care of others if you can’t take care of yourselves?” was 
echoed in the way he prioritizes the different elements of his life. 
The question at this point, which I do not have the answer to, is about the future—
how long are Korean Americans going to reach out exclusively to the Korean 
community? When will non-Koreans become a part of the “we”? There is no clear 
answer, at least not yet. Even Korean Americans who are critical of Koreans’ tendency to 
stay within the ethnic community show no real signs in their everyday lives of making a 
bridge outside of the ethnic circle. For instance, with a tone of disapproval, Emily said, “I 
look at the Korean community, and  when someone outstanding comes out of the Korean 
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community it’s just the Korean community that’s proud of you. And it’s like, ‘How long 
are you going to stay relegated to your own people?’ You know? There’s a bigger world. 
And if you have gifts and talents that are going to benefit people, why are you just doing 
it for this community?” And yet Emily herself attends a Korean church, works for a 
Korean counseling center that only deals with Korean Americans, and intentionally keeps 
her white and Korean friends separate, believing “they won’t mesh.” I am not suggesting 
that Emily is hypocritical, or that she does not mean what she says. Bridging out, 
however, is easier said than done, especially when there is bridging to be done within. 
Generativity
Bridging the gap between generations was a special concern for many informants, 
and a topic that came up often in interviews. This refers to not only bridging the gap 
between age groups, which is not a concern unique to the Korean community, but 
between the Korean-speaking first generation, many of whom are well into their fifties or 
older, and the English-speaking second generation, who are now young adults. Because 
the two groups have so many clashes, not only in age and language but also values and 
lifestyles, divisions along this line are common in Korean churches, organizations, and 
even homes. And though Korean Americans create these conditions themselves, whether 
intentionally or accidentally, they are not always happy with the results of the separation. 
Many informants were concerned with the increasing space between the two generations, 
and were taking active steps to bridge it. 
The first generation is largely excluded from this work, but as the second 
generation is getting married and having children, they are becoming more aware of the 
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gap that exists between themselves and their parents, with an increased sense of urgency 
to bridge that gap. Many of the first generation Koreans, who “worked so hard for us” 
according to nearly informant, have rather distant relationships with their grandchildren, 
which was not satisfying to any of the parties involved. Furthermore, going beyond their 
own family, many informants made painful observations of young Korean Americans 
today who have fragile relationships with their parents, mostly due to language barriers, 
which tended to also lead to lack of communication, understanding, and time spent 
together—basic things necessary for a healthy relationship. A few informants also 
observed Korean Americans who married non-Koreans, and the tendency in those 
couples to not be as close to the extended families—resulting in the informants’ 
preference to marry Korean not simply on account of racism or opposition to non-
Koreans, but rather, because they had seen the difficulties that the presence of a non-
Korean spouse posed on the extended family. Again, bridging gaps is easier said than 
done, but for the second generation, upon seeing the far-reaching results of the distance 
between the first and second generations, they seemed to hold a priority for generativity 
in their care for “each other.” 
Broadly defined, sociologist Erik Erikson sees generativity as the care that one 
generation gives to the next.186 While beginning with a basic form, from parents to 
children, Erikson extends the virtue of generativity to all places of society, claiming a 
general responsibility on all to those who come after them. Wanting to pass down values 
and priorities from one generation to the next is common enough in groups of all kinds, 
and an ethnic group is no exception—generativity within an ethnic group must not be 
reduced to merely preserving/passing the ethnic identity. Like the “communities of 
186 Erikson 1982. 
174
memory” discussed in Habits of the Heart, the Korean community has a history, but it 
also turns toward the future with hope. And part of that hope is to preserve the 
community itself—maintain it, nurture it, improve it, for the future generations. For 
Korean Americans, this sort of desire for generativity is often highlighted in the church. 
More Korean Americans are increasingly realizing the costs of the separation between 
generations, not only in their families but also in their churches—which for many 
informants, is one and the same.187
During the period of my research, I had a visit from a Korean pastor, an old 
family friend, who was spending a few years as a vsiting pastor at a Korean American 
church in Virginia. He was spending most of his time with first generation Korean 
American pastors who had served the Korean immigrant church for decades. Naturally, 
our conversations revolved around the church. To my surprise, he said, “All of the 
pastors acknowledge one area of failure, and that’s the second generation, the whole 
English Ministry structure. [A failure?] A failure. We failed them. The second generation, 
we set them up in the church to go their own separate way, not to grow up and take our 
place. They all leave eventually. I haven’t seen one church where they bring the two 
generations together well.” How accurate his statement is, especially the last part, I’m not 
sure. Generativity, however, is increasingly becoming a priority among Korean 
Americans, upon reflection of past decisions’ long-term consequences. I am not sure if it 
is too late—after all, just because generativity is now a priority, that does not guarantee 
anything will or can be done about it. 
At the time, I was preparing a lecture on Putnam’s Bowling Alone for my intro-
187 Other than the fact that the church is a staple of the Korean community, religious associations in general 
have long been recognized as an appropriate place to instill and practice the virtue of generativity. See 
Bellah 1991, 279-283. 
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level undergraduate course, and the idea of generativity was fresh in my mind. According 
to Putnam, one of the two main reasons for the decline of community since the 1960s is 
“generational shift”—an engaged generation is being replaced by a not-so-engaged 
generation. The civic virtues and habits of participating in one’s community that defined 
one generation did not get passed down. Putnam does not go so far as to place moral 
responsibility on any one group or generation for the shift, but logically speaking, no 
group (or community, church, association, etc.) will last if there is no generativity. 
Though this is a common issue for groups of all kinds, immigrant communities are 
especially sensitive to generativity, because there is a small and exclusive group of 
individuals who even have the capacity to take the place of the old generation. 
Furthermore, second generation Korean Americans are in a completely different place 
than their parents were, and their children will be in yet another place. 
Some churches put more effort into generativity, though the rate of success is 
another story. Brooke attends a small Korean church where the pastor’s explicit goal and 
mission is to bring together the older and younger groups of Korean Americans. Brooke 
frowned and said, “But strangely at my church there’s old people, senior citizens, and 
then young people in their twenties, and no in-between.” These two groups hardly 
interact—“I eensa (greet them), but we don’t have service together. Ours is at a different 
time, and in English.” Clearly, not the ideal picture of the pastor’s vision, but a familiar 
picture of the separation within a Korean church. 
Nathan is a member of Hope Chapel, the English Ministry of Baltimore Korean 
Presbyterian Church, with a congregation of mostly second-generation young-adult 
Korean Americans. At the present time, members of Hope Chapel have no plans to one 
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day become members Baltimore Korean Presbyterian Church, nor does Hope Chapel 
have plans to become its own autonomous church. According to Nathan, the two groups 
differ in their approach to church, in addition to the language difference. Nathan said, 
“Our generation is just comfortable. Our parents worked those long hours and still they 
made time for early rise service, Wednesday night service, made sure we went to church, 
youth group, all the retreats. We don’t do that. We want our service to end at a certain 
time and we want to eat and then go home. And then we want to watch our big screen 
TVs.” He chuckled, shook his head, and continued. “Our parents went through what they 
went through so we can live better. But living better, I don’t know if it’s really helped us. 
I think we’re struggling more because of that.” The goal is not necessarily worshipping 
together, but it seems that the separation between the two ministries is reflective of an 
indifferent attitude towards future generations. Even within Hope Chapel, Nathan felt 
there was not enough care that one generation is giving another. He continued, “I think 
mentoring is a key thing that should be happening in the church, starting with myself and 
the rest of us older guys, we should be willing to mentor. Some of these younger guys are 
in serious relationships, and not that our relationships are perfect, but to still provide 
guidance and to still have someone to talk to, you know, that should be there.” 
Brooke or Nathan did not have immediate plans to put generativity into action, 
but awareness and recognition of the need are the first steps. And for Korean Americans, 
the church is a good a place as any to put these bridging ideas into action. 
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The 1.5 Generation
Though I made no significant distinction between the second and 1.5 generation 
throughout this work, a special note regarding 1.5ers is in order. As a group that, by 
definition, is between or a mix of two groups on many levels, 1.5ers have a special role in 
the task of bridging the gap, more specifically, bridging the gaps within the Korean 
community. Here, I want to highlight a few notable examples of 1.5 informants who did 
more than merely talk about bridging, and put meaningful bridging between generations 
into action. 
Jenny—KPTA
As briefly mentioned above, Jenny began at her elementary school what she calls 
the Korean Moms’ Meeting, but is more formally known in other schools as the KPTA—
Korean Parent Teacher Association. When Jenny became a teacher Howard County, she 
realized how unreachable the non-English-speaking parents are. She said, “I had some 
students who recently came from India and Pakistan, and I would dread anything that 
would come up that would require me to communicate with their parents.” Like many 
teachers and staff, Jenny was initially frustrated at parents’ ignorance of English, but 
Jenny soon realized how frustrating it must be for the parents as well, if not more. She 
continued, “When I first came to America, I was ten, and my parents couldn’t read any of 
the letters from school, or take their phone calls, and we had to translate everything for 
them. But some of these kids, they don’t speak English that well either, so it’s tough. But 
it’s important, because the kids who don’t have parent involvement in their school stuff, 
they have a harder time. And it’s not that parents don’t want to be involved, they just 
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can’t.” 
Even before Jenny began the KPTA at her school, teachers would often ask her 
for translation help with the Korean students and their parents. “We don’t even have that 
many Korean kids, but at least once a week, some teacher will ask me to call a parent to 
ask for a permission slip, or tell them about a project, or something. So I knew most of 
the Korean parents before we began the official meetings.” Translating was not a problem 
for Jenny, who is perfectly bilingual. Her Korean suffered a bit when she was a teenager, 
but she quickly relearned it in college, mostly as a result of attending a school where 
there was a large group of Korean international students. “I didn’t intend to get so into 
the Korean scene, but I’m glad I did. I love the language. There are things I can say in 
Korean that just doesn’t work in English.” 
KPTA was Jenny’s idea, one which her principal, the teachers, and the moms 
were thrilled about. Once a month, before the school day begins, five or six Korean 
moms gather in Jenny’s classroom. They eat breakfast, drink coffee, and they talk. “We 
talk about all kinds of things. Last time, we talked about some of the difference in signs, 
and what they mean. [Signs?] Yeah, so for Koreans, when an adult is talking to you or 
scolding you, it’s rude to look at them in the eyes. But for Americans, it’s rude to not 
look at them. They say, ‘Look at me when I’m talking to you.’ The moms thought this 
was so weird. They were like, ‘Why would you look at them? Shouldn’t you show you’re 
sorry?’ It’s subtle things like that, difference in communication. They just don’t know, 
and it’s not their fault.” 
According to Jenny, the meetings not only make it easier for the school to 
communicate with the parents, but it also significantly improves the students’ situations
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—at school and at home. Jenny said, “I remember, when I was a kid, I would take 
advantage of the fact that my teachers and my mom don’t talk to each other. And maybe 
not all kids do that, but either way, kids do much better in school when they know that 
their parents and teachers talk. And it makes communication between the kids and the 
parents better too, because the parents can ask specifically about what’s going on in 
school, because they know about it. Usually it’s just ‘How’s school?’ ‘Good.’ This way, 
they can do more than that.” 
Jenny and her experience with the KPTA is an example of not only the cultural 
bridge that is taking place between Koreans and Americans, but also the generational 
bridge, between the first and second generations of Korean Americans. To be sure, the 
more explicit purpose of the KPTA is the former. However, the by-product of these 
meetings is a remedy for a mistake that was made collectively by the first generation for 
decades—leaving their kids alone while they go work, and having little to talk about 
when they come home. Young-adult Korean Americans, like Jenny, are learning from 
past experiences, and putting their time and skill to fulfilling a need in the effort of 
generational bridging. What makes 1.5ers like Jenny vital here is that they have the skill 
and understanding of the different parties involved, that they are able, as well as willing, 
to serve as a bridge. Plenty of Korean Americans feel the need for such bridging, but lack 
sufficient knowledge of Korean language or customs to do what Jenny is doing. Jenny 
doesn’t consider herself a hero, but she is pleased the moms are happy with it. She said, 
“It makes the kids better. And it’s not that hard for me, so I might as well. I enjoy it, and I 
think something like this is really necessary.” 
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Emily—KAFCC
Emily works as one of the two main counselors for a non-profit organization in 
Virginia, called the Korean American Family Counseling Center (KAFCC). Emily is the 
primary counselor for children and adolescents, who are usually second generation, while 
the older and mostly first generation Korean Americans are assigned to the other 
counselor. “I enjoy working with the kids,” Emily said. “It’s not always about the culture 
clash, but a lot of the kids’ problems have to do with their parents.” 
Traditionally taboo in the Korean culture, counseling is becoming more 
acceptable in the Korean community, especially since the Virginia Tech shooting. 
According to Emily, the incident was a wake-up call for many Korean Americans, and a 
push to get help as opposed to making the situation worse in order to save face. Emily 
usually talks to the kids, but not their parents, claiming that though the source of the 
problem at hand may largely rest on the parents, the course of action for a solution often 
cannot. “We can’t fault the parents,” she said. “Parents are doing the best they can with 
what they know and what they grew up with, in a system that worked for them in Korea.” 
Oftentimes, problems arise because the parents can’t change. “It’s too ingrained for the 
parents,” Emily continued, and therefore, “It gets put on the kids.” Emily’s time is mostly 
spent trying to help the kids understand, and “get over the parents.” I asked, “Is that 
okay? For the kids to take the brunt of it?” Emily responded, 
No, it’s not okay. You know, though, I find that kids already figured that out to a 
certain extent. And they just need help getting over the parent thing. They pretty 
much figured out their parents aren’t going to change. They know that much. So 
what we do is help them work around their parents, to accept and embrace their 
parents for who they are and be thankful that they’re doing the best they can in 
providing for you. And you need to figure out how to live your life… [Would you 
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say you had to do that too?] I think every Korean kid has to do that—find a way 
to live your life without going crazy. And there’s usually resistance form 
parents…
Though Emily considered KAFCC more of a stepping stone than a permanent 
place for her career, her role there was crucial. Though the literature and industry for 
counseling minority groups are continuing to grow,188 there are currently only a handful 
of Korean Americans who have the professional qualifications to counsel, as well as the 
bicultural sense of identity and awareness it takes to understand and successfully give 
appropriate counsel to Korean American youth in their unique situation. Counselors who 
are not familiar with the Korean culture or with Korean Americans’ lifestyles and 
struggles would have much greater difficulty finding solutions to the kids’ problems. In 
fact, from a Western point of view, the blame would mostly go to the parents, and in a 
very serious way. Emily recalled many patients who came to KAFCC after 
unsuccessfully having gone to an American counselor first. She said, “There’s so many 
things, just the way Korean culture is structured, where if you were to present the family 
background to a white therapist, immediately, bells would go off, everything is 
unhealthy. So a white therapist would start addressing all the wrong issues first, instead 
of the issue that they came to get addressed. And then it’s tedious for the minority to have 
to explain.” 
Emily firmly believed that the Korean American youth are in need of counselors 
like her and counseling centers like KAFCC, who understand what the youth are going 
through and provide a space for the youth to be heard, especially given that parents at 
home are often unable to do either. Emily is less of a bridge between the Korean and 
188 See the following works, which specifically focus on therapy, counseling, and mental health of Korean 
Americans: Pak 2006, Yoon 2004 (Ed. Kim), Uba 1994, Chin et al 1994. 
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American but more explicitly a bridge between the two Korean generations, which is the 
other way around from Jenny’s role in the KPTA. But like Jenny, Emily is making a 
valuable contribution to the Korean community, in that she is part of mending the gap 
between two generations, which has been neglected and only widening since Koreans’ 
first major wave of immigration. 
Pastor Tim—New Life Church
Pastor Tim Oh is the head of New Life Church, where the congregation is 
predominantly English-speaking Korean Americans. Only four-years-old, New Life holds 
Sunday services at a public elementary school in Columbia, Maryland. Pastor Tim is 
forty-six years old, happily married with three kids, and a self-proclaimed 1.5er. Before 
he became the head pastor at New Life, he was the pastor of the English Ministry at a 
well-known Korean church. Then and now, Pastor Tim’s vision of a church has always 
been, what he calls, the family worship. 
The family worship is not typical in a Korean American church. As worship 
begins, about a dozen small children gather near the pulpit, as Pastor Tim sits with them 
on the floor. He proceeds to give the short kids’ version of that day’s sermon, after which 
they are dismissed to Sunday School classes. Then the full version of the sermon begins, 
with all other members sitting in the congregation—mostly young adults in their thirties 
and forties, with several teenagers and college students, all amounting to around fifty 
people. 
Compared to Bethel, or most Korean American churches in the region, the family 
worship is unconventional. And because the structure is unlike anything most Korean 
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Americans are used to, according to Pastor Tim, there are occasional complaints. He said, 
“My congregation members sometimes hate it. And the reason for that is they’re so 
accustomed to the Korean culture church, which is to separate. And they want quiet 
worship, they don’t want the children. I said no. That’s not church.” 
With the family worship, Pastor Tim is looking to the future, while criticizing the 
way Korean churches have operated in the past. He said, “The first generation, what the 
church has done, they gave their all, the best they could. But they really did not train the 
younger generation up to become adult Christians in a church. What they have done is 
basically give them money, money, money, to just have activities and have fun. And I see 
people coming back as grownups, age-wise, with children, and I ask them to do church. 
They don’t know how. They’ve never experienced it, they don’t know what leadership is, 
and they have come to understand that when they go to church that there should be 
services available to them. And I don’t blame or fault them.” 
The language barrier, which is the primary justification for separation in most 
ethnic churches, has evidently bred the kind of separation that makes generativity in a 
church impossible. Pastor Tim’s reference to the younger generation’s “inability to do 
church” is similar to the “failure of the English Ministry” mentioned by the visiting 
pastor. And while acknowledgment of the past mistakes is common, what each can and 
will do about it is not. Pastor Tim continued, “I am praying that there will be more 
churches like New Life Church where 1.5 and second generation pastors can endure and 
persevere so that even though the size may be small for the next twenty to thirty years, 
that they can persevere as leaders and teach young people that we need to do church as 
our parents did.” Likening the responsibility of New Life Church members to “owning 
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your own place as opposed to living at home,” Pastor Tim looks forward to the second 
generation of Korean Americans maturing, though not without worry. “Will the English-
speaking group ever become mature, and become elders, so that they can sit together with 
the Korean elders and govern and rule that one body of Christ? At the moment, it’s not 
there. To get to that maturity level, it’s hard. It’s really hard.” 
Even without a major language barrier, the family worship is not for all churches
—age groups are often separated in a church, and with good reason. Teenagers and senior 
citizens have little in common, and some sermons will be appropriate for one and not the 
other. Likewise, in New Life, where middle-school-students and 40-year-olds alike are 
worshipping together, Pastor Tim admits to the challenges of giving sermons appropriate 
for all. However, for Korean American churches, where decades of separation has 
produced harmful long-term effects, Pastor Tim believes the remedy is something like the 
family worship, which makes no excuses for unnecessary separation, even with the new 
inconveniences. And like Jenny and Emily, Pastor Tim’s life experience as the 1.5er 
gives him an advantage, or a calling, as he sees it, to serve the generations that are not 
quite ready to leave the ethnically homogeneous church but lack the training to serve the 
church alongside the first generation. 
The 1.5 generation did not quite choose to become what they are—bilingual and 
bicultural, easily fitting in two worlds. Nor are the 1.5ers responsible for the generational 
gaps that exist in the Korean community. Many of them do, however, choose to use their 
skills and assets, inadvertently creating a small bridge between generations. They are 
both willing and able to mend fragile relationships, recognizing the need for a bridging 
within. It is such individuals who keep the sense of community alive for the future, which 
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depends on generativity. 
Summing up
There are many Korean Americans I met, and even more I have not met, who are 
and will continue to be the movers and shapers of the Korean American community. And 
as I finish this work, the Korean American in me feels a tinge of guilt, as though I have 
aired out the dirty laundry of my family members. The researcher in me, however, is 
excited, as this work has raised important findings and questions for future research. 
The main argument of this work is twofold: one, the Korean community is 
composed of individuals who define themselves and one another in terms of 
relationships, making their relationships more obligatory and “normal” as opposed to 
contractual; two, members of the Korean community at this point in time are not well-
integrated into the American civil society, but are certainly not in danger of becoming 
isolaled individuals or losing their community. I would like to argue that the relationship 
culture and a vibrant civil society is compatible, and that a homogeneous ethnic 
community need not be a problem for a healthy American civil society—and it seems 
there is some evidence of that today, particularly with the ease with which many Korean 
Americans, especially the 1.5, flow in and out of their Korean and American worlds. 
However, the evidence is admittedly weak, and because this research is based on a point 
in time that we have not yet seen nor will see in the future from Korean Americans, much 
of the more important and interesting patterns are yet to be seen. 
The Korean community shows no signs of fading or losing its significance, but it 
is still quite young. As I review the interviews with my informants, I notice an underlying 
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assumption (by both my informants and me), that Korean Americans, the second 
generation of today, need and want the Korean community, whereas the first generation 
created the Korean community more as a result of immediate need than long-term desire. 
That being said, we have yet to see an emergence of a third generation, and there is no 
telling what their attitudes/approaches will be to their ethnic identity or their ethnic 
community, and if a vibrant community will even exist. What we do know is that there is 
a lot riding on the second/1.5 generation—if, over time, they identify less with their 
Korean identity and are less involved with their Korean churches, associations, and 
families, and their views translate in the way they raise their children, the third generation 
will not have much of an ethnic community to participate in, whether they want to or not. 
Though the existence of ethnic communities may, in fact, provide more 
opportunities for ethnic segregation, I am inclined to believe that such phenomenon need 
not worry us. As emphasized in Chapter Four, I am confident that the existence of the 
Korean community does not contribute to Koreans’ racism or hostility towards other 
racial/ethnic groups, and because my research has persuaded me that there is so much 
more that sustains the Korean community than affirmation and protection of the Korean 
identity, it is my conclusion that ethnic communities are not in themselves a hindrance to 
a harmonious diverse society, but rather, that ethnic communities provide a place for 
citizens to build and maintain their relationships and communities, ultimately preventing 
those members from becoming a part of the isolated citizenry, and possibly contributing 




Twenty-five Korean Americans were interviewed for this research. The criteria 
for my sample was: 1.5 or second generation Korean American, at least twenty-five years 
old, some participation in the past or current in an ethnic association and/or identify 
oneself as a member of the Korean community. Eleven informants were second 
generation and fourteen were 1.5; thirteen were male and twelve were female. Fifteen 
were in their upper twenties, eight in their thirties, and two in their forties. Six informants 
requested that I use pseudonyms; for al other their real names were used. All informants 
were, at the time of the interview, residing in the Washington metropolitan area. All 
interviews took place either in a home, office, or coffee shop, and were recorded then 
trascribed. 
Though most of the interview questions were follow-up questions specific to the 
informant, the general questions I asked all informants were as follows: 
• When did you (or your parents) come to America? What was your childhood like? 
• What is your current daily/weekly routine like? Who do you interact with the most? 
What is the ethnic/racial breakdown of your social/professional environment? How 
do you feel about that? 
• What associations or communities, ethnic or non, have you participated in? (Would 
you like to?) What is the structure of those associations like? What kinds of problems 
arise, and how do the members go about solving them? 
• Do you consider yourself a part of the Korean community? Do you think Korean 
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Americans are too segregated? 
• Do you actively seek more racial/ethnic integration in your life? How do you feel 
about Korean Americans who do or don’t? 
• What was your reaction to the Virginia Tech shooting? 
Participant observation
In addition to interviews, I joined three Bible study groups for the purpose of 
research. One was organized by a Korean church and was an on-going group, which I 
attended for a total of two months. The other two Bible study groups, which were multi-
ethnic, and organized informally by members of a non-ethnic church, lasted for three to 
four months, which I attended for the full duration. I visited a total of five Korean 
churches, once each, with the exception of Bethel, which I visited on several occasions. I 
also visited Jessica’s small group meeting once (Chapter 2), Emily’s counseling center 
several times (Chapters 4, 5), and Jenny’s KPTA meeting once (Chapter 5). 
In addition to the participation observation explicitly for the purpose of research, 
much of the material in the work was discovered on occasions that I did not necessarily 
intend as research—for instance, the church retreat where I was a volunteer (Chapter 1), 
the church where the hangul-hakgyo was conducted (Chapter 4), the birthday parties or 
casual social interactions that followed interviews, the visit from a family-friend pastor 
(Chapter 5), etc. Several individuals who were named were not formally interviewed, but 
were present in places I visited or was invited to—for instance, Mindy (Chapter 1), 
Jeannie (Chapter 2), David (Chapter 4), the visiting pastor from Korea (Chapter 5), etc. 
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